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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION
ENSEMBLE FUZZY BELIEF INTRUSION DETECTION DESIGN
by
Te-Shun Chou
Florida International University, 2007
Miami, Florida
Professor Kang K. Yen, Major Professor
With the rapid growth of the Internet, computer attacks are increasing at a fast pace and
can easily cause millions of dollar in damage to an organization. Detecting these attacks
is an important issue of computer security. There are many types of attacks and they fall
into four main categories, Denial of Service (DoS) attacks, Probe, User to Root (U2R)
attacks, and Remote to Local (R2L) attacks. Within these categories, DoS and Probe
attacks continuously show up with greater frequency in a short period of time when they
attack systems. They are different from the normal traffic data and can be easily
separated from normal activities. On the contrary, U2R and R2L attacks are embedded in
the data portions of the packets and normally involve only a single connection. It
becomes difficult to achieve satisfactory detection accuracy for detecting these two
attacks. Therefore, we focus on studying the ambiguity problem between normal
activities and U2R/R2L attacks. The goal is to build a detection system that can
accurately and quickly detect these two attacks.
In this dissertation, we design a two-phase intrusion detection approach. In the first
phase, a correlation-based feature selection algorithm is proposed to advance the speed of
detection. Features with poor prediction ability for the signatures of attacks and features
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inter-correlated with one or more other features are considered redundant. Such features
are removed and only indispensable information about the original feature space remains.
In the second phase, we develop an ensemble intrusion detection system to achieve
accurate detection performance. The proposed method includes multiple feature selecting
intrusion detectors and a data mining intrusion detector. The former ones consist of a set
of detectors, and each of them uses a fuzzy clustering technique and belief theory to solve
the ambiguity problem. The latter one applies data mining technique to automatically
extract computer users’ normal behavior from training network traffic data. The final
decision is a combination of the outputs of feature selecting and data mining detectors.
The experimental results indicate that our ensemble approach not only significantly
reduces the detection time but also effectively detect U2R and R2L attacks that contain
degrees of ambiguous information.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

With the rapid growth of Internet based technology, applications of computer networks
such as web service, file transfer, and voice IP are extensively used. In the meantime, the
networks inevitably become as the targets of computer attacks and the attacks can easily
cause millions of dollar damage to an organization. According to the annual report from
the Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT) [1], only 8 computer security
incidents were documented in 1988 but over 130,000 in 2003. Since 2004, CERT no
longer publishes the number of incidents because the attacks against Internet-connected
systems have become so commonplace. Not only are those attacks increasing in a fast
pace, they are also becoming more sophisticated with the advance of technology.
Consequently, to manage breaches of security has become an important issue for
nowadays network infrastructures and has become an irreplaceable element in modern
security systems. Today intrusion detection has caught researchers’ attention greater than
ever. Its development and improvement have been set with the highest priority by
academia, government, research institutes, and industrial corporations.
Intrusion detection is a technology developed to discover breaches of security, attempted
breaches, or open vulnerabilities that could lead to potential breaches [2]. An intrusion
detection system is a security management system for computers and networks. It
examines activities from computer users and identifies inappropriate, incorrect, or
anomalous activities within computers or networks. The possible attempts to breach the
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security could be either attacks from outside of the computer system or misuse conducts
from inside of the computer system [3]. The former aims at gaining access to penetrate
the system and the latter tries to exploit security vulnerabilities or mistreat their approved
privileges. While there are many types of attacks, they fall into four main classes.
•

Denial of Service (DoS) attacks: Attackers disrupt a host or network service in order
to make legitimate users not be able to have an access to a machine;

•

Probe attacks: Attackers use programs to automatically scan networks for gathering
information or finding known vulnerabilities;

•

User to Root (U2R) attacks: Local users get access to root access of a system without
authorization and then exploit the machine’s vulnerabilities; and

•

Remote to Local (R2L) attacks: Unauthorized attackers gain local access from a
remote machine and then exploit the machine’s vulnerabilities.

During the past years, a large variety of techniques to the task of detecting the above
mentioned intruders’ activities have been proposed [6]-[12]. These techniques are mainly
categorized into two groups: anomaly detection and misuse detection. Anomaly detection
searches for intrusive activities by comparing network traffic to those established
acceptable normal usage patterns learned from training data. If the pattern of observed
data is different from those learned normal ones, the data is classified as an attack. This
approach can successfully detect novel and unseen malicious occurrences from computer
users. However, it suffers from a high volume of false alarms. Misuse detection involves
the comparison of observed traffic data with a set of well defined rules that describe
signatures of intrusions. If the signature of observed network traffic is not matched with
any of predefined rules, it is declared as an attack. This approach can detect the
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recognized attacks in an efficient way with high level of accuracy. However, it suffers
from its inability of identifying attacks which differ from these predefined patterns. A
minor variation of an attack may not be identified during the whole detection procedure.

1.1 Problem Statement
Using either anomaly detection or misuse detection techniques in the design of intrusion
detection systems, a data set of network traffic is necessary to be collected in advance for
analysis. It consists of a great amount of traffic records with various features such as the
length of connection, the type of protocol, the network service and other information.
Based on this set of data, misuse detection specifies well defined attack signatures and
anomaly detection constructs acceptable user behavior. However, there are several
problems in the collected database.
a) Problem of Redundant Information
Not every feature of the network traffic information we are monitoring is relevant to the
intrusion detection task. Some features may be irrelevant to the signatures of attacks, and
some features may be redundant since they are highly inter-correlated with one or more
of the other features [4]. The detection speed becomes slow if unnecessary information is
involved in the analysis.
b) Problem of Uncertainty
The collected data always enclose uncertainty when only limited amount of information
about intrusive activities is available. It is difficult to completely collect intrusive
behavior because new exploits are discovered at anytime and anywhere. The available
data is always incomplete that only contains limited information.
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c) Problem of Ambiguity
Within the four attack categories, DoS and Probe attacks continuously show up with
large amounts in a short period of time when they attack systems. They are different from
the normal traffic data and can be easily separated from normal activities. On the
contrary, U2R and R2L attacks are embedded in the data portions of the packets and
normally involve only a single connection (a data packet related to a particular service).
Their patterns are similar to those of normal activities. The boundaries between those two
attacks and the normal behavior are always unclear. When processing an intrusion
detection task, the attacks may not be detected if the ambiguous behavior is not
considered anomalous. On the other hand, if the ambiguity is considered anomalous, then
system administrators may be alerted by false alarms, i.e., in cases where there is no
attack [5].
Past research results [6]-[12] shown in Table 1.1 have indicated that it is difficult to
achieve satisfactory detection accuracy while detecting U2R and R2L attacks. Therefore,
our study will address the issue on how to accurately and quickly detect them in the
network traffic. We expect that our system not only has the ability to correctly detect
those two types of attacks but also achieve a minimum number of incorrect false alarms.
More specifically, we are trying to solve four major problems.
•

To select a subset of features from the network traffic to advance speed of detection

•

To solve the ambiguity problem between U2R/R2L attacks and normal activities

•

To solve the uncertainty problem associated with the available data which is always
incomplete

•

To build an accurate model with high detection rate but low false negative rate
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Table 1.1. Detection Performances of Past Study
Ref.

Method

6

DoS

Probe
DR
FPR

DR

FPR

KDD cup winner

97.10%

0.30%

83.30%

7

SOM map

95.10%

-

8

Gaussian classifier

82.40%

0.90%

8

K-means clustering

97.30%

8

Nearest cluster alg.

97.10%

8

Radial basis

73.00%

8

C4.5 decision tree

97.00%

U2R

R2L

DR

FPR

DR

FPR

0.60%

12.30%

0.00%

8.40%

0.01%

64.30%

-

22.90%

-

11.30%

-

90.20%

11.30%

22.80%

0.50%

9.60%

0.10%

0.40%

87.60%

2.60%

29.80%

0.40%

6.40%

0.10%

0.30%

88.80%

0.50%

2.20%

0.00%

3.40%

0.01%

0.20%

93.20%

18.80%

6.10%

0.04%

5.90%

0.30%

0.30%

80.80%

0.70%

1.80%

0.00%

4.60%

0.01%

9

PN-rule

-

-

-

-

6.60%

-

10.70%

-

10

Linear GP

96.70%

-

85.70%

-

1.30%

-

9.30%

-

11

Online k-means

69.81%

5.00%

99.62%

5.00%

49.45%

5.00%

6.48%

5.00%

11

SVM

99.90%

5.00%

67.31%

5.00%

0.00%

5.00%

29.09%

5.00%

11

KMO+SVM

75.76%

5.00%

99.61%

5.00%

49.45%

5.00%

22.24%

5.00%

11

SVM

99.96%

10.00%

68.10%

10.00%

0.00%

10.00%

29.16%

10.00%

12

Backpropagation

97.23%

-

96.63%

-

87.71%

-

30.97%

-

* DR: Detection Rate, FPR: False Positive Rate

1.2 Research Hypotheses
This dissertation describes the work done with the following hypotheses.
•

Feature selection technique can reduce the complexity of network traffic data and
therefore increase the detection speed.

•

Fuzzy clustering technique [13], [14] can solve the ambiguity problem between
U2R/R2L attacks and normal activities.

•

Dempster-Shafer theory [15], [16] can solve the uncertainty problem caused by
limited information during the detection process.

•

Multiple intrusion detectors can get better detection performance than that of
individual one.

5

1.3 Proposed Approach
In the entire course of work, we develop a system using the intrusion detection
benchmark data set DARPA KDD99 [17], which not only includes a large quantity of
network traffic but also collects a wide variety of attacks. It is a standardized data set for
researchers to develop and test their intrusion detection systems as well as to compare
their results with those of others. In the beginning of research, a correlation-based feature
selection algorithm is proposed to advance both the detection speed and accuracy.
Features with poor prediction ability to the signatures of attacks and features intercorrelated with one or more other features are considered redundant. Such features will
be removed and the remaining ones contain indispensable information about the original
feature space. Then, the selected features are incorporated with other feature subsets into
the ensemble intrusion detection design. This design includes multiple feature selecting
intrusion detectors and a data mining intrusion detector that act as anomaly detection and
misuse detection, respectively. This ensemble approach is capable of further improving
the detection performance.
Each feature selecting intrusion detector uses a subset of features to derive independent
decision about an input network traffic data, then all the decisions from multiple ones are
combined into a fused result. In the kernel of each detector, a developed machine learning
algorithm is used to detect both known and novel U2R and R2L attacks. The problems of
uncertainty and ambiguity caused by incomplete and imprecise information are solved
during the intrusion detection procedure. Using the developed algorithm, we are
considering the intrusion detection task as a decision making process rather than
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identifying the vicious usages by their similarity to earlier defined recognized attacks.
Specifically, fuzzy clustering technique is applied to maximize the intra-class of similar
types of normality and abnormality, as well as to minimize the inter-class of dissimilar
types of normality and abnormality. By the use of Dempster-Shafer theory, the input
network traffic is identified by fusing evidences from clustering process. Also, the knearest neighbors (k-NN) technique [18] is employed to speed up the detection process.
The data mining intrusion detector uses data mining technique to automatically extract
computer users’ normal behavior from training data set. We combine the output of this
detector with the result from multiple feature selecting intrusion detectors to derive an
output, which is the final decision of the input network traffic. The data mining intrusion
detector acts as a filtering mechanism to reduce the number of false alarms.

1.4 Contributions
•

Speed up the detection process: Based on the concept of information theory, a feature
selection algorithm is implemented. With the use of selected features, the detection
time is reduced during the intrusion detection task.

•

Solve the uncertainty problem: By using the developed machine learning algorithm,
the uncertainty problem caused by deficient information and the ambiguity between
U2R/R2L attacks and normal activities is included in the design.

•

Improve the detection performance: The proposed ensemble intrusion detection
model not only increases the detection rate but also reduces the number of false
alarms compared to the results of past research.

7

1.5 Dissertation Organization
The dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter II includes a discussion of taxonomy
schemes on grouping attacks into categories, the survey of the popular used intrusion
detection approaches, and the overview of feature selection and multiple-classifier
techniques. Chapter III presents the idea of correlation based feature selection technique.
We afterwards describe our proposed feature selection algorithm. Chapter IV initially
explains the importance of considering the problem of uncertainty during the detection
process. We then present the intrusion detector, namely fuzzy belief k-NN classifier.
Chapter V discusses the experimental results of our developed feature selection algorithm.
Chapter VI describes the evaluation of the fuzzy belief k-NN classifier. Also, we employ
the feature selection results from Chapter V to test the detection accuracy and detection
speed of fuzzy belief k-NN classifier. Chapter VII presents the ensemble fuzzy belief
selection model, which combines several fuzzy belief k-NN feature selecting classifiers
with a data mining classifier. Chapter VIII draws the conclusions and lists future research
directions.
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CHAPTER II
LITERATURE REVIEW

The main concern of intrusion detection systems is to detect possible abnormal behavior
from computer users. This chapter starts with the discussion of a variety of taxonomies
for intrusions. DARPA KDD99 intrusion detection benchmark data set used throughout
our entire research is described. Next, we introduce two categories of systems and their
related research work. The former category is host-based and network-based intrusion
detection. The later one is knowledge-based and behavior-based intrusion detection. We
then introduce feature selection techniques that have been applied to find informative
feature subset from a network traffic data stream. At last, multiple-classifier intrusion
detection systems are described.

2.1 Intrusion Categorization
The concept of detecting abnormal behavior of computer users was first introduced by
Anderson in 1980 [3]. He published a paper, Computer Security Threat Monitoring and
Surveillance, and defined that an attack was a specific formulation or execution of a plan
to carry out a threat. He classified a threat as a deliberate unauthorized attempt to
z

access information,

z

manipulate information, or

z

render a system unreliable or unusable.
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Since then, a variety of taxonomy schemes on grouping attacks into categories have been
proposed. For example, in 1987 Denning [19] classified abnormal patterns of system
usage into eight categories. They are attempted break-in, masquerading or successful
break-in, penetration by legitimate user, leakage by legitimate user, inference by
legitimate user, trojan horse, virus, and denial-of-service. In 1988 Smaha [20] divided
intrusions into six main types: attempted break-ins, masquerade attacks, penetration of
the security control system, leakage, denial of service, and malicious use. Howard [21]
summarized the variations of taxonomy of attacks on the Internet from 1989 to 1995 in
one of the chapters in his PhD dissertation. Dekker [22] defined network security incident
as an activity threat violated an explicit or implicit security policy and classified incidents
into the probe, scan, account compromise, root compromise, packet sniffer, denial of
service, exploitation of trust, malicious code, and Internet infrastructure attacks in 1997.
In 1999, Lincoln Laboratory at MIT created the KDD99 data set, which is known as
“DARPA Intrusion Detection Evaluation Data Set” [17]. The data set includes thirty-nine
types of attacks that are classified into four main categories. They are DoS, Probe, U2R,
and R2L attacks.
The first category of attacks is DoS attacks. In this type of attacks, attackers attempt to
disrupt a host or network resource in order to make legitimate users not be able to access
to the computer service. The victim machines can be web server, domain name system
server, mail server, and so on. In the DARPA KDD99 data set, there are many common
forms of DoS attacks that are included. For example, smurf attack is one and takes over
70% of the attacks in the DoS category. By using the vulnerability of ICMP (Internet
Control Message Protocol), the attack can cause a target system crash. The attacker can
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send a large number of ICMP “echo request” packets to the broadcast address and every
packet has a spoofed source address of the intended target system. Any machine in the
subnets will respond by sending ICMP “echo reply” packets back to the target. If the
number of the packets is more than the system can handle, the result is the spoofed
system can no longer be able to service to the real ICMP requests. Another common way
to fail a system is neptune attacks. Over 25% of DoS attacks are neptune in the data set. It
is a SYN (Synchronize) flood attack that exists in TCP/IP (Transmission Control
Protocol/Internet Protocol) implementation of a network. The attacker just simply rapidly
sends out a large number of connection requests but never responds to any replies from
the system. While the attacker continues to request new connections faster than the
system can handle, the legitimate connection requests can never be accommodated. In the
mean time, the system may run out of memory and even crash.
The second category of attacks is Probe attacks. By using programs to automatically scan
a large amount network IP addresses, the attacker can explore vulnerabilities of the
computers. Once any vulnerability is found, the attacker can thus gain the access to the
system and start to gather information without authorization. The DARPA KDD99 data
set collects six scanning attacks of Probe attack category. They are ipsweep, mscan,
nmap, portsweep, saint, and satan.
The third category of attacks is U2R attacks. The attacker pretends as a legitimate user of
the system without authorization and then exploits the system’s vulnerabilities to get root
access of that system. The DARPA KDD99 data set consists of eight different types of
U2R attacks. Among them, buffer_overflow attack is the most common one that starts
with by feeding many data into a fix length buffer. When the volume of data exceeds the
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size of the buffer that can hold, the extra information will overflow into other buffers and
overwrite the instructions that suppose to be executed. The result may cause the system
crash or make the system execute the attacker's program as if it is part of the system’s
original programs.
The forth category of attacks is R2L attacks. This type of attacks is that an unauthorized
attacker through networks gains local access as a user of local machine and then exploits
the machine’s vulnerabilities. Totally fifteen types of R2L attacks are included in the
DARPA KDD99 data set. For example, the ftp_write attack is one that the attacker creates
rhost file to make anonymous FTP (File Transfer Protocol) directory writable and finally
obtains local login to the system. The guess_passwd is another one that the attacker tries
to gain access to a user’s account by repeatedly guessing the possible passwords. Any
service that needs password to access possibly becomes an attacked target, for example,
rlogin, ssh, ftp, telnet, pop, and imap.

2.2 Host-Based vs. Network-Based Intrusion Detection
Based on the sources of data, intrusion detection systems can be divided into two major
classes, host-based and network-based. In the first kind of systems, the intrusion
detection mechanism is installed on the local host/terminal. By examining the status of
audit information on system’s behavior, the system finds signs of intrusion and can then
protect its own local machine. The audit information can be obtained from different
sources such as system logs and activities, application logs, and target monitoring [23].
These logs could be Unix logs, NT/2000/XP logs, firewall logs, router logs, web server
logs, and FTP logs. The intrusions can be critical file modifications, segmentation fault
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errors recorded in logs, crashed services or extensive usage of the processors [24]. From
the system point of view, all users are considered as local clients to the target
environment.
Unlike the host-based intrusion detection system that only protects its own host machine
by examining audit trail, network-based intrusion detection system protects the entire
environment of the network by monitoring all the activities from both inside and outside
of the network. By inspecting the traffic data that goes through the network, the possible
intrusions can be identified. In general, the network traffic that needs to be monitored is
quite large. For releasing each sensor’s detection burden, the network based intrusion
system deploys its sensors on different locations instead of one central point. With a good
design of sensor placement on the network, the network-based intrusion detection system
can efficiently monitor a large network environment.
Compared to the audit trial used by a host-based intrusion detection system, the data
shown on network-based intrusion detection system always has less information about
what exactly happens during the attack courses. However, the data of network-based
intrusion detection system has a broader range of attacks because the background traffic
is much wider than that of a host-based intrusion detection system. With the popular use
of the Internet and the growth of larger network systems, more attention has been focused
on the development of network-based intrusion detection systems. Also, current trend
shows people incline to use both host-based and network-based information to design
hybrid systems. These intrusion detection systems are capable of running detection on
local host and monitor network traffic as well.
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Figure 2.1. Comparison of Knowledge-Based and Behavior-Based Intrusion Detection

2.3 Knowledge-Based vs. Behavior-Based Intrusion Detection
Based on the use of detection technique, intrusion detection systems are categorized as
knowledge-based and behavior-based intrusion detection systems as shown in Figure 2.1.
Knowledge-based intrusion detection is typically realized by modeling known attack
behavior with prior understanding about specific attacks and system vulnerabilities. This
technique is to compare network traffic data being observed with well defined attack
patterns for identifying the possible penetrations to a system. When the data is the same
as one of the explicitly defined attack patterns, an alarm is raised. The defined attack
patterns are frequently referred to as the signatures of intrusions. The signature could be a
static string or a sequence of events. This type of detection method is called misuse
detection [25].
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Advantages of this type of approach are it is very efficient to detect known attacks and is
very accurate with a very low false alarm rate. Since the attack patterns are
comprehensively encoded in advance for matching against computer user activities on
background traffic, the recognized attacks can be promptly identified. Once an attack is
identified, the security administrator can quickly analyze the problem and make a correct
action to prevent any breaches of security.
However, the main shortcoming of this approach is that it is only good for detecting
known attacks. Once the attack pattern is slightly changed or a novel attack appears, the
unseen attack will be considered as acceptable pattern and thus cannot be successfully
detected. In addition, maintenance of the knowledge database is an extremely tedious and
time-consuming task. It is very difficult to collect the required information of the known
attacks since to label records of data as either normal or a specific type of attack requires
careful analysis. Especially in this fast pace world, it is impossible to keep an intrusion
detection system always up to date with all attacks and vulnerabilities information.
While knowledge-based intrusion detection is achieved by modeling known attack
behavior, on the contrary, behavior-based intrusion detection also known as anomaly
detection models normal or expected behavior of computer users. It looks for malicious
activities by comparing the observed data with those acceptable behavior. If the data
diverges from the learned normal behavior, an alarm is raised. Advantage of this
approach is that novel and unseen attacks can be detected. Since it assumes any deviation
from normal patterns is regarded as anomalous activities, the technique is not required to
continuously keep up with hackers’ techniques [26], [27]. Also, it is less dependent on
target operating environments compared with the misuse detection technique.
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The main drawback of this approach is it might have a high number of false alarms due to
any deviations from the learned behaviors are treated as attacks. Since not every
deviation is a real intrusion, the security administrator may spare precious time to take
care of these false alarms and ignore the real anomalous activities.

2.4 Intrusion Detection Techniques
The popular intrusion detection techniques are reviewed in this section. We start with the
expert systems based intrusion detection techniques. Expert systems are primary used in
the design of misuse detection systems and most of them are rule-based systems. An
expert system contains a set of predefined rules on the basis of knowledge of the intrusive
activities. The inference engine then uses these rules to identify indications of known
attacks from the background of network traffic. For example, SNORT [28] is a popular
open-source network intrusion detection system of this kind. SNORT uses rules to
describe attacks in which each rule uses a single line of text to explicitly describe the
signatures of a certain attack. When monitoring the network traffic, SNORT compares
traffic data with rule database and fires an alarm if a traffic matches SNORT’s rule
signatures. A sample SNORT rule [29] is shown in the following equation.
alert tcp !HOME_NET any −> HOME_NET any (flags: SF; msg: “SYN-FIN scan”;)

(2.1)

This rule fires an alert message “SYN-FIN scan” when an outsider attempts to make an
internal home network TCP connection. For building such kind of rules, SNORT
employs human knowledge to recognize those attempts of security breach. It provides a
systematic search for attacks in the audit data, yet it will not flag alarm if the attack
signatures are not described within the rules. For maintaining its up-to-date status, a
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regular update is posted on the SNORT website. This update could be a very tedious and
difficult task because the rules in the system must be reformulated by security
professionals. In addition, the rule-based technique lacks flexibility in the rule-to-audit
record representation [30]. Expert systems based approach suffers from its inability to
identify attacks which differ from those predefined patterns. A minor variation of an
attack itself or an attack sequence is possible to affect the rule comparison result and
causes the attack never be found during the detection process.
Unlike the rule-based system that provides a set of predefined rules to identify indications
of known attack activities, researchers also apply a variety of approaches to model the
normal behavior of the protected system. In such approaches, neural networks and fuzzy
logic are two well-known techniques in the development of intrusion detection systems.
Neural network system acts as a computational model to process the network traffic
information, which the system can be trained to perform intrusion detection tasks based
on the traffic data provided. At the end of the training procedure, the neural network
gains the knowledge that can extract the normal and attack signatures from the provided
data automatically. With the ability to generalize rules from learned data, the neural
network performs generalization of attacks and fault tolerance to imprecise and uncertain
information.
Approaches using various neural network structures have been applied in building
anomaly intrusion detection systems and the two most common architectures are the SelfOrganizing Maps (SOM) [31] and the Multilayer Perceptrons (MLP) network [32]. A
SOM uses unsupervised learning algorithm to group similar data to clusters in the input
space. It is a data visualization technique that produces a low dimensional topological
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map to help people understand the original high dimensional data. Once the neural
network is trained, the map converges to a stationary distribution and shows a clear
separation between normal and attacks. The output neurons are considered as the counts
for normal and attacks. Next, future connections can be rapidly classified as normal or
attacks by visualizing the histogram of the map. Examples can be found in the works of
Kayacik et al. [7], Depren et al. [33], and DeLooze [34]. These researchers selected
various subsets of features of KDD99 data set to build different sizes of networks in order
to simplify the complexity of the networks. Kayacik et al. built a hierarchical topological
SOM maps for network intrusion detection. In the first layer, they selected six basic TCP
features (length of the connection, protocol type, network service, status flag, total data
bytes from source to destination, and total data bytes from destination to source) to build
six 6×6 SOMs, each individual one was associated with each basic feature. The second
layer integrated the information from the first level SOMs into a single view of the
problem. Then in the third layer six SOMs were built for the second layer SOM neurons
that demonstrated significant counts for both attack and normal connections. In each third
layer SOM, 20×20 neurons were included. By using the same six basic features as
Kayacik et al. did, Depren et al. built 15×15, 8×8, and 6×6 SOM maps for TCP, UDP
(User Datagram Protocol) and ICMP traffic data, respectively. Each SOM structure was
trained with the normal traffic data. When the training process was completed, any
incoming anomalous traffic would be clustered outside of the normal clustering or inside
the normal clustering with high quantization error. In the work of DeLooze, he created
three 20×20 SOM maps using content, time, and connection features. Content features
included number of total packets, acknowledgement packets, data bytes, retransmitted
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packets, pushed packets, SYN and FIN packets flowing to or from the source and
destination, and the status of completed, not completed and reset for each connection.
Time features included the number of connections and the type of services to or from the
source and destination within the last 5 seconds. Connection features were the duration of
the connection, the service requested, and protocol used. Each feature space was used
independently to detect anomalous behavior. Then the results of the individual SOMs
were combined using the majority ensemble method (reports an attack if two of the three
SOMs report an attack for a particular connection) and the belief ensemble method
(reports an attack if any of the three SOMs reports an attack for a particular connection).
Here, the problems shown in the above three works are how to select a feature space as
the input to the network and how to configure a network with proper size. These two
factors play important roles in the detection performance and the granularity of the
network nodes, which training a SOM with a large amount of neurons needs long
computational time and a SOM with a small volume of neurons may loss some important
information. Also, the empirical nature of training parameters development is still an
unresolved question, which the topology, learning rate and function, the number of
training epochs, and initial weights of the network are decided by trial and error.
MLP uses a feedforward structure to solve classification problems by its supervised
learning algorithm. The network weights are updated by using gradient-based
optimization algorithm during the training period. When the network converges to the
local minima of error, the output layer of the network will show the result when data is
fed into the input layer. In the reported work of Faraoun and Boukelif [12], they applied
k-Means algorithm to group the input data into a number of clusters. Having obtained the
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clustering centers and their relative boundaries, the distances between the centers and
input data were calculated and only the most discriminating samples that cover at
maximum the region of each class were selected for the learning process. The selected
samples were then presented to the MLP network for classifying four classes of attacks in
the KDD99 data set. Although they tried to improve the learning process by reducing the
amount of training samples, the network still had a heavy computational burden because
it was complex with 41, 30, and 5 neurons in input, hidden, and output layers,
respectively. Also, the neural network suffers its “black box” nature that it does not
provide explicit knowledge representation of its internal connections between layers. It is
difficult to understand why a network event is classified as a normal or abnormal activity.
Fuzzy logic [35] is specifically designed to deal with imprecision of facts. With its
capability of dealing with vagueness, there are several reasons it is a possible approach in
the design of intrusion detection system. First, there is often no clear boundary between
normal and abnormal of a computer user’s activity [36]. Instead of a network traffic is
either completely assigned to a member of normal category or a member of abnormal
category, the traffic is possible classified into more than one categories. Fuzzy logic
provides a dynamic decision boundary in the detection of intrusions. Second, the moment
that we raise an alarm is often fuzzy. There would be too many alarms if we raise an
alarm every time when we suspect an intrusion event occurs. At what degree of intrusion
we should raise an alarm often depends on different situations. It depends on the degrees
of intrusion and different circumstances [37]. With the dynamic decision boundary
characteristic provided by fuzzy logic, the security officers can decide the best time to
raise alarms according to the alarm threshold desired.

20

The work of Dickerson et al. [38] is an example of applying fuzzy logic to spot malicious
activities against computers. In their work, they built an anomaly-based intrusion
detection system named FIRE (Fuzzy Intrusion Recognition Engine). Initially the FIRE
system applied data mining technique to TCP packet data to extract metrics. The metrics
were chosen to reveal anomalies in the network traffic and formed the basis for the fuzzy
inputs as well. For example, SDP was one of the metrics, that were composed of the IP
source, IP destination, and the destination port fields. Once the system completed the
metrics extraction, it used the historical data to calculate the ranges over the input space.
All of the data were evaluated in terms of three fuzzy characteristics, COUNT,
UNIQUENESS, and VARIANCE. Each input space had five fuzzy membership
functions: LOW, MEDIUM-LOW, MEDIUM, MEDIUM-HIGH, and HIGH. With the
use of metrics, three fuzzy characteristics, and five fuzzy membership functions, the
authors then developed fuzzy inference rules to describe intrusions with their past
experiences. For example, Equation 2.2 is a fuzzy inference rule to detect the port scan.
IF (COUNT OF SDPs = MEDIUM) AND (UNIQUENESS OF SDPs
Observed = HIGH) THEN “Port Scan” = HIGH

(2.2)

During the development of any fuzzy inference engine such as FIRE, the settings of
fuzzy parameters, fuzzy characteristics and fuzzy membership functions, heavily depend
on the experience of human experts. However, those settings are very critical to the result
of fuzzy inference. It’s preferable if we can find a solution to automatically covert the
professional’s expertise to a knowledge-based fuzzy inference machine. Hence,
Dickerson et al. [39] improved the settings of five fuzzy membership functions by the use
of fuzzy c-Means (FCM) clustering algorithm. They applied FCM to a data set and
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obtained the clustering centers and membership grades. By the reference of clustering
results, the extents and midpoints of the five fuzzy membership functions were
determined. Methods such as neural networks [40], Support Vector Machine (SVM) [37],
genetic algorithms [41], and data mining technique [42] had also been proposed to help
the decision of the fuzzy parameters. All of them did improve the decision process of
deriving necessary parameters of fuzzy logic, however more or less human expert’s
knowledge is still involved. Also, a large number of labeled data is needed during the
design process.
With the fast growing of Internet and the large and complex network systems, it becomes
impossible for a security officer to look for intrusive activities by manually analyzing the
traffic data. Thus data mining technique has caught researchers’ attention because it is
capable of extracting useful information by sorting through a large amount of data. The
intrusion detection is therefore treated as a data analysis process with a data-centric point
of view [43]. The technique is defined as an information discovery task that looks for
patterns in the network traffic data and can be applied to both misuse and anomaly
intrusion detections. The data mining procedure from data collection to model
computation can be made totally automatic. Unlike hand coding intrusion signatures into
the systems [44], [45], data mining reduces the effort on manually analyzing and
encoding intrusion patterns. However, it suffers from the degree of complexity if the raw
data is formed by a great amount of data with a large number of features. For avoiding
too many information included, feature selection or feature extraction technique is always
applied to reduce the dimensionality of the original feature space.
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Generally speaking, two data mining techniques, association rules and decision trees, are
mostly applied to intrusion detection tasks. In the works of Lee and Stolfo [46], they
created a framework: Mining Audit Data for Automated Models for Intrusion Detection
(MADAM ID). Their idea was using frequent episode algorithm and association rules to
compute patterns from system audit data and extract predictive features from the patterns.
Then RIPPER classification algorithm [47] was applied to generate intrusion detection
rules such as Equation 2.3, which represents the telnet connection and is a guessing
password attack if the number of failed logins is greater than 4.
guess:- failed_logins ≥ 4

(2.3)

Although the design process from extracting discriminative features to generating
detection rules is totally automatic, the amount of labeled network traffic is usually large,
which the expert-based labeling process is very tedious and time-consuming. In addition,
labeling a large number of network traffic can possibly lead to errors [11].
The other typical data mining approach is associated with decision trees. Levin [6] used a
data mining tool, Kernel Miner, to generate decision trees for classifying normal behavior
and attacks in KDD99 data set. By randomly choosing 10% data from the entire training
data set, they constructed 218 decision trees for normal and four attack classes (DoS,
Probe, U2R, and R2L). The result showed that the system achieved satisfactory detection
rates on normal examples, DoS and Probe attacks, but failed on detecting U2R and R2L
attacks. The system can only correctly detect 12.3% and 8.4% of U2R and R2L attacks,
respectively, and misclassify most of them that belong to the new attack types not shown
in the training set. Examples of using decision trees technique can also be found in the
publications of Sabhnani and Serpen [9], [48]-[50]. In their works, they focused on
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detecting both U2R and R2L attacks. They analyzed training and testing sets of KDD99
data set through C4.5 decision trees algorithm [51] and concluded that no pattern
classification algorithm or machine learning could be trained to successfully demonstrate
misuse detection on both U2R and R2L attack categories. The reason is that not only
these two attacks are content-based (embedded in the data portions of the packets) but
also the testing set has extensive new types of attacks that are not correlated with attacks
shown in the training set.

2.5 Feature Selection Techniques
For designing an intrusion detection system, a training set involving thousands of traffic
connections is always required. In each traffic connection, it includes a number of
features plus a class label of normal or a type of attack. By the use of misuse or anomaly
detection technique, a model can be induced and used to classify future traffic into
malicious activities or normal usage behavior.
Theoretically and ideally, the ability to discriminate attack from normal behavior should
be performed better if more features are added during the detection process. However, the
answer is sometimes negative. The reason is that some of the features may be irrelevant
with poor prediction ability to the target class, and some of the features may be redundant
due to they are highly inter-correlated with one of more of the other features [52].
Therefore, analysis of traffic features is a very critical step in the development of
intrusion detection system. Of the large number of features included in the high
dimensional data set, it is very important to have a good understanding which features are
truly essential in detecting the attacks; which are less significant in only providing the
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auxiliary information; and which are redundant that can be discarded. Based on the
understanding of the significance of these features, irrelevant and redundant features can
be discarded effectively. The remaining relevant features thus contain most significant
information related to the given intrusion detection task. The feature selection result is
helpful to speed up the detection time and to enhance the detection accuracy. The
maximum overall performance can therefore be achieved.
Generally, the algorithms of feature selection are mainly divided into two categories,
filter and wrapper, as defined in the work of John et al. [53]. Filter method operates
without engaging any information of induction algorithm. By using prior knowledge such
as features should have strong correlation with the target class or should uncorrelate to
each other, filter method selects the best subset of features. Example is the work of
Kayacık et al. [54]. They performed feature relevance analysis in the KDD99 training set.
In order to get feature relevance measure for attacks, they applied information gain to
binary classification (normal and attack) and reported their chosen relevant features for
normal behavior and part of the attacks. In their paper, they only reported the feature
selection result but didn’t demonstrate any evaluation of it. During the feature selection
process, only the irrelevant features were considered to be removed. However, there was
no description about the setting of threshold, which is critical in the elimination of the
irrelevant features. Also, the information gain is possibly biased if feature with more
values, i.e., the features with greater numbers of value will gain more information than
those with fewer values even if the former ones are actually less informative than the
latter ones.
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On the other hand, wrapper method employs a predetermined induction algorithm to find
a subset of features with the highest evaluation by searching through the space of feature
subsets and evaluating quality of selected features. The process of feature selection acts
like “wrapped around” an induction algorithm. Machine learning algorithms such as ID3
[55] and C4.5 [51] are commonly used as the induction algorithm. Since wrapper method
includes a specific induction algorithm to optimize feature selection, it often provides an
accurate classification result than that of filter approach. However, wrapper method is
more time consuming than filter method due to it is strongly coupled with an induction
algorithm with repeatedly calling the algorithm to evaluate the performance of each
subset of features. It thus becomes unpractical to apply a wrapper method to select
features from a large data set that contains numerous features and instances [56].
Furthermore, wrapper approach is required to re-execute its induction algorithm for
selecting features from data set while the algorithm is replaced with a dissimilar one. It is
less independent of any induction algorithms than filter is.
The work of Mukkamala and Sung [57] is an example of using wrapper method. With the
use of KDD99 data set, they applied both Support Vector Machines (SVM) and Support
Vector Decision Function Ranking Method (SVDFRM) to rank important input features
for the intrusion detection task. For each feature, it was deleted from the training and
testing sets and the remaining ones were used to train the classifier. Then the classifier’s
performance was compared with that of using full feature set. Finally, the importance of
the feature was ranked according to a set of rules based on the performance comparison.
Equation 2.4 shows one of the rules.
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IF accuracy decreases AND training time increases AND testing time decreases
THEN the feature is important

(2.4)

With its iterative search and evaluation procedure, the forty-one features were grouped
into important features, secondary features, and unimportant features for normal, DoS,
Probe, U2R, and R2L attacks. Table 2.1 shows their experimental results in which group
1 represents important features, group 2 represents secondary features, and group 3
represents unimportant features. This work used wrapper approach to execute its SVMbase induction algorithm. Without doubt, this process was computationally expensive to
determine the final subset of features because the induction algorithms were iteratively
executed on data sets that is with a large number of records and features.
Table 2.1. Experimental Results of the Work of Mukkamala and Sung
SVM
Normal

{1,3,5,6,8-10,14,15,17,20-23,25-29,33,35,36,38,39,41},
<2,4,7,11,12,16,18,19,24,30,31,34,37,40>, (13,32)

Probe

{3,5,6,23,24,32,33}, <1,4,7-9,12-19,21,22,25-28,34-41>,
(2,10,11,20,29,30,31,36,37)

DoS

{1,3,5,6,8,19,23-28,32,33,35,36,38-41}, <2,7,9-11,14,17,20,22,29,30,34,37>,
(4,12,13,15,16,18,19,21,3)

U2R

{5,6,15,16,18,32,33}, <7,8,11,13,17,19-24,26,30,36-39>,
(9,10,12,14,27,29,31,34,35,40,41)

R2L

{3,5,6,24,32,33}, <2,4,7-23,26-31,34-41>, (1,20,25,38)

SVDFRM
Normal

{1-6,10,12,17,23,24,27,28,29,31-34,36,39},
<11-14,16,19,22,25,26,30,35,37,38, 40,41>, (7-9,15,18,20,21)

Probe

{1-6,23,24,29,32,33}, <10,12,22,28,34-36,38-41>,
(7-9,11,13-21,25-27,30,31,37,40)

DoS

{1,5,6,23-26,32,36,38,39}, <2,3,4,10,12,29,33,34>,
(7-9,11,13-22,27,28,30,31,35-37,40,41)

U2R

{1-6,12,23,24,32,33}, <4,10,13,14,17,22,27,29,31,34,36,37,39>,
(7-9,11,15,16,18-21,25,26,28,30,35,38,40,41)

R2L

{1,3,5,6,32,33}, <2,4,10,12,22-24,29,31,34,36,37,38,40>,
(7-9,11,13-21,25-28,30,35,39,41)
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2.6 Multiple Classifiers Systems
Ensemble is to combine the outputs of a set of base classifiers together in a proper way
when classifying input data. The fused result is expected to perform a better outcome
than that of any individual base classifier within the ensemble. In the schemes of building
an ensemble classifier, three distinct topologies are frequently engaged, they are
cascading, parallel, and hierarchical structures [58]. Figure 2.2 illustrates these three
basic frameworks. In the cascading structure, the output from the previous classifier is
fed into the next one. By cascading all the classifiers together, the final result is obtained
at the last classifier’s output of the chain. While each previous classifier’s output is the
input of succeeding classifier, the latter classifier has difficulty to correct inaccuracy
made by former one. In the parallel structure, the predictions of base classifiers are
integrated to produce a fused output of the ensemble. The combination method is the key
factor to decide if the result is successful or not. A careful choosing of combination
methods can lead the ensemble classifier to a supreme performance, and on the contrary
to poor consequence with an improper selection of combination methods. The
hierarchical structure is a combination of cascading and parallel configurations. It is
possible to alleviate both shortcomings of cascading and parallel structures and thus to
achieve an optimal classification result.
The types of decision generated by the individual base classifier can be classified into
three major categories: abstract form, rank level, and measurement level [59]. The
abstract form is that a classifier only outputs a solitary class label for an input pattern.
The rank level is that a classifier ranks a list of classes in accordance with the degrees of
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Figure 2.2. Three Topologies of Ensemble Classifiers
belief on classes the input pattern belongs to. The list is always sorted in descending way
where the first and the last components are the highest and lowest ranked output classes,
respectively. The measurement level is that the classifier assigns a level of confidence to
each class for expressing the classifier’s degree of belief for an input pattern. Among the
combination methods that work with abstract form outputs, the popular methods are
behavior knowledge space method, majority voting, weighted majority voting, naive
bayes method. For measurement level outputs, the combination methods are DempsterShafer method, MAX, MIN, SUM, PROD, AVG, and MED methods that the ensemble
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selects the maximum, minimum, summation, product, average, or median value of the
combined classifiers as its output.
Example is the work of Giacinto and Roli [60]. In their research, they restricted the
problem domain in the ftp service of the KDD99 data set and selected 30 out of the 41
available features from the data set. They built three neural networks using 4 intrinsic
features, 19 traffic features, and 7 content features, respectively. Also, they built one
neural networks using 30 features for the sake of comparison. All of the networks were
three layers fully-connected multi-layer networks, which each had 5 output neurons (for
normal and four attack classes), a number of input neurons that equal to the number of
features, and a hidden layer made up of 5 neurons for the networks using distinct features
and 15 neurons for the network trained using all of the 30 features. For performing the
ensemble operation, they carried out three fusion techniques: the majority voting rule, the
average rule, and the belief function to combine the outputs from the networks trained on
three distinct features together. The results showed that all of the fusion techniques
improved the overall detection performance compared with those of individual classifiers
and the classifier using 30 features. However, it also showed that the ensemble model did
not improve the detection on unknown attacks in testing set, which had around 15% error
rates. During the entire course of work, they only used 725 training connections and
7,436 testing connections but did not explain the reason. It explicitly hints that the neural
networks could need a long time for training. The work of Mukkamala et al. [61] is
another example using multiple classifiers approach. They used the KDD99 data set and
performed five-class (normal, DoS, Probe, U2R, and R2L) classification. They designed
two ensemble models. One consisted of three multilayer feedforward neural networks and
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the other was made up of neural networks, SVM and MARS (Multivariate Adaptive
Regression Splines). By using the majority voting technique, individual base classifiers’
outcomes of each ensemble model were combined together. The experimental results
showed that each ensemble outcome outperformed that of its every base classifier. In one
of their experiments, they fused three base classifiers’ outputs with 48%, 0%, and 16%
accuracies together and get 56% ensemble accuracy. However, Hansen and Salamon [62]
had proved that multi-classifiers will only work when it is possible to build individual
classifiers which are more than 50% accurate. But, in the paper they did not describe the
input features of every individual base classifier. This is very important because base
classifiers should be independent of each other, otherwise no improvement can be
obtained through the combination.
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CHAPTER III
CORRELATION-BASED FEATURE SELECTION

In an intrusion detection task, the quantity of network traffic data is enormous with a
large amount of features. The objective of feature selection is to reduce the
dimensionality of the original feature space with a way to select a subset of features.
However, the problem is how to select the feature subset, which still can represent
sufficient information about the original data set. For solving this problem, approaches
based on information gain are employed in this dissertation in order to find the strength
of predictive from features to targets and the strength of correlation between features
themselves. As described in Section 2.5, the algorithms of feature selection are mainly
divided into two categories, filter and wrapper. Since filter method is computational
efficient than wrapper method, we choose it when the number of features is large. In the
following, we will address aspects of feature selection based on filter method because the
size of data collected from the network is always large which includes many traffic
records with a number of various features. Our approach uses the concept of information
theory to evaluate the worth of features and eliminate both irrelevant and redundant
features. The approach is close to the Fast Correlation-Based Filter (FCBF) [63], however
the difference is we treat the correlation between features in a global perspective. We
measure the total amount of information associated with a feature as the summation of
the inter-correlations to all of the rest of the features, but FCBF only considers on a
feature of rest ones at a time. Figure 3.1 shows FCBF feature selection scheme.
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Figure 3.1. FCBF Feature Selection Scheme
First of all, the algorithm calculates the symmetrical uncertainty (SU) [65] value for each
feature to the class C, selects the relevant features whose SU values are larger than a
predefined threshold, and orders them in a descending order. In Figure 5, five features are
selected as relevant features and ranked in descending order. In the second step, it
processes the relevant features to remove the redundant ones. The algorithm starts from
the left-most feature Fi and calculates its SU value with the remaining ones (the one Fj
right next to Fi to the last one). If SUi,j ≥ SUj,c, Fj is considered as a redundant feature and
is removed from the list. After one round of removing features based on Fi, the algorithm
takes the feature right next to Fi as the new reference to repeat the process. It stops until
no more features can be selected. By using this technique, some so called redundant
features can be removed quickly. However, FCBF may be tricked in a situation where the
dependence between a pair of features is weak but the total inter-correlated strength of
one feature to the others is strong. So the FCBF possibly will keep a feature that its
information can be found in the remaining selected subset of features. In addition, FCBF
requires adjusting a threshold for its feature selection procedure, while our algorithm
does not.
In the following sections, we first introduce the theoretical framework which forms the
base of our proposed approach in measuring the goodness between features, and between
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features and classes. We then describe our proposed feature selection algorithm in
Section 3.2.

3.1. Theoretical Framework
In information theory, entropy [64] is a measure of the amount of uncertainty about a
source of messages. The entropy of variable Y before and after observing values of
another variable X can be described by.
H (Y ) = −∑ p ( yi ) log 2 p ( yi )

(3.1)

H (Y X ) = −∑ p( x j )∑ p( yi x j ) log 2 p( yi x j )

(3.2)

i

and

j

i

Here p(yi) is the prior probabilities for all values of random variable Y and p(yi|xj) is the
conditional probability of yi given xj. By treating Y as classes and X as features in a data
set, the entropy is 0, i.e., without any uncertainty at all if all members of a feature belong
to the same class. On the other hand, members in a feature set are totally random to a
class if the value of entropy is 1. The range of entropy is between 0 and 1.
The amount by which the entropy of Y decreases reflects additional information about Y
provided by X. This is called information gain (or mutual information) [55] as shown in
Equation 3.3.
I (Y ; X ) = H (Y ) − H (Y X )

= H ( X ) − H (X Y )

(3.3)

It measures how well a given variable separates instances into another variable. The
function I(Y; X) is symmetrical, i.e., the amount of information gained about Y after
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observing X is equal to the information gained about X after observing Y. Symmetry is a
desired property for correlation measurements between features. However, information
gain is biased if feature with more values, which the features with greater numbers of
values will gain more information than those with fewer values even if the former ones
are actually less informative than the latter ones. Also, the range of information gain is
not from 0 to 1. Its values should be normalized in order to ensure they are comparable
and have the same affect. Therefore, we choose SU as our tool to find the strength of
predictive from features to target classes and that of correlations between features
themselves. Its definition is shown in the following equation.
⎡ I (Y ; X ) ⎤
SU (Y ; X ) = 2 ⋅ ⎢
⎥
⎣ H ( X ) + H (Y ) ⎦

(3.4)

It averages the values of two uncertainty variables, compensates for information gain’s
bias toward features with more values, and normalizes its values to the range [0, 1]. A
value of 1 indicates that knowing the value of either one completely predicts the value of
the other and a value of 0 indicates that X and Y are independent each other. In addition, it
still treats a pair of features symmetrically.
In the following study, we apply SU measure to calculate the correlation between features
and target class. If a feature has a low SU to the target class, it implies that the feature has
poor prediction ability to the class. On the other hand, the feature has strong prediction
ability to the class if the SU is high. Once having all the symmetric uncertainties between
features and the target class, features can be ranked in descending order according to their
degrees of association to the target class Y. Those features which have the lowest ranks
are considered as irrelevant features and will be filtered out.
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Figure 3.2. Illustration of Correlations of Three Features in Venn Diagram
Similarly, we apply SU measure to pairs of features. If the measure of mutual information
between a pair of features is low, it represents these two features are independent to each
other, i.e., knowing one feature cannot provide any information about the other. On the
contrary, the two features are highly inter-correlated with each other if they have a high
mutual information measure. This means that one feature contains similar information
about the other and implies that knowing one feature can gain necessary information
about the other. Under this circumstance, one of them can be considered as a redundant
feature and can be discarded.
For a better understanding of the idea of redundant feature, we use Venn diagram to
illustrate correlations among multiple features X1, X2 and X3. As shown in Figure 3.2,
SU(X1; X3) = b + c, SU(X1; X2) = c and SU(X2; X3) = c + d. Obviously, some redundant
information will be included if we choose all three features since the information
included in SU(X1; X3), SU(X1; X2), and SU(X2; X3) is b + 3c + d, which is greater than b +
c + d in SU(X1, X2; X3). Therefore, removing redundant features from the original feature
space is necessary in order to discard needless information. The intrusion detection
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processing time can therefore be reduced by the use of a subset of the original feature
space.
In Figure 3.2, feature X3 is highly inter-correlated with both features X1 and X2. By using
Shannon’s information-theoretic measure, we get the joint entropy:
H ( X 1 , X 2 , X 3 ) = (a + b + c + d + e ) + f
= H ( X 1 , X 2 ) + [H ( X 3 ) + SU ( X 1 , X 2 ; X 3 ) − SU ( X 1 ; X 3 )
− SU ( X 2 ; X 3 )]

(3.5)

The larger mutual information SU(X1; X3) and SU(X2; X3) are, the smaller area f will be.
When f is very small, it represents that X3 heavily depends on both X1 and X2. The
measure of joint entropy H(X1, X2, X3) is approximately equal to H(X1, X2). It implies that
the total amount of information of X1, X2, and X3 can be represented by the amount of
information of X1 and X2. Feature X3 is considered as a redundant feature and can be
removed with only losing a little information of the original feature space. Finally, we
select the feature that is neither an irrelevant feature nor a redundant feature and call this
type of feature as “significant feature”.

3.2 Feature Selection Algorithm
Table 3.1 describes our proposed feature selection algorithm. The algorithm mainly
consists of two parts for achieving the goal of reducing dimensionality of the original
feature space. In the first part (lines 1-5), the algorithm removes irrelevant features with
poor prediction ability to target class. Given a data set with a number of input features
and a target class, the algorithm first calculates the mutual information between features
and class. The algorithm then ranks the features in descending order according to their
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Table 3.1. Feature Selection Algorithm
1 // Remove irrelevant features
2 Input original data set D that includes features X and target class Y
3 For each feature Xi
Calculate mutual information SU(Y; Xi)
4 Sort SU(Y; Xi) in descending order
5 Put Xj whose SU(Y; Xi) > 0 into relevant feature set RXY
6 // Remove redundant features
7 Input relevant feature set RXY
8 For each feature Xj
Calculate pairwise mutual information
SU(Xj; Xk) ∀j ≠ k
9 SXX = Σ (SU(Xj; Xk))
10 Calculate means µR and µS of RXY and SXX , respectively.
w = µS /µR
11 R = w⋅RXY - SXX
12 Select Xj whose R > 0 into final set F

degrees of association to the target class. Once the input features’ degrees of importance
are ranked, those terms whose information measure are equal to zero are removed.
The second part of the algorithm (lines 6-12) eliminates redundant features that are intercorrelated with one or more of other features. It starts with calculating the inter-correlated
strengths of each pair of features. The total amount of mutual information for each
feature is acquired by adding all mutual information measures together that relate to that
feature. For adjusting the discriminative power of mutual information performed on
feature-to-feature and feature-to-class to the same level, we introduce factor w and its
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value is equal to the mean of summation of feature-to-class information divided by the
mean of summation of feature-to-feature information. By multiplying w to each featureto-class measure, both feature-to-class and feature-to-feature reach to the same important
rank. Finally, the differences of them are computed and we only keep those features
whose values are greater than zero; which means the selected features are the most
“significant features” that restrain indispensable information of the original feature space.
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CHAPTER IV
FUZZY BELIEF k-NN ANOMALY DETECTION

This chapter presents an intrusion detection method named fuzzy believe k-NN anomaly
detection. It is a combination of fuzzy clustering technique and Dempster-Shafer theory
since both of them have merit of resolving the uncertainty problems caused by limited
and ambiguous information during a decision process. Also, the k-NN technique is
applied to speed up the detection process.
In the first part of this chapter, we describe the reason of choosing anomaly detection
technique. Then, we explain the importance of considering the problems of uncertainty
while designing intrusion detection models. Finally, we present our proposed fuzzy
believe k-nearest neighbors anomaly detection design.

4.1 Anomaly Detection
As described in Section 2.3, two approaches are typically used for detecting intruders of
the information from network traffic or system audit trail. They are misuse detection and
anomaly detection. Misuse detection models known attack behavior and anomaly
detection models normal behavior. The main drawback of misuse detection technique is
that it cannot detect unknown intrusions. Whenever a novel attack is discovered, it is
necessary to spend a number of hours or days on the development of this new attack
signature and then to update it manually into the intrusion detection system. Maintenance
of the knowledge database therefore becomes an extremely tedious task. Moreover,
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misuse detection approach becomes impractical while the number and types of intrusions
increase dramatically with the networks grow rapidly. Human analysis becomes
insufficient to catch the growing speed of intrusions.
A misuse intrusion detection system can neither cover all intrusive behavior space nor
include all normal behavior space. This is due to the fact that there is not only a large
amount of vulnerabilities that already have been discovered [1] but also an unknown
number of vulnerabilities that may be immediately exposed. So it is very difficult to
model such behavior spaces completely and correctly in reality. Additionally, computer
attacks are usually polymorphic [66]. Computer hackers in general use different
approaches to exploit a same vulnerability. The attack codes may look different from the
known signature but are functionally equivalent. For example, the Internet worms are
polymorphic and spread automatically across networks by exploiting vulnerabilities [67].
These worms are able to mutate as they spread across the network by using selfencryption mechanisms or semantics-preserving code manipulation techniques. Hence, it
is correspondingly difficult to generate all possible combinations to cover the variations
of attacks using misuse detection technique. It is necessary to develop an efficient way
that is able to identify different variations of a same type of attack.
To address the above problems, an obvious solution would be to develop intrusion
detection systems using anomaly detection, which are totally orthogonal to misuse based
models. The anomaly based models have been successfully implemented by modeling
what is normal instead of what is anomalous. It is advantageous to distinguish any
deviations from normal behavior. Consequently, unusual or abnormal patterns are
possible to be discovered. Furthermore, it offers the ability to resist polymorphic attacks
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at the moment that novel attacks are constantly being introduced to the networks today.
The anomaly based models provide a much more feasible approach by the use of
generalizing the signatures of attacks than generating a number of signatures that cover
possible variations of attack as in misuse based models.

4.2 Handling of Uncertainty
Uncertainties exist in our daily life. Sometimes the uncertainty is totally random, e.g., the
future state of weather and the occurrence of failure of our home appliances. In other
occasions it happens due to lack of knowledge or unpredictable factors such as the trend
of stock and whether a war is going to happen. Therefore, people generally classify
uncertainties into two categories, aleatory uncertainty and epistemic uncertainty, based on
their fundamental difference in nature. Aleatory uncertainty is also known as variability,
random uncertainty, stochastic uncertainty, objective uncertainty, and irreducible
uncertainty [68], [69]. It is caused by inherent random variations associated with the
physical system or the environment under consideration. Examples can be found in the
outcomes while rolling a dice, the location and time of occurrence of future earthquakes,
and the variability of a machining operation. The random nature of aleatory uncertainty is
inherent. The occurrence of an event is not predicable even a large quantity of past data is
collected.
The second type of uncertainty is epistemic uncertainty. This uncertainty is also referred
to as imprecision, reducible uncertainty, subjective uncertainty, parameter uncertainty,
model form uncertainty, and state-of-knowledge uncertainty [68], [69]. On the contrary to
aleatory uncertainty that uncertainty arises from the system itself, epistemic uncertainty is
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an uncertainty that is due to a lack of knowledge or information of processes of the
system or the environment. Since it is not caused by the inherent random variations of the
system but by the incomplete information or knowledge, the uncertainty is possible to be
reduced by including new knowledge or information about the system or environmental
factors. Examples of epistemic uncertainty can be seen when there are insufficient
experimental data to describe physical parameters of a new material, limited
understanding of a physics phenomena, and imperfect measurement of a complex
physical model.
Actually, epistemic uncertainty does happen in intrusion detection tasks. From the
decision-based perspective, the goal of intrusion detection is to make decisions on
whether future traffic data are malicious or normal. For effectively and precisely making
the decisions, data are collected in advance for analysis in either misuse or anomaly
detection case. However, the collected data always enclose uncertainty when only limited
information about intrusive activities is available. In real world modern computer systems
and networks, hackers constantly develop new attack codes to exploit security
vulnerabilities of organizations everyday. Not only are these attacks becoming more
numerous, they are also becoming more sophisticated. Accordingly, it is not realistic to
cover all intrusive behavior space completely for the use of decision making in an
intrusion detection system.
Uncertainty is also occurred due to ambiguous information about computer users’
activities. The patterns generated from users’ behavior cannot be specifically defined as
normality and abnormality. In order to illustrate this type of uncertainty, let us consider
the following example of a person who tries to access an account from a remote machine.
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A user attempts to retrieve forgotten passwords when he/she logins his/her own account,
this action is considered as a normal behavior. On the other hand, the action that a hacker
attempts to access other people’s accounts by guessing passwords is definitely an
intrusive activity. Thus, uncertainty is involved during the process of classification. If the
guessing passwords behavior of a hacker is considered as a normal activity, then the
intrusion can never be detected. If the retrieving forgotten passwords behavior of a user is
considered as an intrusive activity, then the system administrators may fire an alarm but
actually there is no intrusion happened. Hence, uncertainty is necessary to be concerned
in the imprecise available data set during the intrusion detection procedure.

4.3 Approach
Intrusion detection in fact is a classification task that classifies network traffics into
normal usage category or attack category. In our work, the main goal is to identify U2R
and R2L attacks from the KDD99 intrusion detection benchmark data set. For
successfully achieving the goal, we divide the development of an intrusion detection
system into two phases: training phase and classification phase. In the training phase,
decision rules are generated in accordance with the clustering result of provided training
data. The rules are used for classifying future network traffic whether is a normal activity
or an attack in the classification phase. Figure 4.1 depicts the general operation scheme of
the proposed approach. The details are described as follows.
A. The Training Phase

Let us assume the available information in a given training set is from a network with N
traffic connections, and each of them is composed of n distinct features with positive
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Figure 4.1. Intrusion Detection Scheme
numeric values. We denote the training set as T, the training traffic connection as x, and
the set of features in each connection as F. Equations 4.1 and 4.2 denote T and F,
respectively.
T = { x1 , x 2 , ..., x N }

(4.1)

F = { f 1 , f 2 , ..., f n }

(4.2)

and

As described in the previous section, a training traffic connection sometimes could not be
crisply defined as normality or abnormality. The boundary between normal activities and
abnormal ones are always unclear. Crisp clustering algorithms cannot handle this
ambiguity problem among network activities. Therefore, we decide to apply fuzzy cMeans (FCM) clustering technique developed by Dunn in 1973 [14] and improved by
Bezdek in 1981 [13] to the following study. It allows one piece of data with gradual
memberships to the clusters rather than completely assigning to just one cluster. By using
this feature of FCM, the problem of ambiguity between attacks and normal activities can
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be solved. The connection could be assigned to diverse classes with different degrees of
memberships. We denote the set L as a number of p possible classes.
L = { l1 , l 2 , ..., l p }

(4.3)

The clustering procedure is done by using iterative optimization technique to minimize an
objective function J.
p

N

σ

J = ∑ ∑ uij xi − c j

2

(4.4)

i =1 j =1

where the parameter σ is a weighting exponent on each fuzzy membership and has a
value in the range [1, ∞). This parameter determines the amount of fuzziness in the
classification process. When it is set to 1, the FCM approaches a hard c-Means algorithm,
i.e., the membership grade assigning to cluster is either 0 or 1. As this parameter becomes
larger, the fuzzier are the membership assignments to the clusters. Also, convergence of
the algorithm tends to be slower as the value of σ increases. Normally, its value is in the
range of 1.25 to 2 [70]. xi is the ith connection of the training set, cj is the center of cluster
j, and uij is the membership grade of xi in the cluster j with a value between 0 and 1. || ||
denotes norm expressing the distance between any measured data and the cluster center.
The membership grades uij and cluster centers cj are updated by the following
expressions,
N

cj =

σ
∑ u ij xi
i =1
N

∑ u ij

(4.5)

σ

i =1

and
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1

uij =

⎛ xi − c j
∑ ⎜⎜
x −c
k =1
⎝ i k
p

⎞
⎟
⎟
⎠

(4.6)

2
σ −1

By iteratively updating the cluster centers and the membership grades for each training
connection, FCM moves the cluster centers gradually to their correct values. Finally, the
iteration stops when maxij u ij

( k +1)

− u ij

(k )

< ε , where ε is a selected threshold for

terminating the iteration process and k denotes the number of iterations.
The connection that lies “closer” to the center of a class has a higher membership grade
to that class. On the contrary, the connection that lies “farther” away from the center of a
class has a lower membership grade to that class. Training connections are grouped into p
classes such that each connection has a certain membership grade to every class. The set
of cluster centers C and membership partition matrix U are shown below.
C = {c1 , c2 , ..., c p }

(4.7)

U = [ ui1 , ui 2 , ..., uip ]

(4.8)

and

where i is the connection number of the training set and p is the number of possible
classes. For each cluster center, it has a number of n values.
Within each row of U, the p membership grades are treated intuitively to be our degrees
of confidence on p classes that a connection can belong to. Consequently, we can build p
decision rules from a connection and each consists of a number of feature values F, a
class label l, and a confidence value α.
RU = {rU } where

rU : F , l , α

(4.9)
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The confidence values are in proportion to the correspondent membership grades that a
connection belongs to certain classes. For a training connection, only portion of our belief
is devoted to a certain class in a rule whereas the rest of beliefs are committed to other
classes in other rules. The summation of the degrees of confidence on rules that generated
from a training connection must be equal to 1. It is not possible that the connection can
belong to any other classes except these p classes.
p

∑ α ij = 1

(4.10)

j =1

where i is the connection number and j is the class number. Since the training set has N
connections and each contains a number of p membership grades, totally N times p
decision rules can therefore be generated.
In addition to the rules created from membership partition matrix U, a number of p rules
are generated from the cluster centers. In each rule, the antecedent part includes n values
of a cluster center and the corresponding class label. The degree of confidence is
designated to 1 because we have full confidence that the cluster center should belong to
that partitioned class without any doubt.
RC = {rC } where

rC : c, l , α = 1

(4.11)

With Equations 4.9 and 4.11, totally (N+1)p rules are included in the decision rule set R.
These rules will act as pieces of evidence to assign beliefs to an incoming connection in
the decision making stage.
R = RU U RC

(4.12)
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B. The Classification Phase

In the classification problem of intrusion detection, a complete prior knowledge regarding
the probability distributions of attacks and normal behavior is not available. Also, the
amount of traffic data for design is always limited. Hence, we decide to incorporate
Dempster-Shafer theory into this phase because it does not require an assumption
regarding the probability of the individual classes. It computes the probability that
evidences support the attack or normal class. Also, this theory offers a solution for the
mathematical representation of uncertainty. It is suitable for anomaly detection on unseen
network traffic by using limited information on the uncertainty. With the combination of
accumulative evidences from an insufficient amount of information, it is capable of
making decision on a traffic whether it is normality or abnormality. In this phase, the
pieces of evidences will be derived from the decision rules of the training phase.
Dempster-Shafer theory also known as Evidence Theory or Theory of Believe Functions,
was introduced by Glenn Shafer in the late 1970s [16] based on the work of Arthur
Dempster [15]. It starts by defining a sample space named frame of discernment (or
simply frame), which is a finite set of mutually exclusive and exhaustive hypotheses in a
problem domain under consideration. For adopting the theory into our intrusion detection
design, we identify the set of class labels L as the frame of the problem domain. The
possible subset A of L represent hypothesis that one could present evidence. The set of all
possible subsets of L, including itself and the null set ∅ , is called a power set and
designated as 2L. Assume v be an incoming traffic connection to be classified. To classify
v means to assign it to one of the members in L, i.e., to assign v to a member of p classes:
v ∈ lq, q = 1, 2, …, p.
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A piece of evidence that influences our degree of belief on a hypothesis can be quantified
by a mass function which is denoted as m(⋅). It is a mapping function and defined as m: 2L
→ [0, 1] such that

∑ m( A) = 1

(4.13)

m(∅) = 0

(4.14)

A⊆ L

and

where A⊆L is called a focal element of m if m(A) > 0. The quantity m(A) is defined as the
hypothesis A’s basic probability assignment. It can be interpreted as the portion of total
belief to hypothesis A given the available evidence. For example, if m(A) = 0.2, then it
means that one’s belief committed to A is 20%. The left 80% beliefs are committed to
other focal elements of frame L.
We treat the set of decision rules as pieces of evidence that alters our degrees of belief to
which class v should belong while classifying it into the correct class. If the distance is
large between v and a decision rule, it represents that v is “far” from the rule, i.e., the rule
only has a little influence on v. On the other hand, we have stronger belief that v should
belong to the same class of the rule if v is “close” to it, which means the distance has a
smaller value. Here, distances from v to all decision rules are computed and the most
informative rules are selected. By using this technique, the computational time is less
than that of using the whole set of rules. Additionally, the weighted k-NN rule [70] is
used to assign different weights to the selected rules.

⎧ d ( x k , v) − d ( xi , v)
⎪
wi = ⎨ d ( x k , v) − d ( x1 , v)
⎪⎩
1

d ( x k , v) ≠ d ( x1 , v)
d ( x k , v) = d ( x1 , v)
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(4.15)

where xi is the ith rule, xk and x1 are the farthest and nearest rule of v, respectively, and d
is the Euclidean distance between v and a rule. This weighting factor is used to give each
decision rule a different amount of influence in a way that closer rule to v has larger
influence. The factor is calculated such that the nearest neighbor of v has a weight value
of 1 and the farthest kth neighbor has a value of 0. Since the range of this factor is from 0
to 1, the resulting weights possibly have very similar values. Therefore, for further
differentiating the rules’ degrees of importance to v, the confidence value α is added to
alter the degree of our belief on v.
m( lq ) = wi ⋅ α i

(4.16)

where i is the rule number and q is the corresponding class number of the ith rule. Up to
this stage, each rule creates a number of belief assignment indicating the degrees that v
belongs to certain classes. If the value of m is large, it means that we have a strong belief
that v belongs to the class of which m indicates. Otherwise v should belong to other
classes if m is small. Nevertheless, we need to notice that a belief should also be
designated to the frame (with every class labels). The reason is that only part of our
beliefs is committed to single class for a given training connection, and the rest of our
belief should be assigned to the frame. According to Dempster-Shafer theory, the
summation of all mass functions inferred from one training connection is equal to 1.
Thus, the belief belonged to the frame becomes one minus the summation of beliefs of all
of the single class.
p

m( L) = 1 − ∑ mi (l q )

(4.17)

i =1
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From the mass function given by Equation 4.16, the belief function Bel and plausibility
function Pl can be derived to characterize certain hypotheses. They are shown in the
following equations,
Bel (l j ) = m (l j )

(4.18)

Pl (l j ) = 1 − Bel (l j )

(4.19)

where j is class number and l j is the hypothesis “not lj” with value between 0 and 1.
Belief function is a measure of the total amount of belief that directly supports for a given
hypothesis. The greater the support assigns to a hypothesis, the higher belief that the
hypothesis is true. It can be regarded as a lower bound that indicates the impact of
evidence of the hypothesis. Plausibility quantifies the extent to which one doubts the
hypothesis. It shows the belief on the given hypothesis can only up to this value, which is
an upper bound on the belief. The gap between them indicates the uncertainty about the
hypothesis. It is a good reference in deciding whether more evidences are needed or not.
Haralick and Shapiro [72] represent those various measurements over the interval unit as
shown in Figure 4.2.
Now let us assume that the frame of the problem domain includes normal and attack
classes. A network traffic connection is coming and the goal is to decide whether it is a
normal activity or an attack by the use of belief and plausibility functions. Suppose we
have two pieces of evidence regarding the connection and the mass functions are 0.1 and
0.2 for normal class and attack class, respectively. By using Equations 4.18 and 4.19, the
belief and plausibility that support for normal class are 0.1 and 0.8 and for the attack class
are 0.2 and 0.9, respectively. From the observation of the gap between belief and
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plausibility, it has a high degree of uncertainty. This indicates that more evidences are
required to be incorporated so that we can make a better decision that the connection is a
normal activity or an attack.
Generally speaking, the mass function is a piece of evidence that supports certain
hypothesis concerning to the class member of a rule. When more evidences appear with
same class label, those evidences can be integrated to generate a single belief function
which represents the total support for the same class. Dempster Rule of Combination is
applied here to combine all the beliefs induced from distinct pieces of information with
same class label together. Using this combination rule, the final belief on every subset of
class set can be obtained. In our case, a number of belief functions for single classes and
one belief function for the class set will be generated.
Now assume that there are two mass functions m1 and m2 induced by distinct items of
evidence X and Y. By using Dempster Rule of Combination, these two independent
evidences can be fused into a single belief function Z that expresses the support of the
hypotheses in both evidences. The combination result is called orthogonal sum of m1 and
m2 and noted as m = m1 ⊕ m2.
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m( Z ) =

∑ m1 ( X ) ⋅ m2 (Y )

⎞
⎛
= ⎜ ∑ m1 ( X ) ⋅ m2 (Y ) ⎟ ⋅ k −1
⎠
∑ m1 ( X ) ⋅ m2 (Y ) ⎝ X IY =Z

X IY = Z

(4.20)

X IY ≠∅

where
−1

k

−1

⎛
⎞
⎛
⎞
= ⎜ ∑ m1 ( X ) ⋅ m2 (Y ) ⎟ = ⎜1 − ∑ m1 ( X ) ⋅ m2 (Y ) ⎟
⎝ X IY ≠∅
⎠
⎝ X IY =∅
⎠

−1

(4.21)

where the factor k-1 is the renormalization constant. Using the above equations, the final
belief on single class and the frame are obtained. In an intrusion detection task, a number
of p belief functions for single classes and one belief function for class set will be
generated. For example, totally four final belief functions are obtained if there are three
classes in the frame. There are three belief functions for single class and one belief
function for the frame. They give fused allocations of belief and emphasize the agreement
between multiple sources.
Let us continue with the previous example that we already have two pieces of evidence
regarding a connection. The mass functions of corresponding evidences are 0.1 and 0.2
for normal class and attack class, respectively. Now assume that we have two more
pieces of evidence regarding the same traffic connection and the correspondent mass
functions are 0.3 and 0.6 for normal class and attack class, respectively. Table 4.1 shows
the information of this example. The frame is
L = {l1 , l 2 } = {N , A}

(4.22)

By using Dempster Rule of Combination, the above evidences can be aggregated into two
fused belief functions Bel(N) and Bel(A). First, the renormalization constant factor k-1 is
calculated in Equation 4.23. Then, individual fused mass functions can be obtained by
using Equation 4.24. Equations 4.25 to 4.27 show the fused results.
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Table 4.1. Connection Information of the Example
m1(N) = 0.1
m2(N) = 0.3
m2(A) = 0.6
m2(N, A) = 0.1

m1(A) = 0.2

m1(N, A) = 0.7

m(N) = 0.03
m(N I A) = 0.06 m(N) = 0.21
m(N I A) = 0.06 m(A) = 0.12
m(A) = 0.42
m(N) = 0.01
m(A) = 0.02
m(N, A) = 0.07

* Normal and Attack are abbreviated as N and A, respectively.
Uncertainty between belief and plausibility is abbreviated as U.

k

−1

⎛
⎞
= ⎜ ∑ m1 ( N ) ⋅ m2 ( A) ⎟
⎝ N I A≠ ∅
⎠

−1

⎛
⎞
= ⎜1 − ∑ m1 ( N ) ⋅ m2 ( A) ⎟
⎝ N I A =∅
⎠

−1

= (1 − [m1 ( N ) I m2 ( A) + m1 ( A) I m2 ( N )])

−1

(4.23)

= (1 − (0.06 + 0.06) )
= 1.14

−1

[

]

m(lq ) = m1 (lq ) ⋅ m2 (lq ) + m1 (lq ) ⋅ m2 ( L) + m1 ( L) ⋅ m2 (lq ) ⋅ k −1

(4.24)

m(N) = m1⊕m2(N) = (0.03 + 0.01 + 0.21)⋅k-1 = 0.28 = Bel(N)

(4.25)

m(A) = m1⊕m2(A) = (0.12 + 002 + 0.42)⋅k-1 = 0.64 = Bel(A)

(4.26)

m(L) = m(N, A) = m1⊕m2 (N, A) = [m1(N, A)⋅m2(N, A)]⋅k-1 = 0.07⋅ k-1 = 0.08

(4.27)

The two fused belief functions m(N) and m(A) express the total support of normal class
and attack class, respectively. The plausibility and uncertainty functions for both normal
and attack classes can be derived using Equations 4.28 to 4.31.
Pl (N ) = 1 − Bel (N ) = 1 − Bel ( A) = 1 − 0.64 = 0.36

(4.28)

Pl ( A) = 1 − Bel (A ) = 1 − Bel ( N ) = 1 − 0.28 = 0.72

(4.29)

U(N) = Pl(N) - Bel(N) = 0.36 - 0.28 = 0.08

(4.30)

U(A) = Pl(A) - Bel(A) = 0.72 - 0.64 = 0.08

(4.31)
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Table 4.2. Data Fusion Result
m1
Bel1
Pl1
m2
Bel2
Pl2
m
Bel
Pl
U
Bp

{N}
0.1
0.1
0.8
0.3
0.3
0.4
0.28
0.28
0.36
0.08
0.32

{A}
0.2
0.2
0.9
0.6
0.6
0.7
0.64
0.64
0.72
0.08
0.68

{N, A}
0.7
1
1
0.1
1
1
0.08
1
1

The gap between belief and plausibility is 0.08. We can tell that uncertainty is reduced
significantly after incorporating more evidences. We have stronger believe that the
connection should be an attack.
At the data fusing level, each piece of evidence initializes the finite amount of belief to
hypotheses of the frame. Part of the belief is allocated to the single class and part of it is
allocated to the frame. To decide which class v should belong to, Equation 4.32 shows the
pignistic probability function and it is applied to make the final decision.
Bp (l q ) = m(l q ) +

m( L )
p

(4.32)

where q is the class number and p is the number of classes. The function quantifies our
beliefs to individual classes with pignistic probability distribution. These probabilities
distributed from zero to one and the summation of them equals to one. For making an
optimal decision, v is assigned to a class with the highest pignistic probability. Continue
with the example, the degrees of final belief on normal and attack classes are shown in
Equation 4.33 and 4.44, respectively. Table 4.2 shows the computation result.
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Bp(N) = m(N) + m(L)/2 = 0.28 + 0.08/2 = 0.32

(4.33)

Bp(A) = m(A) + m(L)/2 = 0.64 + 0.08/2 = 0.68

(4.34)

and
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CHAPTER V
EVALUATION OF FEATURE SELECTION ALGORITHM

In order to test the effectiveness of our feature selection method and compare it with
other methods, we test our method in a various sizes of data sets. In this chapter, the data
sets involved during the experiment are first introduced. We then demonstrate the
experimental methodology, followed by a discussion of the experiment results.

5.1 DARPA KDD99 Intrusion Detection Evaluation Data Set
In the beginning of the research of intrusion detection, the most preliminary step is to
prepare a data set that is good for developing an intrusion detection algorithm and for
future test. Some people built their own simulated network environment and collected
data by using sniff software such as tcpdump [73]. Although they included attacks
purposely, it is often difficult to build a large network with hundreds of computer to
mimic the real network scenario. Also the results of the specific simulated network
environment could not be compared with those from different networks. On the other
hand, people can use an existing data set to design and test their intrusion detection
systems and the most popular one is DARPA KDD99 Intrusion Detection Evaluation data
set [74]. The data set, also known as “DARPA Intrusion Detection Evaluation data set”,
has been chosen for analyzing the performance of our proposed classifier. It was created
by Lincoln Laboratory at MIT [17] and was used in The Third International Knowledge
Discovery and Data Mining Tools Competition, which was held in conjunction with

58

KDD-99 The Fifth International Conference on Knowledge Discovery and Data Mining
with the main objective of intrusion detection and report [74].
It is a tailor-designed data set for the research of intrusion detection and includes a wide
variety of intrusions from a simulated network environment. Although some people
criticize that the data set deliberates mix different types of legitimate traffic (different
ports and client platforms) with attacks, it is still the most realistic and publicly available
one with a full list of actual attacks [75]. Consequently, people have been using it for
designing and evaluating their intrusion detection systems. Also, the best is they can
compare their experimental results with those from others.
For acquiring the evaluation data set, Lincoln Labs built a Local Area Network (LAN) to
simulate a typical U.S. Air Force LAN. The LAN was operated as if it were a true Air
Force environment, but peppered it with multiple attacks. The victim machines subjected
to these attacks ran Linux, SunOSTM, and SolarisTM operating systems. The data set was
acquired from raw tcpdump data for a length of nine weeks. It is made up of a large
number of network traffic activities that include both normal and malicious connections.
In the KDD99 data set, three independent sets are included, they are “whole KDD”, “10%
KDD”, and “corrected KDD”. In our experiment, “10% KDD” and “corrected KDD” are
taken as our training and testing set, respectively. The training set contains a total of 22
training attack types, with an additional 17 types in the testing set. Totally 39 attack types
are included and they fall into four main classes, DoS, Probe, U2R, and R2L. Table 5.1
summarizes the connection distributions of training and testing sets we have used during
the entire work. Table 5.2 lists the attacks and note that the 22 types of attacks in training
set are marked underline. Figure 5.1 shows the detailed distributions of DoS, Probe, U2R,
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Table 5.1. Connection Distributions
Data Set
Training Set
Testing Set

Normal
97,277
60,593

DoS
391,458
229,853

R2L
1,126
16,189

U2R
52
228

Probe
4,107
4,166

Total
494,020
311,029

Table 5.2. Thirty-Nine Attacks
DoS
apache2, back,
land, mailbomb,
netpune, pod,
processtable,
smurf, teardrop,
udpstorm.

R2L
ftp_write, guess_passwd,
imap, multihop, named,
phf, sendmail,
snmpgetattack,
snmpguess, spy,
warezclient, warezmaster,
worm, xlock, xsnoop.

U2R
buffer_overflow,
httptunnel,
loadmodule, perl,
ps, rootkit,
sqlattack, xterm.

Probe
ipsweep, mscan,
nmap, portsweep,
saint, satan.

and R2L attacks. The signatures in DoS and Probe attacks in the testing set are very
similar to those present in the provided training set. However, the types of attack of U2R
and R2L attacks differ significantly between the training and the testing sets. In the
testing set, over 80% U2R attacks and 60% R2L attacks are new to the training set.
Each connection is a sequence of TCP packets starting and ending at some well defined
times. The set describes each connection in terms of 41 features plus a label of either
normal or a type of attack. The content of these features are continuous, discrete, or
symbolic with vary scales and ranges. These features can be classified into four classes,
basic, content, time-based, and host-based features. Table 5.3 shows the detailed
information of these 41 features. Features 1 to 9 are basic features that are derived from
packet header without inspecting the payload. Features 10 to 22 are content features that
are obtained by analyzing the payload of the original TCP packets. Features 23 to 31 are
time-based traffic features that capture properties of connections in the past 2 seconds.
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Figure 5.1. Distributions of Four KDD99 Attack Categories
: Training Set
: Testing Set
Features 32 to 41 are host-based traffic features that examine a number of connections
using a window of 100 connections instead of a 2-second time window.

5.2 UCI Data Sets
In our experiment, six different sizes of data sets are chosen from the UCI Machine
Learning Repository [76]. In the following we briefly describe the six data sets.
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Table 5.3. Forty-One Features
No.

Feature

Description

Type

1

duration

length (no. of seconds) of the connection

continuous

2

protocol_type

type of the protocol

discrete

3

service

network service on the destination

discrete

4

flag

status flag of the connection

discrete

5

src_bytes

no. of data bytes from source to destination

continuous

6

dst_bytes

no. of data bytes from destination to source

continuous

7

land

1 if connection is from/to the same host/port; 0 otherwise

discrete

8

wrong_fragment

no. of wrong fragments

continuous

9

urgent

no. of urgent packets

continuous

10

hot

no. of “hot” indicators

continuous

11

num_failed_logins

no. of failed logins

continuous

12

logged_in

1 if successfully logged in; 0 otherwise

discrete

13

num_compromised

no. of “compromised” conditions

continuous

14

root_shell

1 if root shell is obtained; 0 otherwise

continuous

15

su_attempted

1 if “su root” command attempted; 0 otherwise

continuous

16

num_root

no. of “root” accesses

continuous

17

num_file_creations

no. of file creation operations

continuous

18

num_shells

no. of shell prompts

continuous

19

num_access_files

no. of operations on access control files

continuous

20

num_outbound_cmds

no. of outbound commands in an ftp session

continuous

21

is_host_login

1 if the login belongs to the “hot” list; 0 otherwise

discrete

22

is_guest_login

1 if the login is a “guest” login; 0 otherwise

discrete

23

count

no. of connections to the same host as the current connection in the past two seconds

continuous

24

srv_count

no. of connections to the same service as the current connection in the past two seconds

continuous

25

serror_rate

% of connections that have “SYN” errors

continuous

26

srv_serror_rate

% of connections that have “SYN” errors

continuous

27

rerror_rate

% of connections that have “REJ” errors

continuous

28

srv_rerror_rate

% of connections that have “REJ” errors

continuous

29

same_srv_rate

% of connections to the same service

continuous

30

diff_srv_rate

% of connections to different services

continuous

31

srv_diff_host_rate

% of connections to different hosts

continuous

32

dst_host_count

count of connections having the same destination host

continuous

33

dst_host_srv_count

count of connections having the same destination host and using the same service

continuous

34

dst_host_same_srv_rate

% of connections having the same destination host and using the same service

continuous

35

dst_host_diff_srv_rate

% of different services on the current host

continuous

36

dst_host_same_src_port_rate

% of connections to the current host having the same src port

continuous

37

dst_host_srv_diff_host_rate

% of connections to the same service coming from different hosts

continuous

38

dst_host_serror_rate

% of connections to the current host that have an S0 error

continuous

39

dst_host_srv_serror_rate

% of connections to the current host and specified service that have an S0 error

continuous

40

dst_host_rerror_rate

% of connections to the current host that have an RST error

continuous

41

dst_host_srv_rerror_rate

% of connections to the current host and specified service that have an RST error

continuous
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Abalone: This data set is used for predicting the age of abalone from physical

measurements. It includes totally 4,177 data records and each of them consists of eight
features and one class label. Features include length (continuous), diameter (continuous),
height (continuous), whole weight (continuous), shucked weight (continuous), viscera
weight (continuous), shell weight (continuous), rings (integer). Classes are M (man), F
(female), and I (infant).
Cmc: The data set is provided to study the problem of predicting the current

contraceptive method choice (no use, long-term methods, or short-term methods) of a
woman based on her demographic and socio-economic characteristics. It contains 1,473
data records and each has nine features. Features are wife’s age (numerical), wife’s
education (categorical), husband’s education (categorical), number of children ever born
(numerical), wife’s religion (binary), wife’s now working (binary), husband’s occupation
(categorical), standard-of-living index (categorical), and media exposure (binary).
Classes are 1 (no-use), 2 (long-term), and 3 (short-term).
Ionosphere: This is radar data that were collected by a system in Goose Bay, Labrador.

It has 351 data records and each one has thirty four continuous features plus a class label.
It is used for binary classification tasks and therefore the class label is either good or bad.
Pima: This data set collects information from patients who are all females over 21-year

old of Pima Indian heritage. It includes 768 data records and has eight features which are
number of times pregnant, plasma glucose concentration a 2 hours in an oral glucose
tolerance test, diastolic blood pressure, triceps skin fold thickness, 2-hour serum insulin,
body mass index, diabetes pedigree function, and age. Classes are 0 and 1.
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Wdbc: For the study of breast tumor diagnosis, this data set provides 569 data records

and each one comprises an ID number plus thirty features that describe characteristics of
the cell nuclei presented in the image. The class label is M (malignant) or B (benign).
Wine: This data set includes 178 data records that represent the chemical analysis results

of wines grown in the same region in Italy but derived from three different cultivars.
Each data record has thirteen features, alcohol, malic acid, ash, alcalinity of ash,
magnesium, total phenols, flavanoids, nonflavanoid phenols, proanthocyanins, color
intensity, hue, OD280/OD315 of diluted wines, and praline, plus a class label (1, 2, or 3).

5.3 Experimental Methodology
A. Discretization of Features

In the six UCI data sets and KDD99 data set, each record is composed by a set of
features. The type of features is either discrete or continuous which the former is a
qualitative scale and the latter is quantitative. For qualitative scales, the values are simply
labels without any order involved. They could be symbolic or numeric values where are
distinct and separated. Also, it is a form of categorical data that has no “numeric”
meaning. By using the features of KDD99 data set as an example, the value of feature
protocol_type is one of the symbolic set {icmp, tcp, udp}. The numeric value of feature
logged_in is 1 or 0 to represent the user successfully logged in the system or not. For
quantitative scales, the data are characterized by numeric values within a finite interval.
The distance between any two adjacent values is not necessary the same. Examples can
be found in feature duration where it is given by numeric values to represent the lengths
of record, and the values are within an interval [0, 58,329].
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Since SU is calculated for discrete features only, all the continuous features in a given
data set are necessary to be discretized prior to the feature selection analysis. Thus, we
apply discretization method to transform continuous features to discrete ones prior to the
analysis. For a numeric feature, cut points effectively decompose the range of continuous
values into a number of intervals. These intervals can then be treated as categorical
values of a discrete feature. In our work, equal frequency binning technique [77] is
applied to each continuous feature individually. It is an unsupervised discretization
method with no class information involved. It sorts the observed values of a continuous
feature and then divides these values into a specified number of intervals. Each of the
intervals has an approximate equal number of values. With the use of discretization of
features, the complexity of every continuous feature is reduced as well.
B. Experimental Methodology

In order to evaluate the performance of our proposed feature selection algorithm on data
sets, two representative feature selection algorithms, CFS [77] and FCBF [63], built on
the top of SU are chosen. CFS method uses a correlation-based heuristic search algorithm
to evaluate the worth of subsets of features. It considers good feature subsets that are
highly correlated with the class, yet uncorrelated with one another. The heuristic
algorithm measures the merit of feature subsets from pairwise feature correlations and
then the subset with the highest merit found during the search is reported. Rather than
scoring the worth of subsets of features of CFS approach, FCBF method measures
correlations between features and classes and correlations between pairs of features as
well. It then selects features which are highly correlated with the class to predict but are
less correlated to any feature already selected. In addition, we apply two machine
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learning algorithms, naive bayes and C4.5 algorithm, to evaluate the detection accuracy
on the selected features for each feature selection algorithm.
The experiments are performed on the six UCI data sets and binary classification
(normal/attack) of KDD99 data set. Four new sets of data are generated from KDD99
data set according to the normal class and four categories of attack (DoS, Probe, U2R and
R2L). In each data set, connections with the same attack category and all the normal ones
are included. For each set, we run our proposed approach and the other two feature
selection algorithms CFS and FCBF, and record those features selected by each
algorithm. Throughout the entire experiments, the threshold of FCBF is set to 0. We then
apply C4.5 and naive bayes machine learning algorithms on each original full data set as
well as each newly obtained data set that includes only those selected features from
feature selection algorithms. By applying 10-fold cross-validation evaluation on each
data set, classification accuracy of six UCI data sets and standard measurements, such as
the detection rate (DR), false positive rate (FPR), and overall classification rate (CR), for
evaluating the performance of intrusion detection tasks are reported. The denotations of
True Positive (TP), True Negative (TN), False Positive (FP), and False Negative (FN) are
defined as follows.
•

True Positive (TP): The number of malicious records that are correctly identified.

•

True Negative (TN): The number of legitimate records that are correctly classified.

•

False Positive (FP): The number of records that were incorrectly identified as attacks
however in fact they are legitimate activities.

•

False Negative (FN): The number of records that were incorrectly classified as
legitimate activities however in fact they are malicious.
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Equations 5.1 to 5.3 describe DR, FPR, and CR, respectively.

DR =

TP
TP + FN

FPR =

CR =

(5.1)

FP
TN + FP

(5.2)

TP + TN
TP + TN + FP + FN

(5.3)

5.4 Experimental Results
Based on our developed feature selection algorithm, Tables 5.4 and 5.5 summarize the
selected features from our approach as well as those selected by CFS and FCBF
algorithms of UCI and KDD99 data sets, respectively. Table 5.6 summarizes the
classification accuracy of the six UCI data sets. Tables 5.7 and 5.8 summarize the
percentages of DRs and FPRs performed on KDD99 data set with C4.5 and naive bayes
learning algorithms, respectively. For an intrusion detection task, abnormal activities are
expected to be correctly identified and normal activities are anticipated not to be
misclassified. Therefore, a higher DR and a lower FPR are desired. In addition, we show
the results of SU measures of feature to class and feature to feature of KDD99 data sets in
Tables 5.9 and 5.10, respectively.
From Table 5.6, our approach shows higher averaged accuracies in comparison with the
outcomes of CFS and FCBF feature selection algorithms. Especially in the abalone data
set, we get the highest classification accuracy by using 2 out of 8 features performed on
C4.5 learning algorithm, which is better than that of using full feature set. The averaged
accuracies of Tables 5.7 and 5.8 also show that our approach outperform over CFS and
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Table 5.4. Selected Features of UCI Data Sets
Data Set
Ours
CFS
FCBF
Abalone
3,8
2,3,6,8
8
Cmc
1,4
2,4
2,4
Ionosphere
1,5,6,8,9,16,33,34
1,33
1,33
Pima
2,5,6,8
2,5,6
2
Wdbc
1,3,4,6-8,11,13,14,21,23,24,26-28 8,21,23,24,28
24
Wine
1,7,10,11-13
1,7,10-13
1,2,4,5,7,10-13
Table 5.5. Selected Features of KDD99 Data Sets
Data Set
Ours
CFS
FCBF
Normal-DoS 1-6,12,23,24,31,32,37 3,6,12,37 3,12,31,32
Normal-Probe 1-4,12,16,25,27-30,40 3,4,25,29 3,26,27,29
Normal-U2R
1-3,10,16
10
10,16
Normal-R2L
1-5,10,22
10
5,10,39
FCBF feature selection algorithms. The averaged DRs and the averaged FPRs of our
experimental results are better than those of using full feature set performed on C4.5 and
naive bayes, respectively.
In the Normal-DoS data set, the difference in DRs is very slight for all of the feature
selection algorithms. With our approach, the DR is the same as that of using full feature
set in C4.5 learning algorithm. In the Normal-U2R and Normal-R2L data sets, we have
satisfactory DRs and FPRs. Though CFS and FCBF approaches achieve low FPRs, they
have very poor DRs. In the Normal-Probe data set, both CFS and FCBF approaches fail
to achieve an acceptable presentation on DRs while using naive bayes leaning algorithm,
whereas our approach gains very high DRs performed on both leaning algorithms.
For any of the feature selection algorithms, FPRs are low because sufficient normal
records present in any of those four data sets. As for the number of misclassification
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attack records, our approach provides acceptable DRs on Normal-DoS, Normal-Probe
and Normal-R2L data sets using both C4.5 and naive bayes learning algorithms. It is not
only because each of the above data set supplies sufficient attack records but also most of
the attacks have a same attack signature. For example, the DoS attack type includes near
400,000 data records distributed in 10 different attacks, which 99% of the attacks are
netpune and smurf attacks. In the Probe attack category, 95% of attacks are ipsweep,
portsweep and satan that are distributed in 4,107 attacks. As for R2L attack class, more
than 90% of attacks are warezclient attack while 8 different kinds of attacks present. In
contrast, the classification presented on Normal-U2R data set is satisfactory neither on
full feature set approach nor on one of three feature selection algorithms. The NormalU2R data set includes 52 attack records which are insufficient for learning on a
classification algorithm. The experimental results have been published in [78].
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Table 5.6. CRs of C4.5 and Naive Bayes Using Full and Selected Feature Sets of
UCI Data Sets
Data Set

C4.5
Full Set

Ours

Naive Bayes
CFS

FCBF

Full Set

Ours

CFS

FCBF

Abalone

51.90

56.00 51.90

51.90

63.23

53.60 51.90

51.90

Cmc

63.68

54.65 52.89

52.89

53.36

52.61 52.27

52.27

Ionosphere

74.93

74.93 74.93

74.93

99.15

97.72 94.02

94.02

Pima

65.10

65.10 65.10

65.10

89.97

87.50 85.03

77.34

Wdbc

62.74

62.74 62.74

62.74

99.30

99.30 99.65

94.02

Wine

94.94

94.94 94.94

94.94

98.88

97.75 97.75

98.88

Average

68.88

68.06 67.08

67.08

83.98

81.41 80.10

78.07

Table 5.7. DRs of C4.5 and Naive Bayes Using Full and Selected Feature Sets of
KDD99 Data Sets
Data Set

C4.5
Full Set

Ours

Naive Bayes
CFS

FCBF

Full Set

Ours

CFS

FCBF

Normal-DoS

99.97

99.97 99.86

99.31

99.12

99.16 99.37

99.19

Normal-Probe

98.51

97.78 95.52

94.91

98.27

96.54 62.53

45.31

Normal-U2R

48.08

48.08

0

7.69

82.69

69.23

0

7.69

Normal-R2L

93.52

97.69

0

27.44

99.11

93.25

0

33.84

Average

85.02

85.88 48.85

57.34

94.80

89.55 40.48

46.51

Table 5.8. FPRs of C4.5 and Naive Bayes Using Full and Selected Feature Sets of
KDD99 Data Sets
Data Set

C4.5

Naive Bayes

Full Set

Ours

CFS

FCBF

Full Set

Ours

CFS

FCBF

Normal-DoS

0.04

0.03

2.19

7.58

0.01

0.01

2.76

7.77

Normal-Probe

0.02

0.38

0.36

0.36

1.29

0.87

0.15

0.10

Normal-U2R

0

0

0

0

0.63

0.50

0

0

Normal-R2L

0.01

0.01

0

0.02

1.31

0.49

0

0.08

Average

0.02

0.11

0.64

1.99

0.81

0.47

0.73

1.99
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Table 5.9. SU Measure of Feature (F) to Class (C) of KDD99 Data Set
Normal-DoS

Normal-Probe

Normal-U2R

Normal-R2L

Feature SU(F; C)
12
0.5939
3
0.4638
6
0.4578
37
0.3639
5
0.3423
32
0.3352
2
0.3284
36
0.3126
23
0.2698
31
0.2418
24
0.1699
35
0.1344
1
0.1211
34
0.1158
33
0.1104
39
0.1100
38
0.1028
26
0.0898
25
0.0893
30
0.0891
4
0.0743
29
0.0670
41
0.0397
40
0.0119
13
0.0022
28
0.0014
10
0
27
0
7
0
8
0
9
0
11
0
14
0
15
0
16
0
17
0
18
0
19
0
20
0
21
0
22
0

Feature SU(F; C)
29
0.2427
27
0.2263
25
0.2243
4
0.2223
30
0.1941
28
0.1460
38
0.1374
40
0.1365
41
0.1248
12
0.1232
3
0.1071
35
0.0875
2
0.0695
37
0.0549
26
0.0493
34
0.0466
23
0.0417
5
0.0408
33
0.0389
39
0.0350
36
0.0336
6
0.0304
32
0.0173
31
0.0158
24
0.0124
1
0.0065
16
0.0023
7
0
8
0
9
0
10
0
11
0
13
0
14
0
15
0
17
0
18
0
19
0
20
0
21
0
22
0

Feature SU(F; C)
10
0.0552
16
0.0131
1
0.0037
3
0.0033
33
0.0011
25
0.0010
41
0.0009
29
0.0008
40
0.0007
30
0.0006
36
0.0006
32
0.0005
4
0.0005
5
0.0005
37
0.0004
6
0.0004
27
0.0004
24
0.0003
35
0.0003
31
0.0003
23
0.0002
34
0.0002
39
0.0002
38
0.0002
2
0.0002
26
0.0002
12
0.0001
28
0
7
0
8
0
9
0
11
0
13
0
14
0
15
0
17
0
18
0
19
0
20
0
21
0
22
0

Feature SU(F; C)
10
0.2000
22
0.1919
3
0.0484
39
0.0184
38
0.0171
33
0.0161
4
0.0154
5
0.0143
1
0.0129
40
0.0125
37
0.0114
36
0.0111
6
0.0100
2
0.0086
23
0.0063
24
0.0063
35
0.0061
32
0.0050
12
0.0045
31
0.0045
41
0.0038
34
0.0038
30
0.0017
29
0.0016
26
0.0016
25
0.0007
28
0.0004
27
0.0001
7
0
8
0
9
0
11
0
13
0
14
0
15
0
16
0
17
0
18
0
19
0
20
0
21
0
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Table 5.10. SU Measure of Feature to Feature of KDD99 Data Set
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CHAPTER VI
EVALUATION OF FUZZY BELIEF INTRUSION DETECTION

In this chapter, we first test the feasibility of proposed fuzzy belief k-NN classifier in
intrusion detection task, and compare its result with those of three other k-NN based
classifiers: k-NN classifier [18], fuzzy k-NN classifier [79], and evidence-theoretic k-NN
classifier [80]. Then we apply the experimental results of Chapter V to all four classifiers
for observing the dissimilarities between applying full feature set and selected feature
subsets.

6.1 Experimental Methodology
A. Data Preprocessing

Duplicated connections were removed from the original training and testing data sets.
The new training set has 145,585 connections that are distributed as 87,831 normal
connections, 54,572 DoS attacks, 2,131 Probe attacks, 52 U2R attacks, and 999 R2L
attacks. The new testing set has 51,041 connections that are distributed as 47,913 normal
connections, 23,568 DoS attacks, 2,682 Probe attacks, 215 U2R attacks, and 2,913 R2L
attacks. In each connection, features represented by symbolic values and class labels are
replaced by numeric values for the use of classifiers. For example, the values of icmp,
tcp, and udp of feature protocol_type are replaced by values 1, 2, and 3, respectively.
Class labels for normal connections, U2R attacks and R2L attacks are substituted by
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values 1, 2, and 3, respectively. In addition, values of each feature are normalized
between 0 and 1 in order to offer equal importance among features.
B. Experimental Methodology

In order to evaluate the detection performance of the proposed fuzzy belief k-NN
classifier, three pattern classification algorithms are selected to compare with. One is kNN classifier and the other two are fuzzy k-NN classifier and evidence-theoretic k-NN
classifier that built on the base of k-NN rule.
The k-NN classifier is simple but effective in many pattern classification applications.
For an input to be classified, k nearest training patterns are obtained based on the
Euclidean distance measurement between the input and every training pattern. The input
is then simply assigned to the class by majority voting, i.e., the input is classified to the
most frequent class label among the k nearest training patterns. However, a major
drawback of k-NN algorithm is that the precision of classification may decrease if all
selected k nearest training patterns are equally important without considering the
differences of distances [80]. To eliminate this drawback, fuzzy k-NN classifier assigns
multiple membership grades to classes rather than a single class. By using the distance
differences from the k nearest training patterns, the degrees of membership grades to
classes are determined. As the evidence-theoretic k-NN classifier, it incorporates
Dempster-Shafer theory to treat the k nearest training patterns of an input pattern as
pieces of evidence to support certain hypotheses about the classes. By deriving evidences
from both class labels and distances between input and k nearest training pattern pairs,
these evidences are then combined into final beliefs with respect to each subset of the set
of classes.
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6.2 Experimental Results
Generally, a large amount of traffic records are essential for a classifier to be trained
when using anomaly detection and the consequence is that a long computational time is
required to reach a final decision. But unfortunately, the intrusion detection system has to
perform its analysis as quick as possible, otherwise serious damages could happen and
possibly cause millions of dollars loss. Therefore, only a small amount of connections are
included in our experiments for training the classifiers. It not only speeds up the
classification process but also simulates the uncertainty caused by lack of network traffic
information.
The experiments are performed on the binary (normal/attack) classification. To minimize
the inaccuracy and variation factor of experiment results, 10 trials are performed in every
U2R and R2L detection task. In each trial, certain percentages of normal and attack
connections are randomly selected from the training and testing sets. For detecting U2R
attacks, the training and testing sets comprise 930 (878 normal and 52 U2R) and 694 (479
normal and 215 U2R) connections, respectively. For detecting R2L attacks, the training
and testing sets include 977 (878 normal and 99 R2L) and 770 (479 normal and 291 R2L)
connections, respectively.
To detect the attacks, training and testing are performed in each trial. In the training
phase, the four classifier, k-NN, fuzzy k-NN, evidence-theoretic k-NN, and fuzzy belief
k-NN, are constructed. The testing data are then fed into the trained classifiers to identify
intrusions in the testing phase.
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We evaluate the performances of the four classifiers using distinct values of k that ranges
from 1 to 10. Tables 6.1 and 6.2 summarize the maximum, minimum, and averaged rates
of U2R and R2L attacks, respectively. Figures 6.1 and 6.2 show FPRs, DRs, CRs, and
Receiver Operating Characteristics (ROC) graphs of U2R and R2L attacks, respectively.
A ROC graph is a plot with FPR on the X axis and DR on the Y axis. Since these four
classifiers are discrete classifiers, each of them produces a single point representing the
pair of FPR and DR in the ROC space.
The results show that DRs of our classifier are much higher than those of other three
classifiers in detecting both U2R and R2L attacks. With our proposed classifier, a high
averaged DR of 98.16% is achieved when detecting U2R attacks. By using only one
nearest training connections for each testing connection, 98.33% DR has been reached.
On the contrary, the other three classifiers can only reach around 15% DRs no matter
fewer or more nearest training connections are applied. While detecting R2L attacks, the
averaged DR of 67.88% has been achieved. However the other three classifiers provide
only around 20% DRs. For the other three k-NN based classifiers, evidence-theoretic kNN classifier has a slightly better performance over k-NN and fuzzy k-NN classifiers. It
indicates that Dempster-Shafer theory of evidence-theoretic k-NN classifier provides a
degree of influence while detecting attacks in network traffic.
For identifying the normal connections in our classifier, the averaged FPRs are 13.71%
and 11.58% for U2R and R2L attacks, respectively. Three classifiers have very low FPRs
because they treat most network traffic data as normal connections no matter they are
normal or malicious activities. The above observation can be explained from the ROC
graphs.
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Table 6.1. FPRs and DRs Performed on Four Classifiers of Normal-U2R Data Sets
with k Ranging From 1 to 10
FPR
Min Avg.
0.04 0.20
0.15 0.27
0.08 0.31
12.73 13.71

Max
0.56
0.56
0.56
14.99

k-NN
Fuzzy k-NN
Evidence-Theoretic k-NN
Fuzzy Belief k-NN

0.16

1

0.14

0.9

Max
20.14
20.14
21.81
98.47

Avg.
12.87
15.49
16.87
98.16

0.8

0.12

0.7

0.1

0.6

DR

FPR

DR
Min
8.37
11.67
13.26
97.77

0.08

0.5
0.4

0.06

0.3

0.04

0.2

0.02

0.1

0

0
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

1

10

2

3

k

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

k

(a) False Positive Rates

(b) Detection Rates

0.95

1
0.9

0.9

0.8
0.7
0.6

CR

DR

0.85

0.5
0.4

0.8

0.3
0.2

0.75

0.1
0

0.7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

k

0

0.05

0.1

0.15

FPR

(c) Overall Classification Rates

(d) ROC Graphs

Figure 6.1. ROC Graphs of Four Classifiers Performed on Normal-U2R Data Set
x: k-NN, ∆: Fuzzy k-NN, : Evidence-Theoretic k-NN, •: Fuzzy Belief k-NN

77
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Table 6.2. FPRs and DRs Performed on Four Classifiers of Normal-R2L Data Sets
with k Ranging From 1 to 10
Max
0.56
0.56
0.61
12.17

k-NN
Fuzzy k-NN
Evidence-Theoretic k-NN
Fuzzy Belief k-NN

0.14

0.8

0.12

0.7

0.1

0.6

DR
Min
14.26
15.26
16.22
64.23

Max
23.51
26.29
25.67
71.17

Avg.
18.91
20.92
21.50
67.88

0.5

0.08

DR

FPR

FPR
Min Avg.
0.15 0.36
0.19 0.33
0.25 0.39
10.92 11.58

0.06

0.4
0.3

0.04

0.2

0.02

0.1

0

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

1

2

3

4

5

k

(a) False Positive Rates

7

8

9

10

(b) Detection Rates

0.85

1

0.83

0.9

0.81

0.8

0.79

0.7

0.77

0.6

DR

CR

6

k

0.75

0.5

0.73

0.4

0.71

0.3

0.69

0.2

0.67

0.1
0

0.65
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

k

0

0.02

0.04

0.06

0.08

0.1

0.12

FPR

(c) Overall Classification Rates

(d) ROC Graphs

Figure 6.2. ROC Graphs of Four Classifiers Performed on Normal-R2L Data Set
x: k-NN, ∆: Fuzzy k-NN, : Evidence-Theoretic k-NN, •: Fuzzy Belief k-NN
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0.14

In a ROC graph, the point (0, 1) represents the classifier performs a perfect
classification; it classifies all positive cases and negative cases correctly. On the contrary,
the point (1, 0) represents the classifier in the worst case, i.e., it classifies all cases
incorrectly. The lower left point (0, 0) represents the classifier never reports any false
positive errors, while the upper right point (1, 1) has an opposite policy that the classifier
predicts all cases to be positive. From both ROC graphs of U2R and R2L attacks, we can
see points of k-NN, fuzzy k-NN, and evidence-theoretic k-NN classifiers are all gathering
near point (0, 0), which indicate all of them seldom report false positive errors and
correctly predict a few of attacks. However, all the points of fuzzy believe k-NN classifier
are close to point (0, 1), which have higher DRs and have lower FPRs as well.
In summary, our classifier has a better performance compared with the other three
classifiers. By including only a small portion of connections from the training set of
KDD99, we achieve high DRs of identification of both U2R and R2L attacks.
Once we finish the feasibility test of fuzzy belief k-NN classifier, the results obtained in
Chapter V can thus be provided to classifiers to identify traffic data in a shorter period of
time. Tables 6.3 and 6.4 summarize the averaged FPRs and the averaged DRs performed
on four classifiers with k ranging from 1 to 10 of Normal-U2R and Normal-R2L data sets,
respectively.
In the comparison of four classifiers performed in different feature sets, k-NN, fuzzy kNN, and evidence-theoretic k-NN classifiers have similar detection performances using
either full feature set or one of selected feature subsets, which all the three k-NN based
classifiers have poor detection performances. The maximum DRs in rows 1 to 3 of Tables
6.3 and 6.4 are 19.64% and 26.33% for Normal-U2R and Normal-R2L data sets,
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Table 6.3. Averaged Rates Performed on Four Classifiers of Normal-U2R Data Set
with k Ranging From 1 to 10
Classifier

Full Set

Ours

CFS

FCBF

FPR

DR

FPR

DR

FPR

DR

FPR

DR

k-NN

0.20

12.87

2.55

18.03

0.20

15.07

0.21

15.21

Fuzzy k-NN

0.27

15.49

2.50

18.47

0.19

14.52

0.20

15.27

Evidence-Theoretic k-NN

0.31

16.87

2.65

19.64

0.23

16.99

0.26

18.48

Fuzzy Belief k-NN

13.71

98.16

9.54

83.86

0.25

11.72

0.16

7.32

Table 6.4. Averaged Rates Performed on Four Classifiers of Normal-R2L Data Set
with k Ranging From 1 to 10
Classifier

Full Set

Ours

CFS

FCBF

FPR

DR

FPR

DR

FPR

DR

FPR

DR

k-NN

0.36

18.91

3.68

20.41

0.26

14.42

3.05

19.31

Fuzzy k-NN

0.33

20.92

19.30

23.58

0.26

15.30

3.05

19.68

Evidence-Theoretic k-NN

0.39

21.50

8.76

26.33

0.27

15.84

4.50

26.23

Fuzzy Belief k-NN

11.58

67.88

9.86

69.82

0.18

7.78

0.19

7.98

respectively. With our proposed fuzzy belief k-NN classifier, the results of using three
feature selection algorithms differ a lot, which our selected features provide much
accurate DRs than those from CFS and FCBF. In the last row, the DRs of our approach
reach 83.86% and 69.82% for Normal-U2R and Normal-R2L data sets, respectively. Both
CFS and FCBF achieve low FPRs in the data sets because they treat most of the network
traffic data as normal usages no matter the traffic are normal or malicious activities. For a
better demonstration, Figure 6.3 shows the ROC graphs of four classifiers performed on
Normal-U2R and Normal-R2L data sets using our selected feature subset with k ranging
from 1 to 10. It shows the points of k-NN, fuzzy k-NN, and evidence-theoretic k-NN
classifiers are all gathering near point (0, 0), which indicates that none of them can
correctly identify attacks. However, all the points of fuzzy believe k-NN classifier are
much closer to point (0, 1), which have higher DRs and have lower FPRs as well.
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In Figure 6.4, we show the result of fuzzy belief k-NN classifier using full feature set and
three feature subsets selected by our developed feature selection algorithm, CFS, and
FCBF. For both data sets using features from CFS and FCBF, the diagrams show that all
of the points are in the vicinity of (0, 0), which represents all the traffic are classified as
normal activities and only a very few amount of attacks are correctly detected. In the left
diagram, the DR with full feature set is higher than that of using our feature subset,
however our selected features provide a better FPR result than that of using full feature
set. In the right diagram, we notice that the points with our selected features are closer to
point (0, 1) than those of using full feature set, which show that our selected features
achieve better detection outcomes in both DR and FPR than those of using full feature
set. In addition to the consideration of detection performance, we furthermore consider
the detection processing time because an intrusion detection system has to perform its
analysis as fast as possible before the attacks make any damage to the protected system.
Consequently, we compare the computation time of fuzzy belief k-NN classifier using
full feature set and our selected feature subset. Figure 6.5 illustrates the detection time on
each testing connection of both data sets. The results show that we successfully reduce
the computation time if our selected feature subset is used. Our approach only take about
25% of the time with full feature set in Normal-U2R and Normal-R2L data sets. The
related works have been published in [81]-[84].
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Figure 6.3. The Performance of Four Classifiers Using Normal-U2R (left) and
Normal-R2L (right) Data Sets
x: k-NN, ∆: Fuzzy k-NN, : Evidence-Theoretic k-NN, •: Fuzzy Belief k-NN
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Figure 6.4. The Performance of Fuzzy Belief k-NN Classifier Using Normal-U2R (left)
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Figure 6.5. Detection Time of One Connection Using Fuzzy Belief k-NN Classifier
(a) With all 41 features
(b) With 5 selected features in Normal-U2R set
(c) With 7 selected features in Normal-R2L set
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CHAPTER VII
ENSEMBLE INTRUSION DETECTION

An ensemble of classifiers is a set of base classifiers, whose classification decisions are
combined together in some way to achieve a better performance than that of individual
base classifier. In the intrusion detection task, we apply different feature subsets to base
classifiers. We call it as ensemble feature selection. Also, we apply data mining technique
to promote the FPR.

7.1 Ensemble Intrusion Detection Model
While designing an intrusion detection system, detection accuracy and speed are two
important considerations. The system needs to perform a proper detection task with low
FPR on normal computer usages and high DR on malicious activities. Also, this system
has to perform its analysis as soon as possible before the attacks make any damage to the
protected system. In the past, approaches to intrusion detection based on ensemble
techniques have been investigated with the use of different feature subsets [60] or soft
computing techniques [61] in every individual classifier. However, they only focused on
improving DR in known and unknown intrusions but did not consider reducing the
number of false alarms. Therefore, we propose an ensemble model that includes an
ensemble feature selecting classifier and a data mining classifier to act as anomaly
detection and misuse detection to improve the DR and FPR, respectively. The former
consists of a set of base feature selecting classifiers and each uses partial feature space.
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Ensemble Feature Selecting Classifier
Selected Features Classifier

Content Features Classifier

Combiner

Basic Features Classifier

Traffic Features Classifier

Data Mining
Classifier

Network
Traffic

Result

Figure 7.1. Ensemble Intrusion Detection Model
The latter applies data mining technique to look for patterns of normal activities. We
believe that the overall performance of this ensemble architecture is better than that of
each individual classifier. Also, DR, FPR, and detection speed are more accurate and
faster than those of using full feature set. Figure 7.1 depicts our design.
A. Ensemble Feature Selection Classifier

In an ensemble classifier design, it is important to understand that individual base
classifiers should be independent of each other. If the base classifiers provide similar
outputs, then no significant improvement of the ensemble result can be obtained through
the combination process. It is critical to notice the diversity among base classifiers in
order to get effective and correct classification result. Hence, we decide to use ensemble
feature selection approach to be our feature selecting classifier structure. By choosing
dissimilar feature subsets for various base feature selecting classifiers, the diversity
among these classifiers is expected to be maximized to achieve a better result. In our
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design, we select four distinct subsets of features to be the foundation of the base
classifiers. One subset consists of features selected by our feature selection algorithm.
The other three are the partitions of the original 41 features that are 9 basic features (1 to
9), 13 content features (10 to 22), and 19 traffic features (23 to 41).
Besides the notability of multiplicity among the base classifiers, the right choice of a
combination method is another important issue in creating a successful ensemble result.
As described in Section 2.6, research has shown that there are many methods [59]
available for combining the abstract form outputs of the base classifiers into an ensemble
result. However, some of them in fact are not suitable for our ensemble intrusion
detection design. For example, the behavior knowledge space method requires enough
representative data sets to estimate high order distribution of classifiers’ outputs.
Otherwise overfitting is likely to occur, and the generalization error quickly increases
[85]. In our designed intrusion detection model, we only use a very small amount of
traffic data that is insufficient to offer behavior knowledge space method a representative
number of observations. While the majority voting ensemble approach is used for
integration, Hansen and Salamon [62] had proved that the ensemble only works if the CR
of individual base classifier is higher than 50% accurate and independent of each other.
However, we cannot guarantee that all the classification accuracies of our designed four
base classifiers would satisfy the above requirement. Accordingly, naive bayes ensemble
is selected to combine the decisions of base classifiers together. Based on its probabilistic
approach, the evidences of base classifiers are computed and the most appropriate class
can then be chosen. Its operation is explained as follows.
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Let the possible classes of a system be l1 , l 2 , ..., l p ∈ L and these p classes are mutually

exclusive and exhaustive, i.e., the decision result of the system belongs to only one of the
classes. The set D = {d1 , d 2 , ..., d m } denotes a set of m base feature selecting classifiers
and each of them is built from a feature subset of the feature space F = { f1 , f 2 , ..., f n } .
The output of each base classifier o is an abstract form class label. Then the objective is
to find the probability over a class member l conditional on the outcomes of m classifiers,
h1 through hm.
m

P (h1 , ..., hm | li ) = ∏ P (oij | li )

(7.1)

j =1

p

P (h1 , ..., hm ) = ∑ P(h1 , ..., hm | li ) P(li )

(7.2)

i =1

Here, P(h1 , ..., hm | li ) is the conditional probability of h1 , ..., hm given li and P(oij|li) is the
conditional probability of oij given li. The prior probability of each class is P(li)
and P(h1 , ..., hm ) is the probability of h1 , ..., hm .
Based on the Bayes theorem, we have
P (li | h1 , ..., hm ) =

P(h1 , ..., hm | li ) P(li )
P(h1 , ..., hm )

(7.3)

where i is the number of possible classes ranging from 1 to p. This posterior probability
collects all evidences from base classifiers and integrates them together. Finally, the
naive bayes classifier infers the state of system by choosing a class that achieves the
highest posterior probability.
To illustrate how naive bayes ensemble method works, we assume there are 4 intrusion
detection base feature selecting classifiers h1, h2, h3, and h4 that are built by features
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Table 7.1. Intrusion Detection Accuracies of Four Base Feature Selecting Classifiers
Classifier 1 Classifier 2 Classifier 3 Classifier 4
FPR
DR

20%
70%

10%
60%

30%
50%

10%
90%

selected by our feature selection algorithm, 9 basic features, 13 content features, and 19
traffic features, respectively. The intrusion detection task is a binary assignment, i.e.,
each base classifier assigns the network traffic data into either normal activity l1 or attack
l2 .
Suppose we have tested an amount of network traffic data and the distributions of the
normal activities and attacks of the testing set are 60% and 40%, respectively. The FPRs
and DRs of four base feature selecting classifiers are shown in Table 7.1. Here the goal is
to

classify

a

future

network

traffic

data

x

into

normal

activity

if

P(l1 | h1 , h2 , h3 , h4 ) > P(l2 | h1 , h2 , h3 , h4 ) , else into attack category. Now assume a traffic
data passes through these 4 base classifiers. The first, second and fourth classifiers
identify it as a normal usage, however the third one recognizes it as an attack. Then,
4

P (h1 , h2 , h3 , h4 | l1 ) = ∏ P (o1 j | l1 ) = (1 − 0.2) ⋅ (1 − 0.1) ⋅ 0.3 ⋅ (1 − 0.1) = 0.1944

(7.4)

j =1

4

P (h1 , h2 , h3 , h4 | l 2 ) = ∏ P(o2 j | l 2 ) = (1 − 0.7) ⋅ (1 − 0.6) ⋅ 0.5 ⋅ (1 − 0.9) = 0.006

(7.5)

j =1

2

P (h1 , h2 , h3 , h4 ) = ∑ P(h1 , h2 , h3 , h4 | li ) P(li )
i =1

= 0.1944 ⋅ 0.6 + 0.006 ⋅ 0.4 = 0.11904
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(7.6)

Hence, the joint posterior probabilities of P (l1 | h1 , h2 , h3 , h4 ) and P (l2 | h1 , h2 , h3 , h4 )
based on the above calculation and the prior probabilities of normal activities and attacks
are
P (l1 | h1 , h2 , h3 , h4 ) =

P(h1 , h2 , h3 , h4 | l1 ) P(l1 ) 0.1944 ⋅ 0.6
=
= 0.9798
P (h1 , h2 , h3 , h4 )
0.11904

(7.7)

P (l 2 | h1 , h2 , h3 , h4 ) =

P(h1 , h2 , h3 , h4 | l 2 ) P(l 2 ) 0.006 ⋅ 0.4
=
= 0.0202
P(h1 , h2 , h3 , h4 )
0.11904

(7.8)

We have 97.98% degree of confidence that the incoming traffic data x belongs to class l1
which is greater than that of class l2. We therefore conclude x is a normal computer user
activity.
B. Data Mining Classifier

Having finished the process of ensemble classification, another important concern is the
problem of false alarm rate. Due to the entire scope of both normal and attack behavior is
covered during the training procedure, much study has shown that one of the most
common problems of anomaly intrusion detection is too many false alarms might happen
likely resulted from normal behavior. Hence, we suggest a two levels model that
combines parallel and serial ensemble topologies together for getting a better quality of
detection. In the second level data mining classifier, we utilize data mining technique to
construct a filter to eliminate false alarms.
Data mining technique provides strategy to find useful information from large amount of
data and induce inferences from those information. Here, we use C4.5 decision trees
algorithm to extract patterns from training data. The goal is to find rules that represent
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normal behavior of network traffic stream for our intrusion detection task. In this way, we
can write decision rules as follows.
Rule: IF conditions of features THEN the traffic is a normal behavior
In each rule, the antecedent part consists of a number of conditions that are satisfied by
the features. The consequent action of that rule is defined as the analyzed network traffic
data is a normal behavior.
The data mining classifier compares the result of first level ensemble classifier with those
well defined normal patterns, and the normal computer user activity to the system can be
identified if the data is matched with one of these defined patterns. The data mining
classifier has a higher priority to determine a traffic data is whether a normal behavior or
not if it has a disagreement with the result of ensemble classifier.

7.2 Experimental Results
Continuing on the experiments of Chapters V and VI, we perform experiments over the
KDD99 data set. As shown in the previous section, we propose a two levels model,
ensemble feature selecting classifier and data mining classifier, to classify network traffic
into normal and malicious activities. In the experiments, we first implement the data
mining classifier which uses C4.5 decision trees algorithm to extract rules from the
training set.
Next, we implement the ensemble feature selecting classifier, which is constructed by
four individual base classifiers and each models the system behavior from a single aspect
of view point. By varying the feature subsets and maximizing the disagreement among
four base classifiers, we use four distinct feature representations from the original feature
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Table 7.2. DRs of Classifiers Performed on Normal-U2R Data Set
Classifier

Full Set

Ours

Basic

Content

Traffic

FPR

DR

FPR

DR

FPR

DR

FPR

DR

FPR

DR

k-NN

0.20

12.87

2.55

18.03

6.33

19.98

0.09

18.57

1.06

15.12

Fuzzy k-NN

0.27

15.49

2.50

18.47

5.94

26.40

0.09

26.40

0.99

15.85

Evidence-Theoretic k-NN

0.31

16.87

2.65

19.64

7.16

28.74

0.12

20.24

1.13

15.80

Fuzzy Belief k-NN

13.71

98.16

9.54

83.86

9.48

59.01

11.38

74.42

39.74

54.26

Table 7.3. DRs of Classifiers Performed on Normal-R2L Data Set
Classifier

Full Set

Ours

Basic

Content

Traffic

FPR

DR

FPR

DR

FPR

DR

FPR

DR

FPR

DR

k-NN

0.36

18.91

3.68

20.41

8.11

17.14

0.24

22.62

1.43

28.71

Fuzzy k-NN

0.33

20.92

19.30

23.58

21.48

24.39

0.25

24.39

1.41

28.80

Evidence-Theoretic k-NN

0.39

21.50

8.76

26.33

10.73

20.40

0.27

26.65

1.52

29.60

Fuzzy Belief k-NN

11.58

67.88

9.86

69.82

9.70

60.66

11.43

53.07

19.65

51.66

space, they are our feature selection result, the 9 basic features, the 13 content features,
and the 19 traffic features. For each base classifier, fuzzy belief k-NN algorithm is used.
Using the same experimental setup in Section 6.2, the experiments are performed on the
binary (normal/attack) classification and 10 trials are performed for each k nearest
neighbor experiment. For detecting U2R attacks, the training and testing sets include 930
(878 normal and 52 U2R) and 694 (479 normal and 215 U2R) connections, respectively.
For detecting R2L attacks, the training and testing sets include 977 (878 normal and 99
R2L) and 770 (479 normal and 291 R2L) connections, respectively. The results of our
experiments are summarized in Tables 7.2 and 7.3 for Normal-U2R and Normal-R2L data
sets, respectively. For each of them, the tables show the averaged FPR, DR, and CR on
the test sets of four base classifiers trained using full feature set and four diverse feature
subsets. The averaged accuracies are reported with k ranging from 1 to 10 where the
classification algorithm is run 10 times for each k.
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The results show that three classifiers, k-NN, fuzzy k-NN and evidence-theoretic k-NN
classifiers, performed in different feature sets have similar detection performances using
either full feature set or one of feature subsets, which all of them have poor detection
performances. In rows 1 to 3 of Tables 7.2 and 7.3, the maximum DRs are 28.74% and
29.60% for Normal-U2R and Normal-R2L data sets, respectively. These three classifiers
have low FPRs because they treat most network traffic data as normal connections no
matter these connections are normal or malicious activities. With our proposed fuzzy
belief k-NN classifier, we achieve higher averaged accuracies in comparison with the
outcomes of the other three k-NN based classifiers. Especially in the Normal-R2L data
set, we get the highest classification accuracy by using 7 out of 41 features, which is
better than that of using full feature set.
Having built individual base feature selecting base classifiers, we then proceed to
generate the ensemble one by fusing the outputs of base classifiers together. In addition,
we utilize data mining technique to look for patterns of normal activities in training set
and then to produce a set of ten decision rules which cover 95% of normal behavior. With
the combination of ensemble feature selecting classifier and data mining classifier, the
final intrusion detection model is thus obtained. Figures 7.2 and 7.3 show the
comparisons between fuzzy belief k-NN classifier using full feature set and ensemble
intrusion detection model. Table 7.4 shows the decision rules.
With our proposed ensemble model, we achieve 95.45% and 87.33% averaged CRs for
Normal-U2R and Normal-R2L data sets, respectively, which are higher than 89.97% and
80.66% of the single fuzzy belief k-NN classifier using full feature set. As shown in the
ROC graphs, all the points of ensemble model are much closer to point (0, 1) than those
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Figure 7.2. CRs (left) and ROC Graph (right) of Normal-U2R Data Set with
k Ranging From 1 to 10
x: Fuzzy Belief k-NN Classifier Using Full Feature Set
•: Ensemble Intrusion Detection Model
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x: Fuzzy Belief k-NN Classifier Using Full Feature Set
•: Ensemble Intrusion Detection Model
of classifier using full feature set, which indicate the ensemble model not only has a high
DR but also has a low FPR. To show the performance of ensemble model for specific
intrusions, Table 7.5 describes the detailed DRs. The result shows that our model is
capable of detecting most of the intrusions, especially 7 intrusions (loadmodule, perl,
sqlattack, imap, worm, xlock, and xsnoop) are detected perfectly. In addition, we test the
detection time on each testing connection and illustrate the result in Figure 7.4. The
results show that we successfully reduce the detection time which our ensemble model
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only needs 0.44 and 0.41 of that of classifier using full feature set in Normal-U2R and
Normal-R2L data sets, respectively. The results have been published in [86].
Table 7.4. Decision Rules
Rule 1
IF wrong_fragment < 3 AND
num_compromised < 1 AND
srv_serror_rate < 0.06 AND
rerror_rate < 0.06 AND
flag = SF AND
hot < 1 AND
protocol_type = tcp AND
service = http
THEN normal connection

Rule 2
IF wrong_fragment < 3 AND
num_compromised < 1 AND
srv_serror_rate < 0.06 AND
rerror_rate < 0.06 AND
flag = SF AND
hot < 1 AND
protocol_type = tcp AND
service = smtp
THEN normal connection

Rule 3
IF wrong_fragment < 3 AND
num_compromised < 1 AND
srv_serror_rate < 0.06 AND
rerror_rate >= 1 AND
hot < 1 AND
service = 20 AND
diff_srv_rate < 0.01 AND
flag = REJ
THEN normal connection

Rule 4

Rule 5

Rule 6

IF wrong_fragment < 3 AND
num_compromised < 1 AND
srv_serror_rate < 0.06 AND
rerror_rate < 0.06 AND
flag = SF AND
hot < 1 AND
protocol_type = udp AND
dst_host_rerror_rate < 0.01 AND
diff_srv_rate < 0.01 AND
src_bytes >= 30 AND
src_bytes < 158
THEN normal connection

IF wrong_fragment < 3 AND
num_compromised < 1 AND
srv_serror_rate < 0.06 AND
rerror_rate < 0.06 AND
flag = SF AND
hot < 1 AND
protocol_type = udp AND
dst_host_rerror_rate < 0.01 AND
diff_srv_rate >= 0.5
THEN normal connection

IF wrong_fragment < 3 AND
num_compromised < 1 AND
srv_serror_rate < 0.06 AND
rerror_rate < 0.06 AND
flag = SF AND
hot < 1 AND
protocol_type = tcp AND
service = 17 AND
dst_bytes < 29 AND
duration < 1 AND
src_bytes >= 5 AND
src_bytes < 30
THEN normal connection

Rule 7
IF wrong_fragment < 3 AND
num_compromised < 1 AND
srv_serror_rate < 0.06 AND
rerror_rate < 0.06 AND
flag = SF AND
hot < 1 AND
protocol_type = tcp AND
service = ftp_data AND
dst_bytes < 29 AND
duration < 1 AND
src_bytes >= 32 AND
src_bytes < 246
THEN normal connection

Rule 8
IF wrong_fragment < 3 AND
num_compromised < 1 AND
srv_serror_rate < 0.06 AND
rerror_rate < 0.06 AND
flag = SF AND
hot < 1 AND
protocol_type = tcp AND
service = ftp_data AND
dst_bytes < 29 AND
duration < 1 AND
src_bytes >= 248 AND
src_bytes < 334
THEN normal connection

Rule 10
IF wrong_fragment < 3 AND
num_compromised < 1 AND
srv_serror_rate < 0.06 AND
rerror_rate < 0.06 AND
flag = SF AND
hot < 1 AND
protocol_type = tcp AND
service = ftp_data AND
dst_bytes < 29 AND
duration < 1 AND
src_bytes >= 726
THEN normal connection
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Rule 9
IF wrong_fragment < 3 AND
num_compromised < 1 AND
srv_serror_rate < 0.06 AND
rerror_rate < 0.06 AND
flag = SF AND
hot < 1 AND
protocol_type = tcp AND
service = ftp_data AND
dst_bytes < 29 AND
duration < 1 AND
src_bytes >= 335 AND
src_bytes < 644
THEN normal connection

Table 7.5. Detection Performances of Ensemble Model
Normal-U2R
FPR
3.13
DR 92.30
buffer_overflow 97.00
loadmodule 100.00
perl 100.00
rootkit 50.77
httptunnel 98.92
ps 77.19
sqlattack 100.00
xterm 67.08

Normal-R2L
FPR
DR
ftp_write
guess_passwd
imap
multihop
phf
warezmaster
named
sendmail
snmpgetattack
snmpguess
worm
xlock
xsnoop

3.15
71.66
93.75
97.96
100.00
92.96
0.00
74.61
77.40
57.58
0.00
1.15
100.00
100.00
100.00
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Figure 7.4. Detection Time on One Connection
(a) Full Feature Set
(b) Ensemble Model in Normal-U2R set
(c) Ensemble Model in Normal-R2L set
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7

CHAPTER VIII
CONCLUSIONS

This research presents a solution to the problem of quickly and accurately detecting
computer intrusions from network traffic data. The goal of our work has been set to
detect attacks that attackers use illegal approaches to gain access to the target host and
thus further to exploit the system’s vulnerabilities. The proposed solution includes three
major parts. They are feature selection algorithm, fuzzy belief machine learning
algorithm, and ensemble intrusion detection model.

8.1 Feature Selection Algorithm
The first question in intrusion detection design is what features of a network traffic
should be used to build the model. We start with our research on studying this problem
and developing a correlation-based feature selection algorithm to select a set of most
significant features that reserve vital information of traffic data. For evaluating the
performance of our algorithm, six small and four large databases are used. We observe
that the classification accuracy is improved by using our selected features from the
original feature set, e.g., the CR of the abalone set performing on C4.5 algorithm with 2
out of 8 features, the DR of Normal-DoS set performing on Naive Bayes algorithm with
12 out of 41 features, and the DR of Normal-R2L set performing on C4.5 algorithm with
7 out of 41 features. We also observe that our algorithm has a superior performance
compared with that of two participating correlation-based feature selection algorithms,
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CFS and FCBF, in both small and large data sets. Especially in the Normal-U2R and
Normal-R2L data sets, CFS can detect none of the attacks and FCBF can only detect
around 7% and 30% of U2R and R2L attacks, respectively. On the other hand, the
detection performance of our selected features is close to that of using full feature set.
The result shows that our algorithm approach can be a practical feature selector to select
informative features from data sets for classification tasks.

8.2 Fuzzy Belief Machine Learning Algorithm
We study the problems of uncertainty and ambiguity in audit network traffic data. The
key idea is to imitate ambiguous of users’ activities by fuzzy clustering technique, and to
simulate uncertainty caused by limited information by incorporating only a small amount
of network traffic data for analysis. With the use of Dempster-Shafer theory, we identify
future network traffic by fusing evidences found in clustering development. Also, we
employ k-NN technique to speed up the detection process. The experimental result shows
that our approach is capable of detecting U2R attacks with an averaged DR of 98.16%
using the full feature space. While detecting R2L attacks, we achieve an averaged DR of
67.88%. Compared with the past research results [6]-[12] having very low DRs, we
successfully improve the detection on those two attacks that contain degrees of
ambiguous information. However, we do have relatively high false alarm rates of 13.71%
and 11.58% for U2R and R2L attacks, respectively. That is the stimulus that we
incorporate data mining technique in the ensemble model, which we hope to further
reduce the number of false alarms.
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8.3 Ensemble Intrusion Detection Model
Having finished the development of feature selection and fuzzy belief machine learning
algorithms, we then integrate them together to check whether our selected feature set is
feasible to be applied to our developed detection method or not. The experimental result
shows a DR of 83.86% is achieved in detecting U2R attacks, which drops a lot compared
with the rate of using full feature set. It indicates that five features selected from the
training set are not sufficient to cover all the attacks information that appears in the
testing set. On the other hand, we get a DR of 69.82% in detecting R2L attacks by using
only seven features, which is higher than that of full feature set. Also, the false alarm
rates are reduced to 9.54% and 9.86% for U2R and R2L attacks, respectively.
For further improving the detection performance, we propose an ensemble intrusion
detection model that consists of a set of feature selecting base fuzzy belief classifiers and
a data mining classifier. The basic idea is using ensemble feature selection technique to
promote the DR and data mining technique to reduce the number of false alarms. It is a
combination of both anomaly detection and misuse detection. With our proposed
ensemble model, we achieve 92.30% and 71.66% averaged DRs and 3.13% and 3.15%
averaged false alarm rates in detecting U2R and R2L attacks, respectively. The false
alarm rate is significant improved from around 10% to 3%. As for the CRs, the averaged
rates are 95.45% and 87.33% for U2R and R2L attacks, respectively, which are higher
than 89.97% and 80.66% if a single fuzzy belief machine learning algorithm with full
feature set is used. This indicates that the detection performance is successfully improved
through our proposed ensemble intrusion detection model.
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8.4 Future Work
Up to now, this dissertation has developed an intrusion detection system based on
ensemble of multiple base classifiers. However, there are several topics that deserve to be
future studied.
•

False alarms: In the design of an intrusion detection system, not only a high DR is
necessary but also a low false alarms rate is required. Though it is not easy to control
the false alarm rate because many unusual events sometimes are classified to hostile
activities and most of these unusual events are actually normal behavior. In our
research, we use data mining technique to extract decision rules from training set and
achieve about 3% false alarms rate. We believe that this rate can be further reduced in
the future if a more dedicated rule set can be built.

•

Respond to the intrusions: In our work we focus on developing a detection method
which can efficiently and effectively differentiate intrusive activities from large
volume of network events. We believe that the response to the intrusions is also
equally important. Once an intrusion is happened, it is necessary to properly present
the alarm in order that system administrator can make proper and prompt decision. In
a word, to find a method to integrate the intrusion detection system with the intrusion
response system deserves further research.

•

Feature selection: Feature selection plays an important role on both speed and
accuracy of intrusion detection. It selects the most informative features that cover
normal and intrusive activities by analyzing large quantity of network traffic data. In
this dissertation we have developed a feature selection algorithm based on
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symmetrical uncertainty measure to remove the worthless information from the
original high dimensional database. However, we think there are still some issues that
can be explored in order to get a better performance, e.g., relevant and redundant
features analysis and discretization methods.
•

Multiple identification ability: The KDD99 data set includes four groups of attacks
and each uses diverse skill to explore system’s vulnerabilities. In our work we use
binary classification technique to identify a network event as either normality or
abnormality. The future research will be directed to upgrade the system with multiple
identification ability, i.e., the system will be able to classify a network traffic data into
normal activity or one of four attacks.

•

Real time attack detection: We have made contributions in detecting both U2R and
R2L attacks off-line in a publicly available intrusion detection database DARPA
KDD99. However, the database we used is eight years old that is not enough to reflect
the current status of Internet. In the future, the research can be expanded to the live
Internet traffic based on our past achievement.
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som_read_data.m
% Read data from an ascii file
function sData = som_read_data(filename, varargin)
error(nargchk(1, 3, nargin))
% check no. of input args is correct
dont_care = 'NaN';
% default don't care string
comment_start = '#';
% the char a SOM_PAK command line starts with
comp_name_line = '#n';
% string denoting a special command line,
% which contains names of each component
label_name_line = '#l';
% string denoting a special command line,
% which contains names of each label
block_size = 1000;
% block size used in file read
kludge = num2str(realmax, 100); % used in sscanf
% open input file
fid = fopen(filename);
if fid < 0
error(['Cannot open ' filename]);
end
% process input arguments
if nargin == 2
if isstr(varargin{1})
dont_care = varargin{1};
else
dim = varargin{1};
end
elseif nargin == 3
dim = varargin{1};
dont_care = varargin{2};
end
% if the data dimension is not specified, find out what it is
if nargin == 1 | (nargin == 2 & isstr(varargin{1}))
fpos1 = ftell(fid); c1 = 0; % read first non-comment line
while c1 == 0,
line1 = strrep(fgetl(fid), dont_care, kludge);
[l1, c1] = sscanf(line1, '%f ');
end
fpos2 = ftell(fid); c2 = 0; % read second non-comment line
while c2 == 0,
line2 = strrep(fgetl(fid), dont_care, kludge);
[l2, c2] = sscanf(line2, '%f ');
end
if (c1 == 1 & c2 ~= 1) | (c1 == c2 & c1 == 1 & l1 == 1)
dim = l1;
fseek(fid, fpos2, -1);
elseif (c1 == c2)
dim = c1;
fseek(fid, fpos1, -1);
warning on
warning(['Automatically determined data dimension is ' num2str(dim) '. Is it correct?']);
else
error(['Invalid header line: ' line1]);
end
end
% check the dimension is valid
if dim < 1 | dim ~= round(dim)
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error(['Illegal data dimension: ' num2str(dim)]);
end
% read data
sData = som_data_struct(zeros(1, dim), 'name', filename);
lnum = 0; % data vector counter
data_temp = zeros(block_size, dim);
labs_temp = cell(block_size, 1);
comp_names = sData.comp_names;
label_names = sData.label_names;
form = [repmat('%g',[1 dim-1]) '%g%[^ \t]'];
limit = block_size;
while 1,
li = fgetl(fid); % read next line
if ~isstr(li), break, end; % is this the end of file?
% all missing vectors are replaced by value realmax because
% sscanf is not able to read NaNs
li = strrep(li, dont_care, kludge);
[data, c, err, n] = sscanf(li, form);
if c < dim % if there were less numbers than dim on the input file line
if c == 0
if strncmp(li, comp_name_line, 2) % component name line?
li = strrep(li(3:end), kludge, dont_care); i = 0; c = 1;
while c
[s, c, e, n] = sscanf(li, '%s%[^ \t]');
if ~isempty(s), i = i + 1; comp_names{i} = s; li = li(n:end); end
end
if i ~= dim
error(['Illegal number of component names: ' num2str(i) ...
' (dimension is ' num2str(dim) ')']);
end
elseif strncmp(li, label_name_line, 2) % label name line?
li = strrep(li(3:end), kludge, dont_care); i = 0; c = 1;
while c
[s, c, e, n] = sscanf(li, '%s%[^ \t]');
if ~isempty(s), i = i + 1; label_names{i} = s; li = li(n:end); end
end
elseif ~strncmp(li, comment_start, 1) % not a comment, is it error?
[s, c, e, n] = sscanf(li, '%s%[^ \t]');
if c
error(['Invalid vector on input file data line ' ...
num2str(lnum+1) ': [' deblank(li) ']']),
end
end
else
error(['Only ' num2str(c) ' vector components on input file data line ' ...
num2str(lnum+1) ' (dimension is ' num2str(dim) ')']);
end
else
lnum = lnum + 1; % this was a line containing data vector
data_temp(lnum, 1:dim) = data'; % add data to struct
if lnum == limit % reserve more memory if necessary
data_temp(lnum+1:lnum+block_size, 1:dim) = zeros(block_size, dim);
[dummy nl] = size(labs_temp);
labs_temp(lnum+1:lnum+block_size,1:nl) = cell(block_size, nl);
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limit = limit + block_size;
end
% read labels
if n < length(li)
li = strrep(li(n:end), kludge, dont_care); i = 0; n = 1; c = 1;
while c
[s, c, e, n_new] = sscanf(li(n:end), '%s%[^ \t]');
if c, i = i + 1; labs_temp{lnum, i} = s; n = n + n_new - 1; end
end
end
end
end
% close input file
if fclose(fid) < 0, error(['Cannot close file ' filename]);
else fprintf(2, '\rdata read ok\n'); end
% set values
data_temp(data_temp == realmax) = NaN;
sData.data
= data_temp(1:lnum,:);
sData.labels = labs_temp(1:lnum,:);
sData.comp_names = comp_names;
sData.label_names = label_names;
return;

dataprocess.m
% Separate data to normal, dos, probe, u2r and r2l categories
function [all_normal_data, all_normal_labels, ...
all_dos_data, all_dos_labels, ...
all_probe_data, all_probe_labels, ...
all_u2r_data, all_u2r_labels, ...
all_r2l_data, all_r2l_labels] = dataprocess(data, labels)
% label has three groups
% type: different attacks
% category: 0:normal, 1:dos, 2:probe, 3:r2l ,4:u2r
% binary -- 0:normal, 1:attack
% find records in each category from set
normal = find(strcmp(labels(:,2), '0'));
dos = find(strcmp(labels(:,2), '1'));
probe = find(strcmp(labels(:,2), '2'));
u2r = find(strcmp(labels(:,2), '4'));
r2l = find(strcmp(labels(:,2), '3'));
% all records in each category -- data
all_normal_data = data(normal(1:size(normal)),:);
all_dos_data = data(dos(1:size(dos)),:);
all_probe_data = data(probe(1:size(probe)),:);
all_u2r_data = data(u2r(1:size(u2r)),:);
all_r2l_data = data(r2l(1:size(r2l)),:);
% all records in each category -- label
all_normal_labels = labels(normal(1:size(normal)),:);
all_dos_labels = labels(dos(1:size(dos)),:);
all_probe_labels = labels(probe(1:size(probe)),:);
all_u2r_labels = labels(u2r(1:size(u2r)),:);
all_r2l_labels = labels(r2l(1:size(r2l)),:);
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transfer.m
% Randomly select records for normal, dos, probe, u2r and r2l category
function [transfer_data,transfer_labels,left_data,left_labels] = transfer(A,B,fetch_number)
% A, B: original data set
% fetch_number: number of select records
FETCH = zeros(1,fetch_number);
zero_array = find(FETCH==0);
while ~isempty(zero_array)
rand('state', sum(100*clock));
a = ceil(rand(1)*size(A,1));
origial_array = find(FETCH==a);
while ~isempty(origial_array)
a = ceil(rand(1)*size(A,1));
origial_array = find(FETCH==a);
end
FETCH(zero_array(1)) = a;
zero_array = find(FETCH==0);
end
transfer_data = A(FETCH,:);
transfer_labels = B(FETCH,:);
index_A = 1:size(A,1);
index_B = 1:size(B,1);
left_data = A(setdiff(index_A,FETCH),:);
left_labels = B(setdiff(index_B,FETCH),:);

clust_normalize.m
% Normalization of features
function data=clust_normalize(data,method);
% method can be 'var'or 'range'
% 'var' Variance is normalized to one (linear operation).
% 'range' Values are normalized between [0,1] (linear operation).
data.Xold=data.X;
if strcmp(method,'range')
data.min=min(data.X);
data.max=max(data.X);
array = (repmat(max(data.X),...
size(data.X,1),1)-repmat(min(data.X),size(data.X,1),1));
index = find(array==0);
array(index) = 1;
data.X=(data.X-repmat(min(data.X),size(data.X,1),1))./array;
elseif strcmp(method,'var')
array = (repmat(std(data.X),size(data.X,1),1));
index = find(array==0);
array(index) = 1;
data.X=(data.X-repmat(mean(data.X),size(data.X,1),1))./array;
data.mean=mean(data.X);
data.std=std(data.X);
else
error('Unknown method given')
end

fselection.m
% Feature selection
function [traindata, testdata] = fs(data1, data2, f_s, w)
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% f_s = 1: yes
% w: feature set
j = 1;
if f_s
for i = 1:41
if w(i) ~= 0
traindata(:,j) = w(i).*data1(:,i);
testdata(:,j) = w(i).*data2(:,i);
j = j + 1;
end
end
else
traindata = data1;
testdata = data2;
end

celltonum.m
% Convert cell to number
function [train_labels_num, test_labels_num] = celltonum(train_labels, test_labels)
train_labels_num = zeros(size(train_labels,1),size(train_labels,2));
for i=1:1:size(train_labels,1)
for j=1:1:size(train_labels,2)
temp = cell2mat(train_labels(i,j));
train_labels_num(i,j) = str2num(temp);
end
end
% to add 1 because the class of fknn needs to start from 1, but the class
% label of train.labels starts from 0. same as test.labels
train_labels_num = train_labels_num+1;
test_labels_num = zeros(size(test_labels,1),size(test_labels,2));
for i=1:1:size(test_labels,1)
for j=1:1:size(test_labels,2)
temp = cell2mat(test_labels(i,j));
test_labels_num(i,j) = str2num(temp);
end
end
test_labels_num = test_labels_num+1;

fcm_order_binary.m
% For FCM to find clustering order (final_perms)
function [finalperms, fcm_labels] = fcm_order_binary(U, labels)
% permutation (all combinations) of classes
class = cell([2,1]);
class{1}='0';
class{2}='1';
fcmcluster = perms(class);
temp_current_no = 0;
final_perms = 0; % 1xN where N = no of class, e.g. 0 1
correct_no = 0;
for (j = 1:1:size(fcmcluster,1))
temp_perms = fcmcluster(j,:);
for (i=1:1:size(U,2))
maxU = max(U(:,i));
temp = U(:,i);
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index = find(temp == maxU);
temp_fcmlabels(i) = temp_perms(index);
end
temp_correct = find(strcmp(temp_fcmlabels(:),labels(:,2)));
temp_correct_no = length(temp_correct);
if temp_correct_no > correct_no
correct_no = temp_correct_no;
final_perms = temp_perms;
fcmlabels = temp_fcmlabels;
end
end
for i = 1:1:size(final_perms,2)
temp = cell2mat(final_perms(i));
finalperms(i) = str2num(temp)+1;
end
for i = 1:1:size(fcmlabels,2)
temp = cell2mat(fcmlabels(i));
fcm_labels(i) = str2num(temp)+1;
end

fknn.m
% Fuzzy k-nearest neighbor classification algorithm
function [predicted,memberships, numhits] = fknn(data, labels, test, ...
testlabels, k_values, info, fuzzy)
if nargin<7
fuzzy = true;
end
num_train = size(data,1);
num_test = size(test,1);
% scaling factor for fuzzy weights. see [1] for details
m = 2;
% convert class labels to unary membership vectors (of 1s and 0s)
max_class = max(labels); %original
temp = zeros(length(labels),max_class);
for i=1:num_train
temp(i,:) = [zeros(1, labels(i)-1) 1 zeros(1,max_class - labels(i))];
end
labels = temp;
clear temp;
% allocate space for storing predicted labels
predicted = zeros(num_test, length(k_values));
% allocate space for 'numhits'. This will only be used if 'testlabels' is provided
numhits = zeros(length(k_values),1);
% will the memberships be stored? if yes, allocate space
store_memberships = false;
if nargout > 1,
store_memberships=true;
memberships = zeros(num_test, max_class, length(k_values));
end
% BEGIN kNN
% for each test point, do:
t0=clock;
tstart = t0;
for i=1:num_test
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distances = (repmat(test(i,:), num_train,1) - data).^2;
% for efficiency, no need to take sqrt since it is a non-decreasing function
if size(distances,2) ~= 1 % add
distances = sum(distances');
else %add
distances = distances'; % add
end % add
% sort the distances
[junk, indeces] = sort(distances);
for k=1:length(k_values)
neighbor_index = indeces(1:k_values(k));
weight = ones(1,length(neighbor_index));
if fuzzy,
% originally, this weight calculation should be:
% weight = distances(neighbor_index).^(-2/(m-1));
% but since we didn't take sqrt above and the inverse 2th power
% the weights are:
% weight = sqrt(distances(neighbor_index)).^(-2/(m-1));
% which is equaliavent to:
weight = distances(neighbor_index).^(-1/(m-1));
% set the Inf (infite) weights, if there are any, to 1.
if max(isinf(weight))
warning(['Some of the weights are Inf for sample: ' ...
num2str(i) '. These weights are set to 1.']);
weight(isinf(weight))=1;
end
end
test_out = weight*labels(neighbor_index,:)/(sum(weight));
if store_memberships, memberships(i,:,k) = test_out; end;
% find predicted class (the one with the max. fuzzy vote)
[junk, index_of_max] = max(test_out');
predicted(i,k) = index_of_max;
% compute current hit rate, if test labels are given
if ~isempty(testlabels) && predicted(i,k)==testlabels(i)
numhits(k) = numhits(k)+1;
end
end
% print info
if mod(i,info)==0
elapsed = etime(clock, t0);
fprintf(1,['%dth sample done. Elapsed (from previous info): %.2f' ...
' sn. Estimated left: %.2f sn.\n\tHit rate(s) so far: '], ...
i, elapsed, etime(clock, tstart)*((num_test-i)/i) );
for k=1:length(k_values)
fprintf(1,'%3d: %.3f\t',k_values(k), 100*numhits(k)/i);
end
fprintf(1,'\n');
t0=clock; % start timer again
end
end

knndsinit.m
% Initialise parameter gamma and alpha of the BPA
% Modifiy from Thierry Denoeux, http://www.hds.utc.fr/~tdenoeux/software.htm
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% Last browsed in December 2007
function [gamm,alpha] = knndsinit1(x,S);
[Napp,nent]=size(x);
M=max(S);
for i=1:M,
ii=find(S==i);Nii=length(ii);
D=zeros(1,Nii);
for j=1:Nii
D(1,j) = D(1,j) + sum(sqrt(sum(((ones(Nii,1)*x(ii(j),:))-x(ii,:))'.^2)')');
end;
Dm(i) = sum(D)/(Nii*Nii - Nii);
end;
gamm = ones(1,M) ./ Dm;
gamm=gamm';
alpha=.95;

knndsval.m
% K-nearest neighbour classification rule based on Dempster-Shafer theory
% Modifiy from Thierry Denoeux, http://www.hds.utc.fr/~tdenoeux/software.htm
% Last browsed in December 2007
function [m,L] = knndsval(xapp,Sapp,K,gamm,alpha,loo,xtst);
[Napp,nent]=size(xapp);
M=max(Sapp); % original
if loo,
xtst=xapp;
end;
[Ntst,nent]=size(xtst);
% Computation of the K-nearest neighbors in the training set
dst=[];ist=[];
for i = 1:Ntst,
if size(xapp,2) ~= 1 % add
dist=sum(((ones(Napp,1)*xtst(i,:))-xapp)'.^2)';
else % add
dist=(((ones(Napp,1)*xtst(i,:))-xapp)'.^2)'; %add
end % add
[dss,iss]=sort(dist);
dst = [dst dss(1+loo:K+loo)]; % distance matrix: MxN where M=k, N=number of testing records
% each testing record has M nearest neighbors
ist = [ist iss(1+loo:K+loo)]; % index matrix: MxN
% each testing record has M nearest training record number
end;
% Computation of the BPA
m = classdstst(alpha,gamm,xtst,dst,ist,Sapp,K);
[temp,L]=max(m(:,1:M)');
L=L';
function m = classdstst(alpha,gamm,xtst,ds,is,Sapp,K);
N= max(size(xtst));
M=max(Sapp); % original
m = [zeros(M,N);ones(1,N)];
cppv=zeros(N,1);
for i=1:N,
for j=1:K,
m1 = zeros(M+1,1);
m1(Sapp(is(j,i))) = alpha*exp(-gamm(Sapp(is(j,i))).^2*ds(j,i));
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m1(M+1) = 1 - m1(Sapp(is(j,i)));
m(1:M,i) = m1(1:M).*m(1:M,i) + m1(1:M)*m(M+1,i) + m(1:M,i)*m1(M+1);
m(M+1,i) = m1(M+1) * m(M+1,i);
end;
end;
m=m./(ones(M+1,1)*sum(m));
m=m';

myknn_binary.m
% Fuzzy Belief k-NN Classification Algorithm
% Modifiy from Thierry Denoeux, http://www.hds.utc.fr/~tdenoeux/software.htm
% Last browsed in December 2007
function [m,L1] = myknn(xapp,Sapp,K,U,loo,xtst,finalperms);
[Napp,nent]=size(xapp);
if loo,
xtst=xapp;
end;
[Ntst,nent]=size(xtst);
% Computation of the K-nearest neighbours in the training set
dst=[];ist=[];
for i = 1:Ntst,
if size(xapp,2) ~= 1 % add
dist=sum(((ones(Napp,1)*xtst(i,:))-xapp)'.^2)';
else % add
dist=(((ones(Napp,1)*xtst(i,:))-xapp)'.^2)'; %add
end % add
[dss,iss]=sort(dist);
dst = [dst dss(1+loo:K+loo)]; % distance matrix: MxN where M=k, N=number of testing records
% each testing record has M nearest neighbors
ist = [ist iss(1+loo:K+loo)]; % index matrix: MxN
% each testing record has M nearest training record number
end;
N= max(size(xtst));
% M=max(Sapp);
M=2; % binay classification
m = [zeros(M,N);ones(1,N)];
cppv=zeros(N,1);
% distance weighted
dw(K,N) = 0;
for i = 1:N
for j = 1:K
if dst(j,i) == max(dst(:,i))
dw(j,i) = 1;
else
dw(j,i) = (max(dst(:,i))-dst(j,i))/(max(dst(:,i))-min(dst(:,i)));
end
end
end
for i=1:N
num=ones(M+1,1);
for j=1:K
m1 = zeros(M+1,1);
m1(1:M) = U(1:M,ist(j,i))*dw(j,i);
m1(M+1) = 1 - sum(m1);
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m(1:M,i) = m1(1:M).*m(1:M,i)+ m1(1:M)*m(M+1,i) + m(1:M,i)*m1(M+1);
m(M+1,i) = m1(M+1) * m(M+1,i);
end
end
m(3,:) = 1-m(1,:)-m(2,:);
m=m./(ones(M+1,1)*sum(m));
m=m';
[temp,L]=max(m(:,1:M)');
L=L';
L1=zeros(size(L,1),1);
for i = 1:1:size(L,1)
if L(i)==1
L1(i)=finalperms(1);
elseif L(i)==2
L1(i)=finalperms(2);
end
end

weight.m
% Weighting for myknn_binary_w.m
function w = weight(data,labels,m)
for i=1:size(data,1)
if labels(i,2) == 1
S(i,1) = 1;
S(i,2) = 0;
else
S(i,1) = 0;
S(i,2) = 1;
end
end
w = ones(size(data,1),3);
for i = 1:size(data,1)-1
w(i,1:2) = 2*(m(i,1:2).*w(i,1:2)-S(i,1:2)).*m(i,1:2);
w(i+1,1:2) = w(i+1,1:2)+0.1*w(i,1:2);
end
w = w(size(w,1),:);

myknn_binary_w.m
% weighted fb_knn
% Modifiy from Thierry Denoeux, http://www.hds.utc.fr/~tdenoeux/software.htm
% Last browsed in December 2007
function [m,L1] = myknn(xapp,Sapp,K,U,loo,xtst,finalperms,w);
[Napp,nent]=size(xapp);
if loo,
xtst=xapp;
end;
[Ntst,nent]=size(xtst);
% Computation of the K-nearest neighbours in the training set
dst=[];ist=[];
for i = 1:Ntst,
if size(xapp,2) ~= 1 % add
dist=sum(((ones(Napp,1)*xtst(i,:))-xapp)'.^2)';
else % add
dist=(((ones(Napp,1)*xtst(i,:))-xapp)'.^2)'; % add
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end % add
[dss,iss]=sort(dist);
dst = [dst dss(1+loo:K+loo)]; % distance matrix: MxN where M=k, N=number of testing records
% each testing record has M nearest neighbors
ist = [ist iss(1+loo:K+loo)]; % index matrix: MxN
% each testing record has M nearest training record number
end;
N= max(size(xtst));
M=2; % binay classification
m = [zeros(M,N);ones(1,N)];
cppv=zeros(N,1);
% distance weighted
dw(K,N) = 0;
for i = 1:N
for j = 1:K
if dst(j,i) == max(dst(:,i))
dw(j,i) = 1;
else
dw(j,i) = (max(dst(:,i))-dst(j,i))/(max(dst(:,i))-min(dst(:,i)));
end
end
end
for i=1:N
num=ones(M+1,1);
for j=1:K
m1 = zeros(M+1,1);
m1(1:M) = U(1:M,ist(j,i))*dw(j,i);
m1(M+1) = 1 - sum(m1);
m(1:M,i) = m1(1:M).*m(1:M,i)+ m1(1:M).*m(M+1,i) + m(1:M,i).*m1(M+1);
m(M+1,i) = m1(M+1) * m(M+1,i);
end
end
m(3,:) = 1-m(1,:)-m(2,:);
m=m./(ones(M+1,1)*sum(m));
m=m';
for i=1:N
m(i,1:M+1)=m(i,1:M+1).*w;
end
m(3,:) = 1-m(1,:)-m(2,:);
[temp,L]=max(m(:,1:M)');
L=L';
L1=zeros(size(L,1),1);
for i = 1:1:size(L,1)
if L(i)==1
L1(i)=finalperms(1);
elseif L(i)==2
L1(i)=finalperms(2);
end
end

accuracy_binary.m
% Detection performance
function [correct_normal_rate, correct_attack_rate] = ...
accuracy_binary(labels_num, predicted, normal_record_no, attack_record_no, attack_index, attack_label)
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% normal
correct_normal = find(labels_num(:,2)==1 & predicted(:)==1);
correct_normal_no = length(correct_normal);
correct_normal_rate = correct_normal_no / normal_record_no;
n_a = find(labels_num(:,2)==1 & predicted(:)==attack_label);
n_a_no = length(n_a);
% attack
correct_attack = find(labels_num(:,2)==attack_index & predicted(:)==attack_label);
correct_attack_no = length(correct_attack);
correct_attack_rate = correct_attack_no / attack_record_no;
a_n = find(labels_num(:,2)==attack_index & predicted(:)==1);
a_n_no = length(a_n);
fprintf('\n');

ensemble_mv.m
% Ensemble using majority voting
function [e_result, predict] = ensemble_mv(A_predicted, B_predicted, C_predicted, test_label)
predict = [A_predicted B_predicted C_predicted test_label(:,3)];
e_result = zeros(size(A_predicted));
for i=1:size(e_result)
if predict(i,1) == 1 && predict(i,2) == 1 && predict(i,3) == 1
e_result(i) = 1;
elseif predict(i,1) == 2 && predict(i,2) == 2 && predict(i,3) == 2
e_result(i) = 2;
elseif predict(i,1) == 1 && predict(i,2) == 1 && predict(i,3) == 2
e_result(i) = 1;
elseif predict(i,1) == 1 && predict(i,2) == 2 && predict(i,3) == 1
e_result(i) = 1;
elseif predict(i,1) == 2 && predict(i,2) == 1 && predict(i,3) == 1
e_result(i) = 1;
elseif predict(i,1) == 2 && predict(i,2) == 2 && predict(i,3) == 1
e_result(i) = 2;
elseif predict(i,1) == 2 && predict(i,2) == 1 && predict(i,3) == 2
e_result(i) = 2;
elseif predict(i,1) == 1 && predict(i,2) == 2 && predict(i,3) == 2
e_result(i) = 2;
end
end
predict = [predict e_result];

ensemble_avg.m
% Selects average value of the combined classifiers as the ensemble output
function [m, e_result, predict] = ensemble_avg(A_memberships, A1, A2, index, ...
B_memberships, B1, B2, ...
C_memberships, C1, C2, ...
D_memberships, D1, D2, ...
test_label)
e_memberships = zeros(size(A_memberships),2);
e_result = zeros(size(e_memberships),1);
A_memberships = [A_memberships(:,1) A_memberships(:,2) A_memberships(:,3)]';
B_memberships = [B_memberships(:,1) B_memberships(:,2) B_memberships(:,3)]';
C_memberships = [C_memberships(:,1) C_memberships(:,2) C_memberships(:,3)]';
D_memberships = [D_memberships(:,1) D_memberships(:,2) D_memberships(:,3)]';
M=2;
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N = size(e_result);
m = [zeros(M,N);ones(1,N)];
for i=1:N
m(1,i) = A_memberships(1,i)*A1+B_memberships(1,i)*B1+…
C_memberships(1,i)*C1+D_memberships(1,i)*D1;
m(2,i) = A_memberships(2,i)*A2+B_memberships(2,i)*B2+…
C_memberships(2,i)*C2+D_memberships(2,i)*D2;
end
m=m./(ones(M+1,1)*sum(m));
for i=1:size(e_result)
if (m(1,i) - m(2,i)) > 0
e_result(i) = 1;
else
e_result(i) = 2;
end
end
predict = e_result;

ensemble_m.m
% Ensemble using Dempster-Shafer theory
function [m, e_result, predict] = ensemble_m(A_memberships, A_predicted, index, ...
B_memberships, B_predicted, ...
C_memberships, C_predicted, ...
D_memberships, D_predicted, ...
test_label)
predict = [A_predicted B_predicted C_predicted D_predicted test_label(:,3)];
e_memberships = zeros(size(A_memberships),2);
e_result = zeros(size(e_memberships),1);
A_memberships = [A_memberships(:,1) A_memberships(:,2) A_memberships(:,3)]';
B_memberships = [B_memberships(:,1) B_memberships(:,2) B_memberships(:,3)]';
C_memberships = [C_memberships(:,1) C_memberships(:,2) C_memberships(:,3)]';
D_memberships = [D_memberships(:,1) D_memberships(:,2) D_memberships(:,3)]';
M=2;
N = size(e_result);
m = [zeros(M,N);ones(1,N)];
for i=1:N
num=ones(M+1,1);
for j=1:4
m1 = zeros(M+1,1);
if j==1
m1(1:M) = A_memberships(1:M,i);
elseif j==2
m1(1:M) = B_memberships(1:M,i);
elseif j==3
m1(1:M) = C_memberships(1:M,i);
elseif j==4
m1(1:M) = D_memberships(1:M,i);
end
m1(M+1) = 1 - sum(m1);
m(1:M,i) = m1(1:M).*m(1:M,i)+ m1(1:M)*m(M+1,i) + m(1:M,i)*m1(M+1);
m(M+1,i) = m1(M+1) * m(M+1,i);
end
end
m(3,:) = 1-m(1,:)-m(2,:);
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m=m./(ones(M+1,1)*sum(m));
for i=1:size(e_result)
if m(1,i) >= m(2,i)
e_result(i) = 1;
else
e_result(i) = 2;
end
end
predict = [predict e_result];

ensemble4.m
% Ensemble using naive bayes
function [result] = ensemble4(A1, A2, A_p, B1, B2, B_p, C1, C2, C_p, D1, D2, D_p, P1, P2)
predict = [A_p B_p C_p D_p];
P_1 = zeros(size(A_p));
P_2 = zeros(size(A_p));
for i = 1:size(A_p)
if predict(i,:) == [1 1 1 1]
P_1(i) = A1*B1*C1*D1*P1 / (A1*B1*C1*D1*P1 + (1-A2)*(1-B2)*(1-C2)*(1-D2)*P2);
elseif predict(i,1) == [2 2 2 2]
P_1(i) = (1-A1)*(1-B1)*(1-C1)*(1-D1)*P1 / ((1-A1)*(1-B1)*(1-C1)*(1-D1)*P1 +
A2*B2*C2*D2*P2);
elseif predict(i,1) == [1 1 1 2]
P_1(i) = A1*B1*C1*(1-D1)*P1 / (A1*B1*C1*(1-D1)*P1 + (1-A2)*(1-B2)*(1-C2)*D2*P2);
elseif predict(i,1) == [1 1 2 1]
P_1(i) = A1*B1*(1-C1)*D1*P1 / (A1*B1*(1-C1)*D1*P1 + (1-A2)*(1-B2)*C2*(1-D2)*P2);
elseif predict(i,1) == [1 1 2 2]
P_1(i) = A1*B1*(1-C1)*(1-D1)*P1 / (A1*B1*(1-C1)*(1-D1)*P1 + (1-A2)*(1-B2)*C2*D2*P2);
elseif predict(i,:) == [1 2 1 1]
P_1(i) = A1*(1-B1)*C1*D1*P1 / (A1*(1-B1)*C1*D1*P1 + (1-A2)*B2*(1-C2)*(1-D2)*P2);
elseif predict(i,1) == [1 2 1 2]
P_1(i) = A1*(1-B1)*C1*(1-D1)*P1 / (A1*(1-B1)*C1*(1-D1)*P1 + (1-A2)*B2*(1-C2)*D2*P2);
elseif predict(i,:) == [1 2 2 1]
P_1(i) = A1*(1-B1)*(1-C1)*D1*P1 / (A1*(1-B1)*(1-C1)*D1*P1 + (1-A2)*B2*C2*(1-D2)*P2);
elseif predict(i,1) == [1 2 2 2]
P_1(i) = A1*(1-B1)*(1-C1)*(1-D1)*P1 / (A1*(1-B1)*(1-C1)*(1-D1)*P1 + (1-A2)*B2*C2*D2*P2);
elseif predict(i,:) == [2 1 1 1]
P_1(i) = (1-A1)*B1*C1*D1*P1 / ((1-A1)*B1*C1*D1*P1 + A2*(1-B2)*(1-C2)*(1-D2)*P2);
elseif predict(i,:) == [2 1 1 2]
P_1(i) = (1-A1)*B1*C1*(1-D1)*P1 / ((1-A1)*B1*C1*(1-D1)*P1 + A2*(1-B2)*(1-C2)*D2*P2);
elseif predict(i,:) == [2 1 2 1]
P_1(i) = (1-A1)*B1*(1-C1)*D1*P1 / ((1-A1)*B1*(1-C1)*D1*P1 + A2*(1-B2)*C2*(1-D2)*P2);
elseif predict(i,:) == [2 1 2 2]
P_1(i) = (1-A1)*B1*(1-C1)*(1-D1)*P1 / ((1-A1)*B1*(1-C1)*(1-D1)*P1 + A2*(1-B2)*C2*D2*P2);
elseif predict(i,:) == [2 2 1 1]
P_1(i) = (1-A1)*(1-B1)*C1*D1*P1 / ((1-A1)*(1-B1)*C1*D1*P1 + A2*B2*(1-C2)*(1-D2)*P2);
elseif predict(i,:) == [2 2 1 2]
P_1(i) = (1-A1)*(1-B1)*C1*(1-D1)*P1 / ((1-A1)*(1-B1)*C1*(1-D1)*P1 + A2*B2*(1-C2)*D2*P2);
elseif predict(i,:) == [2 2 2 1]
P_1(i) = (1-A1)*(1-B1)*(1-C1)*D1*P1 / ((1-A1)*(1-B1)*(1-C1)*D1*P1 + A2*B2*C2*(1-D2)*P2);
end
P_2(i) = 1-P_1(i);
end
for i = 1:size(A_p)
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if P_1(i) >= P_2(i)
result(i) = 1;
else
result(i) = 2;
end
end

attack_train_binary.m
% The number of each attack in training set
function [ train_3_no, train_4_no, train_5_no,
train_6_no, train_7_no, train_8_no, train_9_no, train_10_no, ...
train_11_no, train_12_no, train_13_no, train_14_no, train_15_no, ...
train_16_no, train_17_no, train_18_no, train_19_no, train_20_no, ...
train_21_no, train_22_no, train_23_no, train_24_no, train_25_no, ...
train_26_no, train_27_no, train_28_no, train_29_no, train_30_no, ...
train_31_no, train_32_no, train_33_no, train_34_no, train_35_no, ...
train_36_no, train_37_no, train_38_no, train_39_no, train_40_no, train_41_no] = ...
attack_train_binary(train_labels_num)
% DOS
train_3_record = find(train_labels_num(:,1)==3);
train_3_no = length(train_3_record);
train_9_record = find(train_labels_num(:,1)==9);
train_9_no = length(train_9_record);
train_12_record = find(train_labels_num(:,1)==12);
train_12_no = length(train_12_record);
train_16_record = find(train_labels_num(:,1)==16);
train_16_no = length(train_16_record);
train_20_record = find(train_labels_num(:,1)==20);
train_20_no = length(train_20_record);
train_22_record = find(train_labels_num(:,1)==22);
train_22_no = length(train_22_record);
train_27_record = find(train_labels_num(:,1)==27);
train_27_no = length(train_27_record);
train_25_record = find(train_labels_num(:,1)==25);
train_25_no = length(train_25_record);
train_30_record = find(train_labels_num(:,1)==30);
train_30_no = length(train_30_record);
train_37_record = find(train_labels_num(:,1)==37);
train_37_no = length(train_37_record);
% PROBE
train_8_record = find(train_labels_num(:,1)==8);
train_8_no = length(train_8_record);
train_13_record = find(train_labels_num(:,1)==13);
train_13_no = length(train_13_record);
train_17_record = find(train_labels_num(:,1)==17);
train_17_no = length(train_17_record);
train_19_record = find(train_labels_num(:,1)==19);
train_19_no = length(train_19_record);
train_28_record = find(train_labels_num(:,1)==28);
train_28_no = length(train_28_record);
train_32_record = find(train_labels_num(:,1)==32);
train_32_no = length(train_32_record);
% R2L
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train_5_record = find(train_labels_num(:,1)==5);
train_5_no = length(train_5_record);
train_6_record = find(train_labels_num(:,1)==6);
train_6_no = length(train_6_record);
train_7_record = find(train_labels_num(:,1)==7);
train_7_no = length(train_7_record);
train_11_record = find(train_labels_num(:,1)==11);
train_11_no = length(train_11_record);
train_15_record = find(train_labels_num(:,1)==15);
train_15_no = length(train_15_record);
train_21_record = find(train_labels_num(:,1)==21);
train_21_no = length(train_21_record);
train_23_record = find(train_labels_num(:,1)==23);
train_23_no = length(train_23_record);
train_24_record = find(train_labels_num(:,1)==24);
train_24_no = length(train_24_record);
train_29_record = find(train_labels_num(:,1)==29);
train_29_no = length(train_29_record);
train_33_record = find(train_labels_num(:,1)==33);
train_33_no = length(train_33_record);
train_34_record = find(train_labels_num(:,1)==34);
train_34_no = length(train_34_record);
train_35_record = find(train_labels_num(:,1)==35);
train_35_no = length(train_35_record);
train_38_record = find(train_labels_num(:,1)==38);
train_38_no = length(train_38_record);
train_39_record = find(train_labels_num(:,1)==39);
train_39_no = length(train_39_record);
train_40_record = find(train_labels_num(:,1)==40);
train_40_no = length(train_40_record);
% U2R
train_4_record = find(train_labels_num(:,1)==4);
train_4_no = length(train_4_record);
train_10_record = find(train_labels_num(:,1)==10);
train_10_no = length(train_10_record);
train_14_record = find(train_labels_num(:,1)==14);
train_14_no = length(train_14_record);
train_18_record = find(train_labels_num(:,1)==18);
train_18_no = length(train_18_record);
train_26_record = find(train_labels_num(:,1)==26);
train_26_no = length(train_26_record);
train_31_record = find(train_labels_num(:,1)==31);
train_31_no = length(train_31_record);
train_36_record = find(train_labels_num(:,1)==36);
train_36_no = length(train_36_record);
train_41_record = find(train_labels_num(:,1)==41);
train_41_no = length(train_41_record);

attack_test_binary.m
% The correct predict attack number in testing set
function [ total_3_no, correct_3_no, total_4_no, correct_4_no, total_5_no, correct_5_no, ...
total_6_no, correct_6_no, total_7_no, correct_7_no, total_8_no, correct_8_no, ...
total_9_no, correct_9_no, total_10_no, correct_10_no, total_11_no, correct_11_no, ...
total_12_no, correct_12_no, total_13_no, correct_13_no, total_14_no, correct_14_no, ...
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total_15_no, correct_15_no, total_16_no, correct_16_no, total_17_no, correct_17_no, ...
total_18_no, correct_18_no, total_19_no, correct_19_no, total_20_no, correct_20_no, ...
total_21_no, correct_21_no, total_22_no, correct_22_no, total_23_no, correct_23_no, ...
total_24_no, correct_24_no, total_25_no, correct_25_no, total_26_no, correct_26_no, ...
total_27_no, correct_27_no, total_28_no, correct_28_no, total_29_no, correct_29_no, ...
total_30_no, correct_30_no, total_31_no, correct_31_no, total_32_no, correct_32_no, ...
total_33_no, correct_33_no, total_34_no, correct_34_no, total_35_no, correct_35_no, ...
total_36_no, correct_36_no, total_37_no, correct_37_no, total_38_no, correct_38_no, ...
total_39_no, correct_39_no, total_40_no, correct_40_no, total_41_no, correct_41_no] = ...
attack_test_binary(labels_num, ...
predicted1, predicted2, predicted3, predicted4, ...
predicted5, predicted6, predicted7, predicted8, ...
predicted9, predicted10, predicted11, predicted12, ...
predicted13, predicted14, predicted15, predicted16, ...
predicted17, predicted18, predicted19, predicted20, ...
predicted21, predicted22, predicted23, ...
predicted24, predicted25, predicted26, ...
predicted27, predicted28, predicted29)
for i = 1:29
if i == 1
predicted = predicted1;
elseif i == 2
predicted = predicted2;
elseif i == 3
predicted = predicted3;
elseif i == 4
predicted = predicted4;
elseif i == 5
predicted = predicted5;
elseif i == 6
predicted = predicted6;
elseif i == 7
predicted = predicted7;
elseif i == 8
predicted = predicted8;
elseif i == 9
predicted = predicted9;
elseif i == 10
predicted = predicted10;
elseif i == 11
predicted = predicted11;
elseif i == 12
predicted = predicted12;
elseif i == 13
predicted = predicted13;
elseif i == 14
predicted = predicted14;
elseif i == 15
predicted = predicted15;
elseif i == 16
predicted = predicted16;
elseif i == 17
predicted = predicted17;
elseif i == 18
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predicted = predicted18;
elseif i == 19
predicted = predicted19;
elseif i == 20
predicted = predicted20;
elseif i == 21
predicted = predicted21;
elseif i == 22
predicted = predicted22;
elseif i == 23
predicted = predicted23;
elseif i == 24
predicted = predicted24;
elseif i == 25
predicted = predicted25;
elseif i == 26
predicted = predicted26;
elseif i == 27
predicted = predicted27;
elseif i == 28
predicted = predicted28;
elseif i == 29
predicted = predicted29;
end
% DOS
total_3_record = find(labels_num(:,1)==3);
total_3_no(i) = length(total_3_record);
correct_3_record = find(labels_num(:,1)==3 & predicted(:)~=1);
correct_3_no(i) = length(correct_3_record);
total_9_record = find(labels_num(:,1)==9);
total_9_no(i) = length(total_9_record);
correct_9_record = find(labels_num(:,1)==9 & predicted(:)~=1);
correct_9_no(i) = length(correct_9_record);
total_12_record = find(labels_num(:,1)==12);
total_12_no(i) = length(total_12_record);
correct_12_record = find(labels_num(:,1)==12 & predicted(:)~=1);
correct_12_no(i) = length(correct_12_record);
total_16_record = find(labels_num(:,1)==16);
total_16_no(i) = length(total_16_record);
correct_16_record = find(labels_num(:,1)==16 & predicted(:)~=1);
correct_16_no(i) = length(correct_16_record);
total_20_record = find(labels_num(:,1)==20);
total_20_no(i) = length(total_20_record);
correct_20_record = find(labels_num(:,1)==20 & predicted(:)~=1);
correct_20_no(i) = length(correct_20_record);
total_22_record = find(labels_num(:,1)==22);
total_22_no(i) = length(total_22_record);
correct_22_record = find(labels_num(:,1)==22 & predicted(:)~=1);
correct_22_no(i) = length(correct_22_record);
total_27_record = find(labels_num(:,1)==27);
total_27_no(i) = length(total_27_record);
correct_27_record = find(labels_num(:,1)==27 & predicted(:)~=1);
correct_27_no(i) = length(correct_27_record);
total_25_record = find(labels_num(:,1)==25);
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total_25_no(i) = length(total_25_record);
correct_25_record = find(labels_num(:,1)==25 & predicted(:)~=1);
correct_25_no(i) = length(correct_25_record);
total_30_record = find(labels_num(:,1)==30);
total_30_no(i) = length(total_30_record);
correct_30_record = find(labels_num(:,1)==30 & predicted(:)~=1);
correct_30_no(i) = length(correct_30_record);
total_37_record = find(labels_num(:,1)==37);
total_37_no(i) = length(total_37_record);
correct_37_record = find(labels_num(:,1)==37 & predicted(:)~=1);
correct_37_no(i) = length(correct_37_record);
% PROBE
total_8_record = find(labels_num(:,1)==8);
total_8_no(i) = length(total_8_record);
correct_8_record = find(labels_num(:,1)==8 & predicted(:)~=1);
correct_8_no(i) = length(correct_8_record);
total_13_record = find(labels_num(:,1)==13);
total_13_no(i) = length(total_13_record);
correct_13_record = find(labels_num(:,1)==13 & predicted(:)~=1);
correct_13_no(i) = length(correct_13_record);
total_17_record = find(labels_num(:,1)==17);
total_17_no(i) = length(total_17_record);
correct_17_record = find(labels_num(:,1)==17 & predicted(:)~=1);
correct_17_no(i) = length(correct_17_record);
total_19_record = find(labels_num(:,1)==19);
total_19_no(i) = length(total_19_record);
correct_19_record = find(labels_num(:,1)==19 & predicted(:)~=1);
correct_19_no(i) = length(correct_19_record);
total_28_record = find(labels_num(:,1)==28);
total_28_no(i) = length(total_28_record);
correct_28_record = find(labels_num(:,1)==28 & predicted(:)~=1);
correct_28_no(i) = length(correct_28_record);
total_32_record = find(labels_num(:,1)==32);
total_32_no(i) = length(total_32_record);
correct_32_record = find(labels_num(:,1)==32 & predicted(:)~=1);
correct_32_no(i) = length(correct_32_record);
% R2L
total_5_record = find(labels_num(:,1)==5);
total_5_no(i) = length(total_5_record);
correct_5_record = find(labels_num(:,1)==5 & predicted(:)~=1);
correct_5_no(i) = length(correct_5_record);
total_6_record = find(labels_num(:,1)==6);
total_6_no(i) = length(total_6_record);
correct_6_record = find(labels_num(:,1)==6 & predicted(:)~=1);
correct_6_no(i) = length(correct_6_record);
total_7_record = find(labels_num(:,1)==7);
total_7_no(i) = length(total_7_record);
correct_7_record = find(labels_num(:,1)==7 & predicted(:)~=1);
correct_7_no(i) = length(correct_7_record);
total_11_record = find(labels_num(:,1)==11);
total_11_no(i) = length(total_11_record);
correct_11_record = find(labels_num(:,1)==11 & predicted(:)~=1);
correct_11_no(i) = length(correct_11_record);
total_15_record = find(labels_num(:,1)==15);
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total_15_no(i) = length(total_15_record);
correct_15_record = find(labels_num(:,1)==15 & predicted(:)~=1);
correct_15_no(i) = length(correct_15_record);
total_21_record = find(labels_num(:,1)==21);
total_21_no(i) = length(total_21_record);
correct_21_record = find(labels_num(:,1)==21 & predicted(:)~=1);
correct_21_no(i) = length(correct_21_record);
total_23_record = find(labels_num(:,1)==23);
total_23_no(i) = length(total_23_record);
correct_23_record = find(labels_num(:,1)==23 & predicted(:)~=1);
correct_23_no(i) = length(correct_23_record);
total_24_record = find(labels_num(:,1)==24);
total_24_no(i) = length(total_24_record);
correct_24_record = find(labels_num(:,1)==24 & predicted(:)~=1);
correct_24_no(i) = length(correct_24_record);
total_29_record = find(labels_num(:,1)==29);
total_29_no(i) = length(total_29_record);
correct_29_record = find(labels_num(:,1)==29 & predicted(:)~=1);
correct_29_no(i) = length(correct_29_record);
total_33_record = find(labels_num(:,1)==33);
total_33_no(i) = length(total_33_record);
correct_33_record = find(labels_num(:,1)==33 & predicted(:)~=1);
correct_33_no(i) = length(correct_33_record);
total_34_record = find(labels_num(:,1)==34);
total_34_no(i) = length(total_34_record);
correct_34_record = find(labels_num(:,1)==34 & predicted(:)~=1);
correct_34_no(i) = length(correct_34_record);
total_35_record = find(labels_num(:,1)==35);
total_35_no(i) = length(total_35_record);
correct_35_record = find(labels_num(:,1)==35 & predicted(:)~=1);
correct_35_no(i) = length(correct_35_record);
total_38_record = find(labels_num(:,1)==38);
total_38_no(i) = length(total_38_record);
correct_38_record = find(labels_num(:,1)==38 & predicted(:)~=1);
correct_38_no(i) = length(correct_38_record);
total_39_record = find(labels_num(:,1)==39);
total_39_no(i) = length(total_39_record);
correct_39_record = find(labels_num(:,1)==39 & predicted(:)~=1);
correct_39_no(i) = length(correct_39_record);
total_40_record = find(labels_num(:,1)==40);
total_40_no(i) = length(total_40_record);
correct_40_record = find(labels_num(:,1)==40 & predicted(:)~=1);
correct_40_no(i) = length(correct_40_record);
% U2R
total_4_record = find(labels_num(:,1)==4);
total_4_no(i) = length(total_4_record);
correct_4_record = find(labels_num(:,1)==4 & predicted(:)~=1);
correct_4_no(i) = length(correct_4_record);
total_10_record = find(labels_num(:,1)==10);
total_10_no(i) = length(total_10_record);
correct_10_record = find(labels_num(:,1)==10 & predicted(:)~=1);
correct_10_no(i) = length(correct_10_record);
total_14_record = find(labels_num(:,1)==14);
total_14_no(i) = length(total_14_record);
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correct_14_record = find(labels_num(:,1)==14 & predicted(:)~=1);
correct_14_no(i) = length(correct_14_record);
total_18_record = find(labels_num(:,1)==18);
total_18_no(i) = length(total_18_record);
correct_18_record = find(labels_num(:,1)==18 & predicted(:)~=1);
correct_18_no(i) = length(correct_18_record);
total_26_record = find(labels_num(:,1)==26);
total_26_no(i) = length(total_26_record);
correct_26_record = find(labels_num(:,1)==26 & predicted(:)~=1);
correct_26_no(i) = length(correct_26_record);
total_31_record = find(labels_num(:,1)==31);
total_31_no(i) = length(total_31_record);
correct_31_record = find(labels_num(:,1)==31 & predicted(:)~=1);
correct_31_no(i) = length(correct_31_record);
total_36_record = find(labels_num(:,1)==36);
total_36_no(i) = length(total_36_record);
correct_36_record = find(labels_num(:,1)==36 & predicted(:)~=1);
correct_36_no(i) = length(correct_36_record);
total_41_record = find(labels_num(:,1)==41);
total_41_no(i) = length(total_41_record);
correct_41_record = find(labels_num(:,1)==41 & predicted(:)~=1);
correct_41_no(i) = length(correct_41_record);
end

main.m
clc;
clear all;
close all;
% READING DATA
t0 = clock;
kdd_train = som_read_data('kdd_org_Data_allnumber.txt');
kdd_test = som_read_data('kdd_test_Data_allnumber.txt');
t = etime(clock,t0);
fprintf('\nreading data time =%6.2f sec\n', t);
% SEPARATE DATA to normal, dos, probe, u2r and r2l categories
[all_normal_train.data, all_normal_train.labels, ...
all_dos_train.data, all_dos_train.labels, ...
all_probe_train.data, all_probe_train.labels, ...
all_u2r_train.data, all_u2r_train.labels, ...
all_r2l_train.data, all_r2l_train.labels] = dataprocess(kdd_train.data, kdd_train.labels);
[all_normal_test.data, all_normal_test.labels, ...
all_dos_test.data, all_dos_test.labels, ...
all_probe_test.data, all_probe_test.labels, ...
all_u2r_test.data, all_u2r_test.labels, ...
all_r2l_test.data, all_r2l_test.labels] = dataprocess(kdd_test.data, kdd_test.labels);
% TRAINING
% original – 494,020
% normal:97,277, dos:391,458, probe:4,107, u2r:52, r2l:1,126
% no duplicate – 145,585
% normal:87,831, dos:54,572, probe:2,131, u2r:52, r2l:999
% selected no. of training records in each category
normal_train_record_no = 878;
dos_train_record_no = 0;
probe_train_record_no = 0;
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u2r_train_record_no = 0;
r2l_train_record_no = 99;
train_record_no = normal_train_record_no + dos_train_record_no + probe_train_record_no +
u2r_train_record_no + r2l_train_record_no;
% TESTING
% original – 311,029
% normal:60,593, dos:229,853, probe:4,166, u2r:228, r2l:16,189
% no duplicate – 77,291
% normal:47,913, dos:23,568, probe:2,682, u2r:215, r2l:2,913
% selected no. of testing records in each category
normal_test_record_no = 479;
dos_test_record_no = 0;
probe_test_record_no = 0;
u2r_test_record_no = 0;
r2l_test_record_no = 291;
test_record_no = normal_test_record_no + dos_test_record_no + probe_test_record_no +
u2r_test_record_no + r2l_test_record_no;
% attack_index: normal = 1, dos = 2, probe = 3, r2l = 4, u2r = 5
attack_index = 4;
% attack_label: normal = 1, dos = 2, probe = 3, r2l = 4, u2r = 5 for knn, fknn, etknn
attack_label = 4;
% attack_label: 2 for myknn
attack_mylabel = 2; % fix
attack_train_record_no = r2l_train_record_no;
attack_test_record_no = r2l_test_record_no;
nn = 2; % number of nearest neighbors
iter_no = 3; % number of iteration
for k = 1:nn
for iter = 1:iter_no
% RANDOMLY SELECT records
% randomly select records for normal, dos, probe, u2r and r2l category
[normal_train.data,normal_train.labels,normal_left.data,normal_left.labels] =
transfer(all_normal_train.data,all_normal_train.labels,normal_train_record_no);
[dos_train.data,dos_train.labels,dos_left.data,dos_left.labels] =
transfer(all_dos_train.data,all_dos_train.labels,dos_train_record_no);
[probe_train.data,probe_train.labels,probe_left.data,probe_left.labels] =
transfer(all_probe_train.data,all_probe_train.labels,probe_train_record_no);
[u2r_train.data,u2r_train.labels,u2r_left.data,u2r_left.labels] =
transfer(all_u2r_train.data,all_u2r_train.labels,u2r_train_record_no);
[r2l_train.data,r2l_train.labels,r2l_left.data,r2l_left.labels] =
transfer(all_r2l_train.data,all_r2l_train.labels,r2l_train_record_no);
[normal_test.data,normal_test.labels,normal_left.data,normal_left.labels] =
transfer(all_normal_test.data,all_normal_test.labels,normal_test_record_no);
[dos_test.data,dos_test.labels,dos_left.data,dos_left.labels] =
transfer(all_dos_test.data,all_dos_test.labels,dos_test_record_no);
[probe_test.data,probe_test.labels,probe_left.data,probe_left.labels] =
transfer(all_probe_test.data,all_probe_test.labels,probe_test_record_no);
[u2r_test.data,u2r_test.labels,u2r_left.data,u2r_left.labels] =
transfer(all_u2r_test.data,all_u2r_test.labels,u2r_test_record_no);
[r2l_test.data,r2l_test.labels,r2l_left.data,r2l_left.labels] =
transfer(all_r2l_test.data,all_r2l_test.labels,r2l_test_record_no);
% FINAL data set
mytrain.data = [normal_train.data;dos_train.data;probe_train.data;u2r_train.data;r2l_train.data];
mytrain.labels = [normal_train.labels;dos_train.labels;probe_train.labels;u2r_train.labels;r2l_train.labels];
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mytest.data = [normal_test.data;dos_test.data;probe_test.data;u2r_test.data;r2l_test.data];
mytest.labels = [normal_test.labels;dos_test.labels;probe_test.labels;u2r_test.labels;r2l_test.labels];
% NORMALIZATION of features
data_train.X = mytrain.data;
data_train = clust_normalize(data_train,'range');
mytrain.data = data_train.X;
data_test.X = mytest.data;
data_test = clust_normalize(data_test,'range');
mytest.data = data_test.X;
% FEATURE SELECTION
fs = 1;
% BASIC: 1-9
% 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
w_e = [ 1; 1; 1; 1; 1; 1; 0; 0; 0; 1; ... % 1-10
0; 1; 0; 0; 0; 0; 1; 0; 0; 0; ... % 11-20
0; 0; 1; 1; 0; 0; 1; 1; 1; 0; ... % 21-30
1; 1; 1; 1; 0; 1; 0; 0; 1; 0; 0]; % 31-41
% CONTENT: 10-22
% 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
w_f = [ 0; 0; 0; 0; 0; 0; 0; 0; 0; 1; ... % 1-10
1; 1; 1; 1; 1; 1; 1; 1; 1; 1; ... % 11-20
1; 1; 0; 0; 0; 0; 0; 0; 0; 0; ... % 21-30
0; 0; 0; 0; 0; 0; 0; 0; 0; 0; 0]; % 31-41
% TRAFFIC: 23-41
% 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
w_g = [ 0; 0; 0; 0; 0; 0; 0; 0; 0; 0; ... % 1-10
0; 0; 0; 0; 0; 0; 0; 0; 0; 0; ... % 11-20
0; 0; 1; 1; 1; 1; 1; 1; 1; 1; ... % 21-30
1; 1; 1; 1; 1; 1; 1; 1; 1; 1; 1]; % 31-41
% All: 1-41
% 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
w_a = [ 1; 1; 1; 1; 1; 1; 1; 1; 1; 1; ... % 1-10
1; 1; 1; 1; 1; 1; 1; 1; 1; 1; ... % 11-20
1; 1; 1; 1; 1; 1; 1; 1; 1; 1; ... % 21-30
1; 1; 1; 1; 1; 1; 1; 1; 1; 1; 1]; % 31-41
% Ours
% dos : 1,2,3,4,5,6,12,23,24,31,32,37
% probe : 1,2,3,4,12,16,25,27,28,29,30,40
% u2r : 1,2,3,10,16
% r2l : 1,2,3,4,5,10,22
% 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
w_b = [ 1; 1; 1; 1; 1; 0; 0; 0; 0; 1; ... % 1-10
0; 0; 0; 0; 0; 0; 0; 0; 0; 0; ... % 11-20
0; 1; 0; 0; 0; 0; 0; 0; 0; 0; ... % 21-30
0; 0; 0; 0; 0; 0; 0; 0; 0; 0; 0]; % 31-41
% CFS
% dos : 3,6,12,37
% probe : 3,4,25,29
% u2r : 10
% r2l : 10
% 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
w_c = [ 0; 0; 0; 0; 0; 0; 0; 0; 0; 1; ... % 1-10
0; 0; 0; 0; 0; 0; 0; 0; 0; 0; ... % 11-20
0; 0; 0; 0; 0; 0; 0; 0; 0; 0; ... % 21-30
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0; 0; 0; 0; 0; 0; 0; 0; 0; 0; 0]; % 31-41
% FCBF
% dos : 3,12,31,32
% probe : 3,26,27,29
% u2r : 10,16
% r2l : 5,10,39
% 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
w_d = [ 0; 0; 0; 0; 1; 0; 0; 0; 0; 1; ... % 1-10
0; 0; 0; 0; 0; 0; 0; 0; 1; 0; ... % 11-20
0; 0; 0; 0; 0; 0; 0; 0; 0; 0; ... % 21-30
0; 0; 0; 0; 0; 0; 0; 0; 0; 0; 0]; % 31-41
[train_data_a, test_data_a] = fselection(mytrain.data, mytest.data, fs, w_a);
[train_data_b, test_data_b] = fselection(mytrain.data, mytest.data, fs, w_b);
[train_data_c, test_data_c] = fselection(mytrain.data, mytest.data, fs, w_c);
[train_data_d, test_data_d] = fselection(mytrain.data, mytest.data, fs, w_d);
[train_data_e, test_data_e] = fselection(mytrain.data, mytest.data, fs, w_e);
[train_data_f, test_data_f] = fselection(mytrain.data, mytest.data, fs, w_f);
[train_data_g, test_data_g] = fselection(mytrain.data, mytest.data, fs, w_g);
% CONVERTION
% convert cell (mytrain.labels,mytest.labels) to number (train_labels_num,test_labels_num)
% reason: fknn can only take number
[train_labels_num,test_labels_num] = celltonum(mytrain.labels,mytest.labels);
% for myknn
% CLUSTERING
% fuzzy cmeans
class_no = 2;
[center_a,U_a,objFcn] = fcm(train_data_a,class_no); % NxM, N = no of class, M = no of training records
[center_b,U_b,objFcn] = fcm(train_data_b,class_no);
[center_c,U_c,objFcn] = fcm(train_data_c,class_no);
[center_d,U_d,objFcn] = fcm(train_data_d,class_no);
[center_e,U_e,objFcn] = fcm(train_data_e,class_no);
[center_f,U_f,objFcn] = fcm(train_data_f,class_no);
[center_g,U_g,objFcn] = fcm(train_data_g,class_no);
% for myknn
% for FCM to find clustering order (final_perms)
[finalperms_a, fcm1_labels_a] = fcm_order_binary(U_a, mytrain.labels);
[finalperms_b, fcm1_labels_b] = fcm_order_binary(U_b, mytrain.labels);
[finalperms_c, fcm1_labels_c] = fcm_order_binary(U_c, mytrain.labels);
[finalperms_d, fcm1_labels_d] = fcm_order_binary(U_d, mytrain.labels);
[finalperms_e, fcm1_labels_e] = fcm_order_binary(U_e, mytrain.labels);
[finalperms_f, fcm1_labels_f] = fcm_order_binary(U_f, mytrain.labels);
[finalperms_g, fcm1_labels_g] = fcm_order_binary(U_g, mytrain.labels);
% CLASSIFICATION of k-NN, fuzzy k-NN, evidence-theoretic k-NN and my-knn
% k-NN
tic;
[knn_predicted_a, knn_memberships_a, knn_numhits_a] = fknn(train_data_a, train_labels_num(:,2),
test_data_a, test_labels_num(:,2), k, 0, 0);
t_knn_a = toc; tic;
[knn_predicted_b, knn_memberships_b, knn_numhits_b] = fknn(train_data_b, train_labels_num(:,2),
test_data_b, test_labels_num(:,2), k, 0, 0);
t_knn_b = toc; tic;
[knn_predicted_c, knn_memberships_c, knn_numhits_c] = fknn(train_data_c, train_labels_num(:,2),
test_data_c, test_labels_num(:,2), k, 0, 0);
t_knn_c = toc; tic;
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[knn_predicted_d, knn_memberships_d, knn_numhits_d] = fknn(train_data_d, train_labels_num(:,2),
test_data_d, test_labels_num(:,2), k, 0, 0);
t_knn_d = toc; tic;
[knn_predicted_e, knn_memberships_e, knn_numhits_e] = fknn(train_data_e, train_labels_num(:,2),
test_data_e, test_labels_num(:,2), k, 0, 0);
t_knn_e = toc; tic;
[knn_predicted_f, knn_memberships_f, knn_numhits_f] = fknn(train_data_f, train_labels_num(:,2),
test_data_f, test_labels_num(:,2), k, 0, 0);
t_knn_f = toc; tic;
[knn_predicted_g, knn_memberships_g, knn_numhits_g] = fknn(train_data_g, train_labels_num(:,2),
test_data_g, test_labels_num(:,2), k, 0, 0);
t_knn_g = toc;
% fuzzy k-NN
tic;
[fknn_predicted_a, fknn_memberships_a, fknn_numhits_a] = fknn(train_data_a, train_labels_num(:,2),
test_data_a, test_labels_num(:,2), k, 0);
t_fknn_a = toc; tic;
[fknn_predicted_b, fknn_memberships_b, fknn_numhits_b] = fknn(train_data_b, train_labels_num(:,2),
test_data_b, test_labels_num(:,2), k, 0);
t_fknn_b = toc; tic;
[fknn_predicted_c, fknn_memberships_c, fknn_numhits_c] = fknn(train_data_c, train_labels_num(:,2),
test_data_c, test_labels_num(:,2), k, 0);
t_fknn_c = toc; tic;
[fknn_predicted_d, fknn_memberships_d, fknn_numhits_d] = fknn(train_data_d, train_labels_num(:,2),
test_data_d, test_labels_num(:,2), k, 0);
t_fknn_d = toc; tic;
[fknn_predicted_e, fknn_memberships_e, fknn_numhits_e] = fknn(train_data_e, train_labels_num(:,2),
test_data_e, test_labels_num(:,2), k, 0);
t_fknn_e = toc; tic;
[fknn_predicted_f, fknn_memberships_f, fknn_numhits_f] = fknn(train_data_f, train_labels_num(:,2),
test_data_f, test_labels_num(:,2), k, 0);
t_fknn_f = toc; tic;
[fknn_predicted_g, fknn_memberships_g, fknn_numhits_g] = fknn(train_data_g, train_labels_num(:,2),
test_data_g, test_labels_num(:,2), k, 0);
t_fknn_g = toc;
% evidence-theoretic k-NN
[gamm_a, alpha_a] = knndsinit(train_data_a, train_labels_num(:,2));
tic;
[etknn_memberships_a, etknn_predicted_a] = knndsval(train_data_a,
train_labels_num(:,2),k,gamm_a,alpha_a,0,test_data_a);
t_etknn_a = toc;
[gamm_b, alpha_b] = knndsinit(train_data_b, train_labels_num(:,2));
tic;
[etknn_memberships_b, etknn_predicted_b] = knndsval(train_data_b,
train_labels_num(:,2),k,gamm_b,alpha_b,0,test_data_b);
t_etknn_b = toc;
[gamm_c, alpha_c] = knndsinit(train_data_c, train_labels_num(:,2));
tic;
[etknn_memberships_c, etknn_predicted_c] = knndsval(train_data_c,
train_labels_num(:,2),k,gamm_c,alpha_c,0,test_data_c);
t_etknn_c = toc;
[gamm_d, alpha_d] = knndsinit(train_data_d, train_labels_num(:,2));
tic;
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[etknn_memberships_d, etknn_predicted_d] = knndsval(train_data_d,
train_labels_num(:,2),k,gamm_d,alpha_d,0,test_data_d);
t_etknn_d = toc;
[gamm_e, alpha_e] = knndsinit(train_data_e, train_labels_num(:,2));
tic;
[etknn_memberships_e, etknn_predicted_e] = knndsval(train_data_e,
train_labels_num(:,2),k,gamm_e,alpha_e,0,test_data_e);
t_etknn_e = toc;
[gamm_f, alpha_f] = knndsinit(train_data_f, train_labels_num(:,2));
tic;
[etknn_memberships_f, etknn_predicted_f] = knndsval(train_data_f,
train_labels_num(:,2),k,gamm_f,alpha_f,0,test_data_f);
t_etknn_f = toc;
[gamm_g, alpha_g] = knndsinit(train_data_g, train_labels_num(:,2));
tic;
[etknn_memberships_g, etknn_predicted_g] = knndsval(train_data_g,
train_labels_num(:,2),k,gamm_g,alpha_g,0,test_data_g);
t_etknn_g = toc;
tic;
[myknn_memberships_a, myknn_predicted_a] = myknn_binary(train_data_a,
train_labels_num(:,2),k,U_a,0,test_data_a,finalperms_a);
t_myknn_a = toc; tic;
[myknn_memberships_b, myknn_predicted_b] = myknn_binary(train_data_b,
train_labels_num(:,2),k,U_b,0,test_data_b,finalperms_b);
t_myknn_b = toc; tic;
[myknn_memberships_c, myknn_predicted_c] = myknn_binary(train_data_c,
train_labels_num(:,2),k,U_c,0,test_data_c,finalperms_c);
t_myknn_c = toc; tic;
[myknn_memberships_d, myknn_predicted_d] = myknn_binary(train_data_d,
train_labels_num(:,2),k,U_d,0,test_data_d,finalperms_d);
t_myknn_d = toc; tic;
[myknn_memberships_e, myknn_predicted_e] = myknn_binary(train_data_e,
train_labels_num(:,2),k,U_e,0,test_data_e,finalperms_e);
t_myknn_e = toc; tic;
[myknn_memberships_f, myknn_predicted_f] = myknn_binary(train_data_f,
train_labels_num(:,2),k,U_f,0,test_data_f,finalperms_f);
t_myknn_f = toc; tic;
[myknn_memberships_g, myknn_predicted_g] = myknn_binary(train_data_g,
train_labels_num(:,2),k,U_g,0,test_data_g,finalperms_g);
t_myknn_g = toc;
train_data_a_w = train_data_a;
test_data_a_w = test_data_a;
mytrain.labels_a_w = mytrain.labels;
train_labels_num_a_w = train_labels_num;
U_a_w = U_a;
finalperms_a_w = finalperms_a;
[m_a_w,L_a_w] =
myknn_binary(train_data_a_w,train_labels_num_a_w(:,2),k,U_a_w,0,train_data_a_w,finalperms_a_w);
a_w = weight(train_data_a_w,train_labels_num_a_w,m_a_w);
tic;
[myknn_memberships_a_w,myknn_predicted_a_w] =
myknn_binary_w(train_data_a_w,train_labels_num_a_w(:,2),k,U_a_w,0,test_data_a_w,finalperms_a_w,a_
w);
t_myknn_a_w = toc;
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train_data_b_w = train_data_b;
test_data_b_w = test_data_b;
mytrain.labels_b_w = mytrain.labels;
train_labels_num_b_w = train_labels_num;
U_b_w = U_b;
finalperms_b_w = finalperms_b;
[m_b_w,L_b_w] =
myknn_binary(train_data_b_w,train_labels_num_b_w(:,2),k,U_b_w,0,train_data_b_w,finalperms_b_w);
b_w = weight(train_data_b_w,train_labels_num_b_w,m_b_w);
tic;
[myknn_memberships_b_w,myknn_predicted_b_w] =
myknn_binary_w(train_data_b_w,train_labels_num_b_w(:,2),k,U_b_w,0,test_data_b_w,finalperms_b_w,b
_w);
t_myknn_b_w = toc;
train_data_c_w = train_data_c;
test_data_c_w = test_data_c;
mytrain.labels_c_w = mytrain.labels;
train_labels_num_c_w = train_labels_num;
U_c_w = U_c;
finalperms_c_w = finalperms_c;
[m_c_w,L_c_w] =
myknn_binary(train_data_c_w,train_labels_num_c_w(:,2),k,U_c_w,0,train_data_c_w,finalperms_c_w);
c_w = weight(train_data_c_w,train_labels_num_c_w,m_c_w);
tic;
[myknn_memberships_c_w,myknn_predicted_c_w] =
myknn_binary_w(train_data_c_w,train_labels_num_c_w(:,2),k,U_c_w,0,test_data_c_w,finalperms_c_w,c_
w);
t_myknn_c_w = toc;
train_data_d_w = train_data_d;
test_data_d_w = test_data_d;
mytrain.labels_d_w = mytrain.labels;
train_labels_num_d_w = train_labels_num;
U_d_w = U_d;
finalperms_d_w = finalperms_d;
[m_d_w,L_d_w] =
myknn_binary(train_data_d_w,train_labels_num_d_w(:,2),k,U_d_w,0,train_data_d_w,finalperms_d_w);
d_w = weight(train_data_d_w,train_labels_num_d_w,m_d_w);
tic;
[myknn_memberships_d_w,myknn_predicted_d_w] =
myknn_binary_w(train_data_d_w,train_labels_num_d_w(:,2),k,U_d_w,0,test_data_d_w,finalperms_d_w,d
_w);
t_myknn_d_w = toc;
fprintf('k = %d\n', k);
fprintf('\n KNN');
[knn_correct_normal_rate_a, knn_correct_attack_rate_a] = ...
accuracy_binary(test_labels_num, knn_predicted_a, normal_test_record_no, attack_test_record_no,
attack_index, attack_label);
[knn_correct_normal_rate_b, knn_correct_attack_rate_b] = ...
accuracy_binary(test_labels_num, knn_predicted_b, normal_test_record_no, attack_test_record_no,
attack_index, attack_label);
[knn_correct_normal_rate_c, knn_correct_attack_rate_c] = ...
accuracy_binary(test_labels_num, knn_predicted_c, normal_test_record_no, attack_test_record_no,
attack_index, attack_label);
[knn_correct_normal_rate_d, knn_correct_attack_rate_d] = ...
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accuracy_binary(test_labels_num, knn_predicted_d, normal_test_record_no, attack_test_record_no,
attack_index, attack_label);
[knn_correct_normal_rate_e, knn_correct_attack_rate_e] = ...
accuracy_binary(test_labels_num, knn_predicted_e, normal_test_record_no, attack_test_record_no,
attack_index, attack_label);
[knn_correct_normal_rate_f, knn_correct_attack_rate_f] = ...
accuracy_binary(test_labels_num, knn_predicted_f, normal_test_record_no, attack_test_record_no,
attack_index, attack_label);
[knn_correct_normal_rate_g, knn_correct_attack_rate_g] = ...
accuracy_binary(test_labels_num, knn_predicted_g, normal_test_record_no, attack_test_record_no,
attack_index, attack_label);
fprintf('\n FKNN');
[fknn_correct_normal_rate_a, fknn_correct_attack_rate_a] = ...
accuracy_binary(test_labels_num, fknn_predicted_a, normal_test_record_no, attack_test_record_no,
attack_index, attack_label);
[fknn_correct_normal_rate_b, fknn_correct_attack_rate_b] = ...
accuracy_binary(test_labels_num, fknn_predicted_b, normal_test_record_no, attack_test_record_no,
attack_index, attack_label);
[fknn_correct_normal_rate_c, fknn_correct_attack_rate_c] = ...
accuracy_binary(test_labels_num, fknn_predicted_c, normal_test_record_no, attack_test_record_no,
attack_index, attack_label);
[fknn_correct_normal_rate_d, fknn_correct_attack_rate_d] = ...
accuracy_binary(test_labels_num, fknn_predicted_d, normal_test_record_no, attack_test_record_no,
attack_index, attack_label);
[fknn_correct_normal_rate_e, fknn_correct_attack_rate_e] = ...
accuracy_binary(test_labels_num, fknn_predicted_e, normal_test_record_no, attack_test_record_no,
attack_index, attack_label);
[fknn_correct_normal_rate_f, fknn_correct_attack_rate_f] = ...
accuracy_binary(test_labels_num, fknn_predicted_f, normal_test_record_no, attack_test_record_no,
attack_index, attack_label);
[fknn_correct_normal_rate_g, fknn_correct_attack_rate_g] = ...
accuracy_binary(test_labels_num, fknn_predicted_g, normal_test_record_no, attack_test_record_no,
attack_index, attack_label);
fprintf('\n ETKNN');
[etknn_correct_normal_rate_a, etknn_correct_attack_rate_a] = ...
accuracy_binary(test_labels_num, etknn_predicted_a, normal_test_record_no, attack_test_record_no,
attack_index, attack_label);
[etknn_correct_normal_rate_b, etknn_correct_attack_rate_b] = ...
accuracy_binary(test_labels_num, etknn_predicted_b, normal_test_record_no, attack_test_record_no,
attack_index, attack_label);
[etknn_correct_normal_rate_c, etknn_correct_attack_rate_c] = ...
accuracy_binary(test_labels_num, etknn_predicted_c, normal_test_record_no, attack_test_record_no,
attack_index, attack_label);
[etknn_correct_normal_rate_d, etknn_correct_attack_rate_d] = ...
accuracy_binary(test_labels_num, etknn_predicted_d, normal_test_record_no, attack_test_record_no,
attack_index, attack_label);
[etknn_correct_normal_rate_e, etknn_correct_attack_rate_e] = ...
accuracy_binary(test_labels_num, etknn_predicted_e, normal_test_record_no, attack_test_record_no,
attack_index, attack_label);
[etknn_correct_normal_rate_f, etknn_correct_attack_rate_f] = ...
accuracy_binary(test_labels_num, etknn_predicted_f, normal_test_record_no, attack_test_record_no,
attack_index, attack_label);
[etknn_correct_normal_rate_g, etknn_correct_attack_rate_g] = ...
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accuracy_binary(test_labels_num, etknn_predicted_g, normal_test_record_no, attack_test_record_no,
attack_index, attack_label);
fprintf('\n MYKNN');
[myknn_correct_normal_rate_a, myknn_correct_attack_rate_a] = ...
accuracy_binary(test_labels_num, myknn_predicted_a, normal_test_record_no, attack_test_record_no,
attack_index, attack_mylabel);
[myknn_correct_normal_rate_b, myknn_correct_attack_rate_b] = ...
accuracy_binary(test_labels_num, myknn_predicted_b, normal_test_record_no, attack_test_record_no,
attack_index, attack_mylabel);
[myknn_correct_normal_rate_c, myknn_correct_attack_rate_c] = ...
accuracy_binary(test_labels_num, myknn_predicted_c, normal_test_record_no, attack_test_record_no,
attack_index, attack_mylabel);
[myknn_correct_normal_rate_d, myknn_correct_attack_rate_d] = ...
accuracy_binary(test_labels_num, myknn_predicted_d, normal_test_record_no, attack_test_record_no,
attack_index, attack_mylabel);
[myknn_correct_normal_rate_e, myknn_correct_attack_rate_e] = ...
accuracy_binary(test_labels_num, myknn_predicted_e, normal_test_record_no, attack_test_record_no,
attack_index, attack_mylabel);
[myknn_correct_normal_rate_f, myknn_correct_attack_rate_f] = ...
accuracy_binary(test_labels_num, myknn_predicted_f, normal_test_record_no, attack_test_record_no,
attack_index, attack_mylabel);
[myknn_correct_normal_rate_g, myknn_correct_attack_rate_g] = ...
accuracy_binary(test_labels_num, myknn_predicted_g, normal_test_record_no, attack_test_record_no,
attack_index, attack_mylabel);
fprintf('\n MYKNN-W');
[myknn_correct_normal_rate_a_w, myknn_correct_attack_rate_a_w] = ...
accuracy_binary(test_labels_num, myknn_predicted_a_w, normal_test_record_no, attack_test_record_no,
attack_index, attack_mylabel);
[myknn_correct_normal_rate_b_w, myknn_correct_attack_rate_b_w] = ...
accuracy_binary(test_labels_num, myknn_predicted_b_w, normal_test_record_no, attack_test_record_no,
attack_index, attack_mylabel);
[myknn_correct_normal_rate_c_w, myknn_correct_attack_rate_c_w] = ...
accuracy_binary(test_labels_num, myknn_predicted_c_w, normal_test_record_no, attack_test_record_no,
attack_index, attack_mylabel);
[myknn_correct_normal_rate_d_w, myknn_correct_attack_rate_d_w] = ...
accuracy_binary(test_labels_num, myknn_predicted_d_w, normal_test_record_no, attack_test_record_no,
attack_index, attack_mylabel);
A_memberships = myknn_memberships_b;
A_predicted = myknn_predicted_b;
B_memberships = myknn_memberships_e;
B_predicted = myknn_predicted_e;
C_memberships = myknn_memberships_f;
C_predicted = myknn_predicted_f;
D_memberships = myknn_memberships_g;
D_predicted = myknn_predicted_g;
E_memberships = myknn_memberships_e;
E_predicted = myknn_predicted_e;
F_memberships = myknn_memberships_a;
F_predicted = myknn_predicted_a;
G_memberships = etknn_memberships_b;
G_predicted = etknn_predicted_b;
G_membership(:,1) = G_memberships(:,1);
G_membership(:,2) = G_memberships(:,attack_label);
G_membership(:,3) = G_memberships(:,attack_label+1);
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H_memberships = etknn_memberships_d;
H_predicted = etknn_predicted_d;
H_membership(:,1) = H_memberships(:,1);
H_membership(:,2) = H_memberships(:,attack_label);
H_membership(:,3) = H_memberships(:,attack_label+1);
I_memberships = etknn_memberships_c;
I_predicted = etknn_predicted_c;
I_membership(:,1) = I_memberships(:,1);
I_membership(:,2) = I_memberships(:,attack_label);
I_membership(:,3) = I_memberships(:,attack_label+1);
if finalperms_b == [2 1]
A_membership(:,1) = A_memberships(:,2);
A_membership(:,2) = A_memberships(:,1);
A_membership(:,3) = A_memberships(:,3);
else
A_membership = A_memberships;
end
if finalperms_e == [2 1]
B_membership(:,1) = B_memberships(:,2);
B_membership(:,2) = B_memberships(:,1);
B_membership(:,3) = B_memberships(:,3);
else
B_membership = B_memberships;
end
if finalperms_f == [2 1]
C_membership(:,1) = C_memberships(:,2);
C_membership(:,2) = C_memberships(:,1);
C_membership(:,3) = C_memberships(:,3);
else
C_membership = C_memberships;
end
if finalperms_g == [2 1]
D_membership(:,1) = D_memberships(:,2);
D_membership(:,2) = D_memberships(:,1);
D_membership(:,3) = D_memberships(:,3);
else
D_membership = D_memberships;
end
if finalperms_e == [2 1]
E_membership(:,1) = E_memberships(:,2);
E_membership(:,2) = E_memberships(:,1);
E_membership(:,3) = E_memberships(:,3);
else
E_membership = E_memberships;
end
if finalperms_a == [2 1]
F_membership(:,1) = F_memberships(:,2);
F_membership(:,2) = F_memberships(:,1);
F_membership(:,3) = F_memberships(:,3);
else
F_membership = F_memberships;
end
index = attack_mylabel;
fprintf('\n ENSEMBLE');
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% ensemble: majority voting
[ensemble_predicted_mv, predict_mv] = ensemble_mv(A_predicted, ...
C_predicted, ...
D_predicted, ...
test_labels_num);
[ensemble_correct_normal_rate_mv, ensemble_correct_attack_rate_mv] = ...
accuracy_binary(test_labels_num, ensemble_predicted_mv, normal_test_record_no,
attack_test_record_no, attack_index, attack_mylabel);
A1 = myknn_correct_normal_rate_b;
A2 = myknn_correct_attack_rate_b;
A_p = myknn_predicted_b;
B1 = myknn_correct_normal_rate_e;
B2 = myknn_correct_attack_rate_e;
B_p = myknn_predicted_e;
C1 = myknn_correct_normal_rate_f;
C2 = myknn_correct_attack_rate_f;
C_p = myknn_predicted_f;
D1 = myknn_correct_normal_rate_g;
D2 = myknn_correct_attack_rate_g;
D_p = myknn_predicted_g;
% ensemble: average
[ensemble_memberships_avg, ensemble_predicted_avg, predict_avg] = ensemble_avg(A_membership, …
A1, A2, index, ...
B_membership, B1, B2, ...
C_membership, C1, C2, ...
D_membership, D1, D2, ...
test_labels_num);
% ensemble: dempster-shafer
[ensemble_memberships_m, ensemble_predicted_m, predict_m] = ensemble_m(A_membership, …
A_predicted, index, ...
B_membership, B_predicted, ...
C_membership, C_predicted, ...
D_membership, D_predicted, ...
test_labels_num);
[ensemble_correct_normal_rate_m, ensemble_correct_attack_rate_m] = ...
accuracy_binary(test_labels_num, ensemble_predicted_m, normal_test_record_no, attack_test_record_no,
attack_index, attack_mylabel);
% ensemble: naive bayes
% prior probability
if attack_index == 4
P1 = normal_test_record_no / (normal_test_record_no + r2l_test_record_no); % normal distribution
P2 = r2l_test_record_no / (normal_test_record_no + r2l_test_record_no); % attack distribution
elseif attack_index == 5
P1 = normal_test_record_no / (normal_test_record_no + u2r_test_record_no);
P2 = u2r_test_record_no / (normal_test_record_no + u2r_test_record_no);
end
tic;
[ensemble_predicted_bayes] = ensemble4(A1, A2, A_p, B1, B2, B_p, C1, C2, C_p, D1, D2, D_p, P1, P2);
t_ensemble_bayes = toc;
[ensemble_correct_normal_rate_bayes, ensemble_correct_attack_rate_bayes] = ...
accuracy_binary(test_labels_num, ensemble_predicted_bayes, normal_test_record_no,
attack_test_record_no, attack_index, attack_mylabel);
% normal
myknn_predicted_a_tree = myknn_predicted_a;

139

myknn_predicted_b_tree = myknn_predicted_b;
myknn_predicted_c_tree = myknn_predicted_c;
myknn_predicted_d_tree = myknn_predicted_d;
myknn_predicted_e_tree = myknn_predicted_e;
myknn_predicted_f_tree = myknn_predicted_f;
myknn_predicted_g_tree = myknn_predicted_g;
ensemble_predicted_tree_m = ensemble_predicted_m;
ensemble_predicted_tree_mv = ensemble_predicted_mv;
ensemble_predicted_tree_bayes = ensemble_predicted_bayes;
% use reduced training set 145585 (41 features, normal-attacks) to generate rules
tic;
for i=1:size(myknn_predicted_a,1)
if attack_index == 4 || attack_index == 5
% 55229
if data_test.Xold(i,8) < 3 & ...
data_test.Xold(i,13) < 1 & ...
data_test.Xold(i,26) < 0.06 & ...
data_test.Xold(i,27) < 0.06 & ...
data_test.Xold(i,4) == 10 & ...
data_test.Xold(i,10) < 1 & ...
data_test.Xold(i,2) == 2 & ...
data_test.Xold(i,3) == 20
myknn_predicted_a_tree(i) = 1;
myknn_predicted_b_tree(i) = 1;
myknn_predicted_c_tree(i) = 1;
myknn_predicted_d_tree(i) = 1;
myknn_predicted_e_tree(i) = 1;
myknn_predicted_f_tree(i) = 1;
myknn_predicted_g_tree(i) = 1;
ensemble_predicted_tree_m(i) = 1;
ensemble_predicted_tree_mv(i) = 1;
ensemble_predicted_tree_bayes(i) = 1;
% 9541
elseif data_test.Xold(i,8) < 3 & ...
data_test.Xold(i,13) < 1 & ...
data_test.Xold(i,26) < 0.06 & ...
data_test.Xold(i,27) < 0.06 & ...
data_test.Xold(i,4) == 10 & ...
data_test.Xold(i,10) < 1 & ...
data_test.Xold(i,2) == 2 & ...
data_test.Xold(i,3) == 49
myknn_predicted_a_tree(i) = 1;
myknn_predicted_b_tree(i) = 1;
myknn_predicted_c_tree(i) = 1;
myknn_predicted_d_tree(i) = 1;
myknn_predicted_e_tree(i) = 1;
myknn_predicted_f_tree(i) = 1;
myknn_predicted_g_tree(i) = 1;
ensemble_predicted_tree_m(i) = 1;
ensemble_predicted_tree_mv(i) = 1;
ensemble_predicted_tree_bayes(i) = 1;
% 4611
elseif data_test.Xold(i,8) < 3 & ...
data_test.Xold(i,13) < 1 & ...
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data_test.Xold(i,26) < 0.06 & ...
data_test.Xold(i,27) >= 1 & ...
data_test.Xold(i,10) < 1 & ...
data_test.Xold(i,3) == 20 & ...
data_test.Xold(i,30) < 0.01 & ...
data_test.Xold(i,4) == 2
myknn_predicted_a_tree(i) = 1;
myknn_predicted_b_tree(i) = 1;
myknn_predicted_c_tree(i) = 1;
myknn_predicted_d_tree(i) = 1;
myknn_predicted_e_tree(i) = 1;
myknn_predicted_f_tree(i) = 1;
myknn_predicted_g_tree(i) = 1;
ensemble_predicted_tree_m(i) = 1;
ensemble_predicted_tree_mv(i) = 1;
ensemble_predicted_tree_bayes(i) = 1;
% 9167
elseif data_test.Xold(i,8) < 3 & ...
data_test.Xold(i,13) < 1 & ...
data_test.Xold(i,26) < 0.06 & ...
data_test.Xold(i,27) < 0.06 & ...
data_test.Xold(i,4) == 10 & ...
data_test.Xold(i,10) < 1 & ...
data_test.Xold(i,2) == 3 & ...
data_test.Xold(i,40) < 0.01 & ...
data_test.Xold(i,30) < 0.01 & ...
data_test.Xold(i,5) >= 30 & ...
data_test.Xold(i,5) < 158
myknn_predicted_a_tree(i) = 1;
myknn_predicted_b_tree(i) = 1;
myknn_predicted_c_tree(i) = 1;
myknn_predicted_d_tree(i) = 1;
myknn_predicted_e_tree(i) = 1;
myknn_predicted_f_tree(i) = 1;
myknn_predicted_g_tree(i) = 1;
ensemble_predicted_tree_m(i) = 1;
ensemble_predicted_tree_mv(i) = 1;
ensemble_predicted_tree_bayes(i) = 1;
% 1212
elseif data_test.Xold(i,8) < 3 & ...
data_test.Xold(i,13) < 1 & ...
data_test.Xold(i,26) < 0.06 & ...
data_test.Xold(i,27) < 0.06 & ...
data_test.Xold(i,4) == 10 & ...
data_test.Xold(i,10) < 1 & ...
data_test.Xold(i,2) == 3 & ...
data_test.Xold(i,40) < 0.01 & ...
data_test.Xold(i,30) >= 0.5
myknn_predicted_a_tree(i) = 1;
myknn_predicted_b_tree(i) = 1;
myknn_predicted_c_tree(i) = 1;
myknn_predicted_d_tree(i) = 1;
myknn_predicted_e_tree(i) = 1;
myknn_predicted_f_tree(i) = 1;
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myknn_predicted_g_tree(i) = 1;
ensemble_predicted_tree_m(i) = 1;
ensemble_predicted_tree_mv(i) = 1;
ensemble_predicted_tree_bayes(i) = 1;
% 107
elseif data_test.Xold(i,8) < 3 & ...
data_test.Xold(i,13) < 1 & ...
data_test.Xold(i,26) < 0.06 & ...
data_test.Xold(i,27) < 0.06 & ...
data_test.Xold(i,4) == 10 & ...
data_test.Xold(i,10) < 1 & ...
data_test.Xold(i,2) == 2 & ...
data_test.Xold(i,3) == 17 & ...
data_test.Xold(i,6) < 29 & ...
data_test.Xold(i,1) < 1 & ...
data_test.Xold(i,5) >= 5 & ...
data_test.Xold(i,5) < 30
myknn_predicted_a_tree(i) = 1;
myknn_predicted_b_tree(i) = 1;
myknn_predicted_c_tree(i) = 1;
myknn_predicted_d_tree(i) = 1;
myknn_predicted_e_tree(i) = 1;
myknn_predicted_f_tree(i) = 1;
myknn_predicted_g_tree(i) = 1;
ensemble_predicted_tree_m(i) = 1;
ensemble_predicted_tree_mv(i) = 1;
ensemble_predicted_tree_bayes(i) = 1;
% 611
elseif data_test.Xold(i,8) < 3 & ...
data_test.Xold(i,13) < 1 & ...
data_test.Xold(i,26) < 0.06 & ...
data_test.Xold(i,27) < 0.06 & ...
data_test.Xold(i,4) == 10 & ...
data_test.Xold(i,10) < 1 & ...
data_test.Xold(i,2) == 2 & ...
data_test.Xold(i,3) == 17 & ...
data_test.Xold(i,6) < 29 & ...
data_test.Xold(i,1) < 1 & ...
data_test.Xold(i,5) >= 32 & ...
data_test.Xold(i,5) < 246
myknn_predicted_a_tree(i) = 1;
myknn_predicted_b_tree(i) = 1;
myknn_predicted_c_tree(i) = 1;
myknn_predicted_d_tree(i) = 1;
myknn_predicted_e_tree(i) = 1;
myknn_predicted_f_tree(i) = 1;
myknn_predicted_g_tree(i) = 1;
ensemble_predicted_tree_m(i) = 1;
ensemble_predicted_tree_mv(i) = 1;
ensemble_predicted_tree_bayes(i) = 1;
% 88
elseif data_test.Xold(i,8) < 3 & ...
data_test.Xold(i,13) < 1 & ...
data_test.Xold(i,26) < 0.06 & ...
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data_test.Xold(i,27) < 0.06 & ...
data_test.Xold(i,4) == 10 & ...
data_test.Xold(i,10) < 1 & ...
data_test.Xold(i,2) == 2 & ...
data_test.Xold(i,3) == 17 & ...
data_test.Xold(i,6) < 29 & ...
data_test.Xold(i,1) < 1 & ...
data_test.Xold(i,5) >= 248 & ...
data_test.Xold(i,5) < 334
myknn_predicted_a_tree(i) = 1;
myknn_predicted_b_tree(i) = 1;
myknn_predicted_c_tree(i) = 1;
myknn_predicted_d_tree(i) = 1;
myknn_predicted_e_tree(i) = 1;
myknn_predicted_f_tree(i) = 1;
myknn_predicted_g_tree(i) = 1;
ensemble_predicted_tree_m(i) = 1;
ensemble_predicted_tree_mv(i) = 1;
ensemble_predicted_tree_bayes(i) = 1;
% 628
elseif data_test.Xold(i,8) < 3 & ...
data_test.Xold(i,13) < 1 & ...
data_test.Xold(i,26) < 0.06 & ...
data_test.Xold(i,27) < 0.06 & ...
data_test.Xold(i,4) == 10 & ...
data_test.Xold(i,10) < 1 & ...
data_test.Xold(i,2) == 2 & ...
data_test.Xold(i,3) == 17 & ...
data_test.Xold(i,6) < 29 & ...
data_test.Xold(i,1) < 1 & ...
data_test.Xold(i,5) >= 335 & ...
data_test.Xold(i,5) < 644
myknn_predicted_a_tree(i) = 1;
myknn_predicted_b_tree(i) = 1;
myknn_predicted_c_tree(i) = 1;
myknn_predicted_d_tree(i) = 1;
myknn_predicted_e_tree(i) = 1;
myknn_predicted_f_tree(i) = 1;
myknn_predicted_g_tree(i) = 1;
ensemble_predicted_tree_m(i) = 1;
ensemble_predicted_tree_mv(i) = 1;
ensemble_predicted_tree_bayes(i) = 1;
% 2310
elseif data_test.Xold(i,8) < 3 & ...
data_test.Xold(i,13) < 1 & ...
data_test.Xold(i,26) < 0.06 & ...
data_test.Xold(i,27) < 0.06 & ...
data_test.Xold(i,4) == 10 & ...
data_test.Xold(i,10) < 1 & ...
data_test.Xold(i,2) == 2 & ...
data_test.Xold(i,3) == 17 & ...
data_test.Xold(i,6) < 29 & ...
data_test.Xold(i,1) < 1 & ...
data_test.Xold(i,5) >= 726

143

myknn_predicted_a_tree(i) = 1;
myknn_predicted_b_tree(i) = 1;
myknn_predicted_c_tree(i) = 1;
myknn_predicted_d_tree(i) = 1;
myknn_predicted_e_tree(i) = 1;
myknn_predicted_f_tree(i) = 1;
myknn_predicted_g_tree(i) = 1;
ensemble_predicted_tree_m(i) = 1;
ensemble_predicted_tree_mv(i) = 1;
ensemble_predicted_tree_bayes(i) = 1;
end
end
end
t_tree = toc;
[myknn_correct_normal_rate_a_tree, myknn_correct_attack_rate_a_tree] = ...
accuracy_binary(test_labels_num, myknn_predicted_a_tree, normal_test_record_no,
attack_test_record_no, attack_index, attack_mylabel);
[myknn_correct_normal_rate_b_tree, myknn_correct_attack_rate_b_tree] = ...
accuracy_binary(test_labels_num, myknn_predicted_b_tree, normal_test_record_no,
attack_test_record_no, attack_index, attack_mylabel);
[myknn_correct_normal_rate_c_tree, myknn_correct_attack_rate_c_tree] = ...
accuracy_binary(test_labels_num, myknn_predicted_c_tree, normal_test_record_no,
attack_test_record_no, attack_index, attack_mylabel);
[myknn_correct_normal_rate_d_tree, myknn_correct_attack_rate_d_tree] = ...
accuracy_binary(test_labels_num, myknn_predicted_d_tree, normal_test_record_no,
attack_test_record_no, attack_index, attack_mylabel);
[myknn_correct_normal_rate_e_tree, myknn_correct_attack_rate_e_tree] = ...
accuracy_binary(test_labels_num, myknn_predicted_e_tree, normal_test_record_no,
attack_test_record_no, attack_index, attack_mylabel);
[myknn_correct_normal_rate_f_tree, myknn_correct_attack_rate_f_tree] = ...
accuracy_binary(test_labels_num, myknn_predicted_f_tree, normal_test_record_no,
attack_test_record_no, attack_index, attack_mylabel);
[myknn_correct_normal_rate_g_tree, myknn_correct_attack_rate_g_tree] = ...
accuracy_binary(test_labels_num, myknn_predicted_g_tree, normal_test_record_no,
attack_test_record_no, attack_index, attack_mylabel);
[ensemble_correct_normal_rate_tree_m, ensemble_correct_attack_rate_tree_m] = ...
accuracy_binary(test_labels_num, ensemble_predicted_tree_m, normal_test_record_no,
attack_test_record_no, attack_index, attack_mylabel);
[ensemble_correct_normal_rate_tree_mv, ensemble_correct_attack_rate_tree_mv] = ...
accuracy_binary(test_labels_num, ensemble_predicted_tree_mv, normal_test_record_no,
attack_test_record_no, attack_index, attack_mylabel);
[ensemble_correct_normal_rate_tree_bayes, ensemble_correct_attack_rate_tree_bayes] = ...
accuracy_binary(test_labels_num, ensemble_predicted_tree_bayes, normal_test_record_no,
attack_test_record_no, attack_index, attack_mylabel);
fprintf('\n KNN');
knn_normal_rate_a(iter) = knn_correct_normal_rate_a;
knn_attack_rate_a(iter) = knn_correct_attack_rate_a;
knn_normal_rate_b(iter) = knn_correct_normal_rate_b;
knn_attack_rate_b(iter) = knn_correct_attack_rate_b;
knn_normal_rate_c(iter) = knn_correct_normal_rate_c;
knn_attack_rate_c(iter) = knn_correct_attack_rate_c;
knn_normal_rate_d(iter) = knn_correct_normal_rate_d;
knn_attack_rate_d(iter) = knn_correct_attack_rate_d;
knn_normal_rate_e(iter) = knn_correct_normal_rate_e;
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knn_attack_rate_e(iter) = knn_correct_attack_rate_e;
knn_normal_rate_f(iter) = knn_correct_normal_rate_f;
knn_attack_rate_f(iter) = knn_correct_attack_rate_f;
knn_normal_rate_g(iter) = knn_correct_normal_rate_g;
knn_attack_rate_g(iter) = knn_correct_attack_rate_g;
knn_rate_a(iter) = (knn_correct_normal_rate_a*normal_test_record_no +
knn_correct_attack_rate_a*attack_test_record_no)/test_record_no;
knn_rate_b(iter) = (knn_correct_normal_rate_b*normal_test_record_no +
knn_correct_attack_rate_b*attack_test_record_no)/test_record_no;
knn_rate_c(iter) = (knn_correct_normal_rate_c*normal_test_record_no +
knn_correct_attack_rate_c*attack_test_record_no)/test_record_no;
knn_rate_d(iter) = (knn_correct_normal_rate_d*normal_test_record_no +
knn_correct_attack_rate_d*attack_test_record_no)/test_record_no;
knn_rate_e(iter) = (knn_correct_normal_rate_e*normal_test_record_no +
knn_correct_attack_rate_e*attack_test_record_no)/test_record_no;
knn_rate_f(iter) = (knn_correct_normal_rate_f*normal_test_record_no +
knn_correct_attack_rate_f*attack_test_record_no)/test_record_no;
knn_rate_g(iter) = (knn_correct_normal_rate_g*normal_test_record_no +
knn_correct_attack_rate_g*attack_test_record_no)/test_record_no;
time_knn_a(iter) = t_knn_a;
time_knn_b(iter) = t_knn_b;
time_knn_c(iter) = t_knn_c;
time_knn_d(iter) = t_knn_d;
time_knn_e(iter) = t_knn_e;
time_knn_f(iter) = t_knn_f;
time_knn_g(iter) = t_knn_g;
fprintf('\n FKNN');
fknn_normal_rate_a(iter) = fknn_correct_normal_rate_a;
fknn_attack_rate_a(iter) = fknn_correct_attack_rate_a;
fknn_normal_rate_b(iter) = fknn_correct_normal_rate_b;
fknn_attack_rate_b(iter) = fknn_correct_attack_rate_b;
fknn_normal_rate_c(iter) = fknn_correct_normal_rate_c;
fknn_attack_rate_c(iter) = fknn_correct_attack_rate_c;
fknn_normal_rate_d(iter) = fknn_correct_normal_rate_d;
fknn_attack_rate_d(iter) = fknn_correct_attack_rate_d;
fknn_normal_rate_e(iter) = fknn_correct_normal_rate_e;
fknn_attack_rate_e(iter) = fknn_correct_attack_rate_e;
fknn_normal_rate_f(iter) = fknn_correct_normal_rate_f;
fknn_attack_rate_f(iter) = fknn_correct_attack_rate_f;
fknn_normal_rate_g(iter) = fknn_correct_normal_rate_g;
fknn_attack_rate_g(iter) = fknn_correct_attack_rate_g;
fknn_rate_a(iter) = (fknn_correct_normal_rate_a*normal_test_record_no +
fknn_correct_attack_rate_a*attack_test_record_no)/test_record_no;
fknn_rate_b(iter) = (fknn_correct_normal_rate_b*normal_test_record_no +
fknn_correct_attack_rate_b*attack_test_record_no)/test_record_no;
fknn_rate_c(iter) = (fknn_correct_normal_rate_c*normal_test_record_no +
fknn_correct_attack_rate_c*attack_test_record_no)/test_record_no;
fknn_rate_d(iter) = (fknn_correct_normal_rate_d*normal_test_record_no +
fknn_correct_attack_rate_d*attack_test_record_no)/test_record_no;
fknn_rate_e(iter) = (fknn_correct_normal_rate_e*normal_test_record_no +
fknn_correct_attack_rate_e*attack_test_record_no)/test_record_no;
fknn_rate_f(iter) = (fknn_correct_normal_rate_f*normal_test_record_no +
fknn_correct_attack_rate_f*attack_test_record_no)/test_record_no;
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fknn_rate_g(iter) = (fknn_correct_normal_rate_g*normal_test_record_no +
fknn_correct_attack_rate_g*attack_test_record_no)/test_record_no;
time_fknn_a(iter) = t_fknn_a;
time_fknn_b(iter) = t_fknn_b;
time_fknn_c(iter) = t_fknn_c;
time_fknn_d(iter) = t_fknn_d;
time_fknn_e(iter) = t_fknn_e;
time_fknn_f(iter) = t_fknn_f;
time_fknn_g(iter) = t_fknn_g;
fprintf('\n ETKNN');
etknn_normal_rate_a(iter) = etknn_correct_normal_rate_a;
etknn_attack_rate_a(iter) = etknn_correct_attack_rate_a;
etknn_normal_rate_b(iter) = etknn_correct_normal_rate_b;
etknn_attack_rate_b(iter) = etknn_correct_attack_rate_b;
etknn_normal_rate_c(iter) = etknn_correct_normal_rate_c;
etknn_attack_rate_c(iter) = etknn_correct_attack_rate_c;
etknn_normal_rate_d(iter) = etknn_correct_normal_rate_d;
etknn_attack_rate_d(iter) = etknn_correct_attack_rate_d;
etknn_normal_rate_e(iter) = etknn_correct_normal_rate_e;
etknn_attack_rate_e(iter) = etknn_correct_attack_rate_e;
etknn_normal_rate_f(iter) = etknn_correct_normal_rate_f;
etknn_attack_rate_f(iter) = etknn_correct_attack_rate_f;
etknn_normal_rate_g(iter) = etknn_correct_normal_rate_g;
etknn_attack_rate_g(iter) = etknn_correct_attack_rate_g;
etknn_rate_a(iter) = (etknn_correct_normal_rate_a*normal_test_record_no +
etknn_correct_attack_rate_a*attack_test_record_no)/test_record_no;
etknn_rate_b(iter) = (etknn_correct_normal_rate_b*normal_test_record_no +
etknn_correct_attack_rate_b*attack_test_record_no)/test_record_no;
etknn_rate_c(iter) = (etknn_correct_normal_rate_c*normal_test_record_no +
etknn_correct_attack_rate_c*attack_test_record_no)/test_record_no;
etknn_rate_d(iter) = (etknn_correct_normal_rate_d*normal_test_record_no +
etknn_correct_attack_rate_d*attack_test_record_no)/test_record_no;
etknn_rate_e(iter) = (etknn_correct_normal_rate_e*normal_test_record_no +
etknn_correct_attack_rate_e*attack_test_record_no)/test_record_no;
etknn_rate_f(iter) = (etknn_correct_normal_rate_f*normal_test_record_no +
etknn_correct_attack_rate_f*attack_test_record_no)/test_record_no;
etknn_rate_g(iter) = (etknn_correct_normal_rate_g*normal_test_record_no +
etknn_correct_attack_rate_g*attack_test_record_no)/test_record_no;
time_etknn_a(iter) = t_etknn_a;
time_etknn_b(iter) = t_etknn_b;
time_etknn_c(iter) = t_etknn_c;
time_etknn_d(iter) = t_etknn_d;
time_etknn_e(iter) = t_etknn_e;
time_etknn_f(iter) = t_etknn_f;
time_etknn_g(iter) = t_etknn_g;
fprintf('\n MYKNN');
myknn_normal_rate_a(iter) = myknn_correct_normal_rate_a;
myknn_attack_rate_a(iter) = myknn_correct_attack_rate_a;
myknn_normal_rate_b(iter) = myknn_correct_normal_rate_b;
myknn_attack_rate_b(iter) = myknn_correct_attack_rate_b;
myknn_normal_rate_c(iter) = myknn_correct_normal_rate_c;
myknn_attack_rate_c(iter) = myknn_correct_attack_rate_c;
myknn_normal_rate_d(iter) = myknn_correct_normal_rate_d;
myknn_attack_rate_d(iter) = myknn_correct_attack_rate_d;
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myknn_normal_rate_e(iter) = myknn_correct_normal_rate_e;
myknn_attack_rate_e(iter) = myknn_correct_attack_rate_e;
myknn_normal_rate_f(iter) = myknn_correct_normal_rate_f;
myknn_attack_rate_f(iter) = myknn_correct_attack_rate_f;
myknn_normal_rate_g(iter) = myknn_correct_normal_rate_g;
myknn_attack_rate_g(iter) = myknn_correct_attack_rate_g;
myknn_rate_a(iter) = (myknn_correct_normal_rate_a*normal_test_record_no +
myknn_correct_attack_rate_a*attack_test_record_no)/test_record_no;
myknn_rate_b(iter) = (myknn_correct_normal_rate_b*normal_test_record_no +
myknn_correct_attack_rate_b*attack_test_record_no)/test_record_no;
myknn_rate_c(iter) = (myknn_correct_normal_rate_c*normal_test_record_no +
myknn_correct_attack_rate_c*attack_test_record_no)/test_record_no;
myknn_rate_d(iter) = (myknn_correct_normal_rate_d*normal_test_record_no +
myknn_correct_attack_rate_d*attack_test_record_no)/test_record_no;
myknn_rate_e(iter) = (myknn_correct_normal_rate_e*normal_test_record_no +
myknn_correct_attack_rate_e*attack_test_record_no)/test_record_no;
myknn_rate_f(iter) = (myknn_correct_normal_rate_f*normal_test_record_no +
myknn_correct_attack_rate_f*attack_test_record_no)/test_record_no;
myknn_rate_g(iter) = (myknn_correct_normal_rate_g*normal_test_record_no +
myknn_correct_attack_rate_g*attack_test_record_no)/test_record_no;
time_myknn_a(iter) = t_myknn_a;
time_myknn_b(iter) = t_myknn_b;
time_myknn_c(iter) = t_myknn_c;
time_myknn_d(iter) = t_myknn_d;
time_myknn_e(iter) = t_myknn_e;
time_myknn_f(iter) = t_myknn_f;
time_myknn_g(iter) = t_myknn_g;
fprintf('\n MYKNN-W');
myknn_normal_rate_a_w(iter) = myknn_correct_normal_rate_a_w;
myknn_attack_rate_a_w(iter) = myknn_correct_attack_rate_a_w;
myknn_normal_rate_b_w(iter) = myknn_correct_normal_rate_b_w;
myknn_attack_rate_b_w(iter) = myknn_correct_attack_rate_b_w;
myknn_normal_rate_c_w(iter) = myknn_correct_normal_rate_c_w;
myknn_attack_rate_c_w(iter) = myknn_correct_attack_rate_c_w;
myknn_normal_rate_d_w(iter) = myknn_correct_normal_rate_d_w;
myknn_attack_rate_d_w(iter) = myknn_correct_attack_rate_d_w;
myknn_rate_a_w(iter) = (myknn_correct_normal_rate_a_w*normal_test_record_no +
myknn_correct_attack_rate_a_w*attack_test_record_no)/test_record_no;
myknn_rate_b_w(iter) = (myknn_correct_normal_rate_b_w*normal_test_record_no +
myknn_correct_attack_rate_b_w*attack_test_record_no)/test_record_no;
myknn_rate_c_w(iter) = (myknn_correct_normal_rate_c_w*normal_test_record_no +
myknn_correct_attack_rate_c_w*attack_test_record_no)/test_record_no;
myknn_rate_d_w(iter) = (myknn_correct_normal_rate_d_w*normal_test_record_no +
myknn_correct_attack_rate_d_w*attack_test_record_no)/test_record_no;
time_myknn_a_w(iter) = t_myknn_a_w;
time_myknn_b_w(iter) = t_myknn_b_w;
time_myknn_c_w(iter) = t_myknn_c_w;
time_myknn_d_w(iter) = t_myknn_d_w;
fprintf('\n ENSEMBLE');
ensemble_normal_rate_m(iter) = ensemble_correct_normal_rate_m;
ensemble_attack_rate_m(iter) = ensemble_correct_attack_rate_m;
ensemble_normal_rate_mv(iter) = ensemble_correct_normal_rate_mv;
ensemble_attack_rate_mv(iter) = ensemble_correct_attack_rate_mv;
ensemble_normal_rate_bayes(iter) = ensemble_correct_normal_rate_bayes;
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ensemble_attack_rate_bayes(iter) = ensemble_correct_attack_rate_bayes;
ensemble_rate_m(iter) = (ensemble_correct_normal_rate_m*normal_test_record_no +
ensemble_correct_attack_rate_m*attack_test_record_no)/test_record_no;
ensemble_rate_mv(iter) = (ensemble_correct_normal_rate_mv*normal_test_record_no +
ensemble_correct_attack_rate_mv*attack_test_record_no)/test_record_no;
ensemble_rate_bayes(iter) = (ensemble_correct_normal_rate_bayes*normal_test_record_no +
ensemble_correct_attack_rate_bayes*attack_test_record_no)/test_record_no;
time_ensemble_bayes(iter) = t_ensemble_bayes;
fprintf('\n TREE');
myknn_normal_rate_a_tree(iter) = myknn_correct_normal_rate_a_tree;
myknn_attack_rate_a_tree(iter) = myknn_correct_attack_rate_a_tree;
myknn_normal_rate_b_tree(iter) = myknn_correct_normal_rate_b_tree;
myknn_attack_rate_b_tree(iter) = myknn_correct_attack_rate_b_tree;
myknn_normal_rate_c_tree(iter) = myknn_correct_normal_rate_c_tree;
myknn_attack_rate_c_tree(iter) = myknn_correct_attack_rate_c_tree;
myknn_normal_rate_d_tree(iter) = myknn_correct_normal_rate_d_tree;
myknn_attack_rate_d_tree(iter) = myknn_correct_attack_rate_d_tree;
myknn_normal_rate_e_tree(iter) = myknn_correct_normal_rate_e_tree;
myknn_attack_rate_e_tree(iter) = myknn_correct_attack_rate_e_tree;
myknn_normal_rate_f_tree(iter) = myknn_correct_normal_rate_f_tree;
myknn_attack_rate_f_tree(iter) = myknn_correct_attack_rate_f_tree;
myknn_normal_rate_g_tree(iter) = myknn_correct_normal_rate_g_tree;
myknn_attack_rate_g_tree(iter) = myknn_correct_attack_rate_g_tree;
myknn_rate_a_tree(iter) = (myknn_correct_normal_rate_a_tree*normal_test_record_no +
myknn_correct_attack_rate_a_tree*attack_test_record_no)/test_record_no;
myknn_rate_b_tree(iter) = (myknn_correct_normal_rate_b_tree*normal_test_record_no +
myknn_correct_attack_rate_b_tree*attack_test_record_no)/test_record_no;
myknn_rate_c_tree(iter) = (myknn_correct_normal_rate_c_tree*normal_test_record_no +
myknn_correct_attack_rate_c_tree*attack_test_record_no)/test_record_no;
myknn_rate_d_tree(iter) = (myknn_correct_normal_rate_d_tree*normal_test_record_no +
myknn_correct_attack_rate_d_tree*attack_test_record_no)/test_record_no;
myknn_rate_e_tree(iter) = (myknn_correct_normal_rate_e_tree*normal_test_record_no +
myknn_correct_attack_rate_e_tree*attack_test_record_no)/test_record_no;
myknn_rate_f_tree(iter) = (myknn_correct_normal_rate_f_tree*normal_test_record_no +
myknn_correct_attack_rate_f_tree*attack_test_record_no)/test_record_no;
myknn_rate_g_tree(iter) = (myknn_correct_normal_rate_g_tree*normal_test_record_no +
myknn_correct_attack_rate_g_tree*attack_test_record_no)/test_record_no;
fprintf('\n ENSENBLE + TREE');
ensemble_normal_rate_tree_m(iter) = ensemble_correct_normal_rate_tree_m;
ensemble_attack_rate_tree_m(iter) = ensemble_correct_attack_rate_tree_m;
ensemble_normal_rate_tree_mv(iter) = ensemble_correct_normal_rate_tree_mv;
ensemble_attack_rate_tree_mv(iter) = ensemble_correct_attack_rate_tree_mv;
ensemble_normal_rate_tree_bayes(iter) = ensemble_correct_normal_rate_tree_bayes;
ensemble_attack_rate_tree_bayes(iter) = ensemble_correct_attack_rate_tree_bayes;
ensemble_rate_tree_m(iter) = (ensemble_correct_normal_rate_tree_m*normal_test_record_no +
ensemble_correct_attack_rate_tree_m*attack_test_record_no)/test_record_no;
ensemble_rate_tree_mv(iter) = (ensemble_correct_normal_rate_tree_mv*normal_test_record_no +
ensemble_correct_attack_rate_tree_mv*attack_test_record_no)/test_record_no;
ensemble_rate_tree_bayes(iter) = (ensemble_correct_normal_rate_tree_bayes*normal_test_record_no +
ensemble_correct_attack_rate_tree_bayes*attack_test_record_no)/test_record_no;
time_tree(iter) = t_tree;
%attacks in training set
[train_3_no, train_4_no, train_5_no, train_6_no, train_7_no, train_8_no, train_9_no, train_10_no, ...
train_11_no, train_12_no, train_13_no, train_14_no, train_15_no, train_16_no, train_17_no, …
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train_18_no, train_19_no, train_20_no, train_21_no, train_22_no, train_23_no, train_24_no, …
train_25_no, train_26_no, train_27_no, train_28_no, train_29_no, train_30_no, train_31_no, …
train_32_no, train_33_no, train_34_no, train_35_no, train_36_no, train_37_no, train_38_no, …
train_39_no, train_40_no, train_41_no ] = attack_train_binary(train_labels_num);
train_3_number(iter,:) = train_3_no; train_4_number(iter,:) = train_4_no;
train_5_number(iter,:) = train_5_no; train_6_number(iter,:) = train_6_no;
train_7_number(iter,:) = train_7_no; train_8_number(iter,:) = train_8_no;
train_9_number(iter,:) = train_9_no; train_10_number(iter,:) = train_10_no;
train_11_number(iter,:) = train_11_no; train_12_number(iter,:) = train_12_no;
train_13_number(iter,:) = train_13_no; train_14_number(iter,:) = train_14_no;
train_15_number(iter,:) = train_15_no; train_16_number(iter,:) = train_16_no;
train_17_number(iter,:) = train_17_no; train_18_number(iter,:) = train_18_no;
train_19_number(iter,:) = train_19_no; train_20_number(iter,:) = train_20_no;
train_21_number(iter,:) = train_21_no; train_22_number(iter,:) = train_22_no;
train_23_number(iter,:) = train_23_no; train_24_number(iter,:) = train_24_no;
train_25_number(iter,:) = train_25_no; train_26_number(iter,:) = train_26_no;
train_27_number(iter,:) = train_27_no; train_28_number(iter,:) = train_28_no;
train_29_number(iter,:) = train_29_no; train_30_number(iter,:) = train_30_no;
train_31_number(iter,:) = train_31_no; train_32_number(iter,:) = train_32_no;
train_33_number(iter,:) = train_33_no; train_34_number(iter,:) = train_34_no;
train_35_number(iter,:) = train_35_no; train_36_number(iter,:) = train_36_no;
train_37_number(iter,:) = train_37_no; train_38_number(iter,:) = train_38_no;
train_39_number(iter,:) = train_39_no; train_40_number(iter,:) = train_40_no;
train_41_number(iter,:) = train_41_no;
% attacks in testing set
[ total_3_no, correct_3_no, total_4_no, correct_4_no, total_5_no, correct_5_no, ...
total_6_no, correct_6_no, total_7_no, correct_7_no, total_8_no, correct_8_no, ...
total_9_no, correct_9_no, total_10_no, correct_10_no, total_11_no, correct_11_no, ...
total_12_no, correct_12_no, total_13_no, correct_13_no, total_14_no, correct_14_no, ...
total_15_no, correct_15_no, total_16_no, correct_16_no, otal_17_no, correct_17_no, ...
total_18_no, correct_18_no, total_19_no, correct_19_no, total_20_no, correct_20_no, ...
total_21_no, correct_21_no, total_22_no, correct_22_no, total_23_no, correct_23_no, ...
total_24_no, correct_24_no, total_25_no, correct_25_no, total_26_no, correct_26_no, ...
total_27_no, correct_27_no, total_28_no, correct_28_no, total_29_no, correct_29_no, ...
total_30_no, correct_30_no, total_31_no, correct_31_no, total_32_no, correct_32_no, ...
total_33_no, correct_33_no, total_34_no, correct_34_no, total_35_no, correct_35_no, ...
total_36_no, correct_36_no, total_37_no, correct_37_no, total_38_no, correct_38_no, ...
total_39_no, correct_39_no, total_40_no, correct_40_no, total_41_no, correct_41_no]= ...
attack_test_binary(test_labels_num, ...
knn_predicted_a, knn_predicted_b, knn_predicted_c, knn_predicted_d, ...
fknn_predicted_a, fknn_predicted_b, fknn_predicted_c, fknn_predicted_d, ...
etknn_predicted_a, etknn_predicted_b, etknn_predicted_c, etknn_predicted_d, ...
myknn_predicted_a, myknn_predicted_b, myknn_predicted_c, myknn_predicted_d, ...
myknn_predicted_e, myknn_predicted_f, myknn_predicted_g, ...
myknn_predicted_a_w, myknn_predicted_b_w, myknn_predicted_c_w, …
myknn_predicted_d_w, ...
ensemble_predicted_m, ensemble_predicted_mv, ensemble_predicted_bayes, ...
ensemble_predicted_tree_m, ensemble_predicted_tree_mv, …
ensemble_predicted_tree_bayes);
total_3_number(iter,:) = total_3_no; correct_3_number(iter,:) = correct_3_no;
total_4_number(iter,:) = total_4_no; correct_4_number(iter,:) = correct_4_no;
total_5_number(iter,:) = total_5_no; correct_5_number(iter,:) = correct_5_no;
total_6_number(iter,:) = total_6_no; correct_6_number(iter,:) = correct_6_no;
total_7_number(iter,:) = total_7_no; correct_7_number(iter,:) = correct_7_no;
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total_8_number(iter,:) = total_8_no; correct_8_number(iter,:) = correct_8_no;
total_9_number(iter,:) = total_9_no; correct_9_number(iter,:) = correct_9_no;
total_10_number(iter,:) = total_10_no; correct_10_number(iter,:) = correct_10_no;
total_11_number(iter,:) = total_11_no; correct_11_number(iter,:) = correct_11_no;
total_12_number(iter,:) = total_12_no; correct_12_number(iter,:) = correct_12_no;
total_13_number(iter,:) = total_13_no; correct_13_number(iter,:) = correct_13_no;
total_14_number(iter,:) = total_14_no; correct_14_number(iter,:) = correct_14_no;
total_15_number(iter,:) = total_15_no; correct_15_number(iter,:) = correct_15_no;
total_16_number(iter,:) = total_16_no; correct_16_number(iter,:) = correct_16_no;
total_17_number(iter,:) = total_17_no; correct_17_number(iter,:) = correct_17_no;
total_18_number(iter,:) = total_18_no; correct_18_number(iter,:) = correct_18_no;
total_19_number(iter,:) = total_19_no; correct_19_number(iter,:) = correct_19_no;
total_20_number(iter,:) = total_20_no; correct_20_number(iter,:) = correct_20_no;
total_21_number(iter,:) = total_21_no; correct_21_number(iter,:) = correct_21_no;
total_22_number(iter,:) = total_22_no; correct_22_number(iter,:) = correct_22_no;
total_23_number(iter,:) = total_23_no; correct_23_number(iter,:) = correct_23_no;
total_24_number(iter,:) = total_24_no; correct_24_number(iter,:) = correct_24_no;
total_25_number(iter,:) = total_25_no; correct_25_number(iter,:) = correct_25_no;
total_26_number(iter,:) = total_26_no; correct_26_number(iter,:) = correct_26_no;
total_27_number(iter,:) = total_27_no; correct_27_number(iter,:) = correct_27_no;
total_28_number(iter,:) = total_28_no; correct_28_number(iter,:) = correct_28_no;
total_29_number(iter,:) = total_29_no; correct_29_number(iter,:) = correct_29_no;
total_30_number(iter,:) = total_30_no; correct_30_number(iter,:) = correct_30_no;
total_31_number(iter,:) = total_31_no; correct_31_number(iter,:) = correct_31_no;
total_32_number(iter,:) = total_32_no; correct_32_number(iter,:) = correct_32_no;
total_33_number(iter,:) = total_33_no; correct_33_number(iter,:) = correct_33_no;
total_34_number(iter,:) = total_34_no; correct_34_number(iter,:) = correct_34_no;
total_35_number(iter,:) = total_35_no; correct_35_number(iter,:) = correct_35_no;
total_36_number(iter,:) = total_36_no; correct_36_number(iter,:) = correct_36_no;
total_37_number(iter,:) = total_37_no; correct_37_number(iter,:) = correct_37_no;
total_38_number(iter,:) = total_38_no; correct_38_number(iter,:) = correct_38_no;
total_39_number(iter,:) = total_39_no; correct_39_number(iter,:) = correct_39_no;
total_40_number(iter,:) = total_40_no; correct_40_number(iter,:) = correct_40_no;
total_41_number(iter,:) = total_41_no; correct_41_number(iter,:) = correct_41_no;
end % iter
fprintf('\n KNN');
knn_average_normal_rate_a(k) = 1- sum(knn_normal_rate_a) / iter_no;
knn_average_attack_rate_a(k) = sum(knn_attack_rate_a) / iter_no;
knn_average_normal_rate_b(k) = 1- sum(knn_normal_rate_b) / iter_no;
knn_average_attack_rate_b(k) = sum(knn_attack_rate_b) / iter_no;
knn_average_normal_rate_c(k) = 1- sum(knn_normal_rate_c) / iter_no;
knn_average_attack_rate_c(k) = sum(knn_attack_rate_c) / iter_no;
knn_average_normal_rate_d(k) = 1- sum(knn_normal_rate_d) / iter_no;
knn_average_attack_rate_d(k) = sum(knn_attack_rate_d) / iter_no;
knn_average_normal_rate_e(k) = 1- sum(knn_normal_rate_e) / iter_no;
knn_average_attack_rate_e(k) = sum(knn_attack_rate_e) / iter_no;
knn_average_normal_rate_f(k) = 1- sum(knn_normal_rate_f) / iter_no;
knn_average_attack_rate_f(k) = sum(knn_attack_rate_f) / iter_no;
knn_average_normal_rate_g(k) = 1- sum(knn_normal_rate_g) / iter_no;
knn_average_attack_rate_g(k) = sum(knn_attack_rate_g) / iter_no;
knn_average_rate_a(k) = sum(knn_rate_a) / iter_no;
knn_average_rate_b(k) = sum(knn_rate_b) / iter_no;
knn_average_rate_c(k) = sum(knn_rate_c) / iter_no;
knn_average_rate_d(k) = sum(knn_rate_d) / iter_no;
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knn_average_rate_e(k) = sum(knn_rate_e) / iter_no;
knn_average_rate_f(k) = sum(knn_rate_f) / iter_no;
knn_average_rate_g(k) = sum(knn_rate_g) / iter_no;
time_average_knn_a(k) = sum(time_knn_a) / iter_no;
time_average_knn_b(k) = sum(time_knn_b) / iter_no;
time_average_knn_c(k) = sum(time_knn_c) / iter_no;
time_average_knn_d(k) = sum(time_knn_d) / iter_no;
time_average_knn_e(k) = sum(time_knn_e) / iter_no;
time_average_knn_f(k) = sum(time_knn_f) / iter_no;
time_average_knn_g(k) = sum(time_knn_g) / iter_no;
fprintf('\n FKNN');
fknn_average_normal_rate_a(k) = 1- sum(fknn_normal_rate_a) / iter_no;
fknn_average_attack_rate_a(k) = sum(fknn_attack_rate_a) / iter_no;
fknn_average_normal_rate_b(k) = 1- sum(fknn_normal_rate_b) / iter_no;
fknn_average_attack_rate_b(k) = sum(fknn_attack_rate_b) / iter_no;
fknn_average_normal_rate_c(k) = 1- sum(fknn_normal_rate_c) / iter_no;
fknn_average_attack_rate_c(k) = sum(fknn_attack_rate_c) / iter_no;
fknn_average_normal_rate_d(k) = 1- sum(fknn_normal_rate_d) / iter_no;
fknn_average_attack_rate_d(k) = sum(fknn_attack_rate_d) / iter_no;
fknn_average_normal_rate_e(k) = 1- sum(fknn_normal_rate_e) / iter_no;
fknn_average_attack_rate_e(k) = sum(fknn_attack_rate_e) / iter_no;
fknn_average_normal_rate_f(k) = 1- sum(fknn_normal_rate_f) / iter_no;
fknn_average_attack_rate_f(k) = sum(fknn_attack_rate_f) / iter_no;
fknn_average_normal_rate_g(k) = 1- sum(fknn_normal_rate_g) / iter_no;
fknn_average_attack_rate_g(k) = sum(fknn_attack_rate_g) / iter_no;
fknn_average_rate_a(k) = sum(fknn_rate_a) / iter_no;
fknn_average_rate_b(k) = sum(fknn_rate_b) / iter_no;
fknn_average_rate_c(k) = sum(fknn_rate_c) / iter_no;
fknn_average_rate_d(k) = sum(fknn_rate_d) / iter_no;
fknn_average_rate_e(k) = sum(fknn_rate_e) / iter_no;
fknn_average_rate_f(k) = sum(fknn_rate_f) / iter_no;
fknn_average_rate_g(k) = sum(fknn_rate_g) / iter_no;
time_average_fknn_a(k) = sum(time_fknn_a) / iter_no;
time_average_fknn_b(k) = sum(time_fknn_b) / iter_no;
time_average_fknn_c(k) = sum(time_fknn_c) / iter_no;
time_average_fknn_d(k) = sum(time_fknn_d) / iter_no;
time_average_fknn_e(k) = sum(time_fknn_e) / iter_no;
time_average_fknn_f(k) = sum(time_fknn_f) / iter_no;
time_average_fknn_g(k) = sum(time_fknn_g) / iter_no;
fprintf('\n ETKNN');
etknn_average_normal_rate_a(k) = 1- sum(etknn_normal_rate_a) / iter_no;
etknn_average_attack_rate_a(k) = sum(etknn_attack_rate_a) / iter_no;
etknn_average_normal_rate_b(k) = 1- sum(etknn_normal_rate_b) / iter_no;
etknn_average_attack_rate_b(k) = sum(etknn_attack_rate_b) / iter_no;
etknn_average_normal_rate_c(k) = 1- sum(etknn_normal_rate_c) / iter_no;
etknn_average_attack_rate_c(k) = sum(etknn_attack_rate_c) / iter_no;
etknn_average_normal_rate_d(k) = 1- sum(etknn_normal_rate_d) / iter_no;
etknn_average_attack_rate_d(k) = sum(etknn_attack_rate_d) / iter_no;
etknn_average_normal_rate_e(k) = 1- sum(etknn_normal_rate_e) / iter_no;
etknn_average_attack_rate_e(k) = sum(etknn_attack_rate_e) / iter_no;
etknn_average_normal_rate_f(k) = 1- sum(etknn_normal_rate_f) / iter_no;
etknn_average_attack_rate_f(k) = sum(etknn_attack_rate_f) / iter_no;
etknn_average_normal_rate_g(k) = 1- sum(etknn_normal_rate_g) / iter_no;
etknn_average_attack_rate_g(k) = sum(etknn_attack_rate_g) / iter_no;
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etknn_average_rate_a(k) = sum(etknn_rate_a) / iter_no;
etknn_average_rate_b(k) = sum(etknn_rate_b) / iter_no;
etknn_average_rate_c(k) = sum(etknn_rate_c) / iter_no;
etknn_average_rate_d(k) = sum(etknn_rate_d) / iter_no;
etknn_average_rate_e(k) = sum(etknn_rate_e) / iter_no;
etknn_average_rate_f(k) = sum(etknn_rate_f) / iter_no;
etknn_average_rate_g(k) = sum(etknn_rate_g) / iter_no;
time_average_etknn_a(k) = sum(time_etknn_a) / iter_no;
time_average_etknn_b(k) = sum(time_etknn_b) / iter_no;
time_average_etknn_c(k) = sum(time_etknn_c) / iter_no;
time_average_etknn_d(k) = sum(time_etknn_d) / iter_no;
time_average_etknn_e(k) = sum(time_etknn_e) / iter_no;
time_average_etknn_f(k) = sum(time_etknn_f) / iter_no;
time_average_etknn_g(k) = sum(time_etknn_g) / iter_no;
fprintf('\n MYKNN');
myknn_average_normal_rate_a(k) = 1- sum(myknn_normal_rate_a) / iter_no;
myknn_average_attack_rate_a(k) = sum(myknn_attack_rate_a) / iter_no;
myknn_average_normal_rate_b(k) = 1- sum(myknn_normal_rate_b) / iter_no;
myknn_average_attack_rate_b(k) = sum(myknn_attack_rate_b) / iter_no;
myknn_average_normal_rate_c(k) = 1- sum(myknn_normal_rate_c) / iter_no;
myknn_average_attack_rate_c(k) = sum(myknn_attack_rate_c) / iter_no;
myknn_average_normal_rate_d(k) = 1- sum(myknn_normal_rate_d) / iter_no;
myknn_average_attack_rate_d(k) = sum(myknn_attack_rate_d) / iter_no;
myknn_average_normal_rate_e(k) = 1- sum(myknn_normal_rate_e) / iter_no;
myknn_average_attack_rate_e(k) = sum(myknn_attack_rate_e) / iter_no;
myknn_average_normal_rate_f(k) = 1- sum(myknn_normal_rate_f) / iter_no;
myknn_average_attack_rate_f(k) = sum(myknn_attack_rate_f) / iter_no;
myknn_average_normal_rate_g(k) = 1- sum(myknn_normal_rate_g) / iter_no;
myknn_average_attack_rate_g(k) = sum(myknn_attack_rate_g) / iter_no;
myknn_average_rate_a(k) = sum(myknn_rate_a) / iter_no;
myknn_average_rate_b(k) = sum(myknn_rate_b) / iter_no;
myknn_average_rate_c(k) = sum(myknn_rate_c) / iter_no;
myknn_average_rate_d(k) = sum(myknn_rate_d) / iter_no;
myknn_average_rate_e(k) = sum(myknn_rate_e) / iter_no;
myknn_average_rate_f(k) = sum(myknn_rate_f) / iter_no;
myknn_average_rate_g(k) = sum(myknn_rate_g) / iter_no;
time_average_myknn_a(k) = sum(time_myknn_a) / iter_no;
time_average_myknn_b(k) = sum(time_myknn_b) / iter_no;
time_average_myknn_c(k) = sum(time_myknn_c) / iter_no;
time_average_myknn_d(k) = sum(time_myknn_d) / iter_no;
time_average_myknn_e(k) = sum(time_myknn_e) / iter_no;
time_average_myknn_f(k) = sum(time_myknn_f) / iter_no;
time_average_myknn_g(k) = sum(time_myknn_g) / iter_no;
fprintf('\n MYKNN-W');
myknn_average_normal_rate_a_w(k) = 1- sum(myknn_normal_rate_a_w) / iter_no;
myknn_average_attack_rate_a_w(k) = sum(myknn_attack_rate_a_w) / iter_no;
myknn_average_normal_rate_b_w(k) = 1- sum(myknn_normal_rate_b_w) / iter_no;
myknn_average_attack_rate_b_w(k) = sum(myknn_attack_rate_b_w) / iter_no;
myknn_average_normal_rate_c_w(k) = 1- sum(myknn_normal_rate_c_w) / iter_no;
myknn_average_attack_rate_c_w(k) = sum(myknn_attack_rate_c_w) / iter_no;
myknn_average_normal_rate_d_w(k) = 1- sum(myknn_normal_rate_d_w) / iter_no;
myknn_average_attack_rate_d_w(k) = sum(myknn_attack_rate_d_w) / iter_no;
myknn_average_rate_a_w(k) = sum(myknn_rate_a_w) / iter_no;
myknn_average_rate_b_w(k) = sum(myknn_rate_b_w) / iter_no;
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myknn_average_rate_c_w(k) = sum(myknn_rate_c_w) / iter_no;
myknn_average_rate_d_w(k) = sum(myknn_rate_d_w) / iter_no;
time_average_myknn_a_w(k) = sum(time_myknn_a_w) / iter_no;
time_average_myknn_b_w(k) = sum(time_myknn_b_w) / iter_no;
time_average_myknn_c_w(k) = sum(time_myknn_c_w) / iter_no;
time_average_myknn_d_w(k) = sum(time_myknn_d_w) / iter_no;
fprintf('\n ENSEMBLE');
ensemble_average_normal_rate_m(k) = 1- sum(ensemble_normal_rate_m) / iter_no;
ensemble_average_attack_rate_m(k) = sum(ensemble_attack_rate_m) / iter_no;
ensemble_average_normal_rate_mv(k) = 1- sum(ensemble_normal_rate_mv) / iter_no;
ensemble_average_attack_rate_mv(k) = sum(ensemble_attack_rate_mv) / iter_no;
ensemble_average_normal_rate_bayes(k) = 1- sum(ensemble_normal_rate_bayes) / iter_no;
ensemble_average_attack_rate_bayes(k) = sum(ensemble_attack_rate_bayes) / iter_no;
ensemble_average_rate_m(k) = sum(ensemble_rate_m) / iter_no;
ensemble_average_rate_mv(k) = sum(ensemble_rate_mv) / iter_no;
ensemble_average_rate_bayes(k) = sum(ensemble_rate_bayes) / iter_no;
time_average_ensemble_bayes(k) = sum(time_ensemble_bayes) / iter_no;
fprintf('\n TREE');
myknn_average_normal_rate_a_tree(k) = 1- sum(myknn_normal_rate_a_tree) / iter_no;
myknn_average_attack_rate_a_tree(k) = sum(myknn_attack_rate_a_tree) / iter_no;
myknn_average_normal_rate_b_tree(k) = 1- sum(myknn_normal_rate_b_tree) / iter_no;
myknn_average_attack_rate_b_tree(k) = sum(myknn_attack_rate_b_tree) / iter_no;
myknn_average_normal_rate_c_tree(k) = 1- sum(myknn_normal_rate_c_tree) / iter_no;
myknn_average_attack_rate_c_tree(k) = sum(myknn_attack_rate_c_tree) / iter_no;
myknn_average_normal_rate_d_tree(k) = 1- sum(myknn_normal_rate_d_tree) / iter_no;
myknn_average_attack_rate_d_tree(k) = sum(myknn_attack_rate_d_tree) / iter_no;
myknn_average_normal_rate_e_tree(k) = 1- sum(myknn_normal_rate_e_tree) / iter_no;
myknn_average_attack_rate_e_tree(k) = sum(myknn_attack_rate_e_tree) / iter_no;
myknn_average_normal_rate_f_tree(k) = 1- sum(myknn_normal_rate_f_tree) / iter_no;
myknn_average_attack_rate_f_tree(k) = sum(myknn_attack_rate_f_tree) / iter_no;
myknn_average_normal_rate_g_tree(k) = 1- sum(myknn_normal_rate_g_tree) / iter_no;
myknn_average_attack_rate_g_tree(k) = sum(myknn_attack_rate_g_tree) / iter_no;
myknn_average_rate_a_tree(k) = sum(myknn_rate_a_tree) / iter_no;
myknn_average_rate_b_tree(k) = sum(myknn_rate_b_tree) / iter_no;
myknn_average_rate_c_tree(k) = sum(myknn_rate_c_tree) / iter_no;
myknn_average_rate_d_tree(k) = sum(myknn_rate_d_tree) / iter_no;
myknn_average_rate_e_tree(k) = sum(myknn_rate_e_tree) / iter_no;
myknn_average_rate_f_tree(k) = sum(myknn_rate_f_tree) / iter_no;
myknn_average_rate_g_tree(k) = sum(myknn_rate_g_tree) / iter_no;
fprintf('\n TREE + ENSEMBLE');
ensemble_average_normal_rate_tree_m(k) = 1- sum(ensemble_normal_rate_tree_m) / iter_no;
ensemble_average_attack_rate_tree_m(k) = sum(ensemble_attack_rate_tree_m) / iter_no;
ensemble_average_normal_rate_tree_mv(k) = 1- sum(ensemble_normal_rate_tree_mv) / iter_no;
ensemble_average_attack_rate_tree_mv(k) = sum(ensemble_attack_rate_tree_mv) / iter_no;
ensemble_average_normal_rate_tree_bayes(k) = 1- sum(ensemble_normal_rate_tree_bayes) / iter_no;
ensemble_average_attack_rate_tree_bayes(k) = sum(ensemble_attack_rate_tree_bayes) / iter_no;
ensemble_average_rate_tree_m(k) = sum(ensemble_rate_tree_m) / iter_no;
ensemble_average_rate_tree_mv(k) = sum(ensemble_rate_tree_mv) / iter_no;
ensemble_average_rate_tree_bayes(k) = sum(ensemble_rate_tree_bayes) / iter_no;
time_average_tree(k) = sum(time_tree) / iter_no;
sum_train_3_number(k,:) = sum(train_3_number(:,:));
sum_train_4_number(k,:) = sum(train_4_number(:,:));
sum_train_5_number(k,:) = sum(train_5_number(:,:));
sum_train_6_number(k,:) = sum(train_6_number(:,:));

153

sum_train_7_number(k,:) = sum(train_7_number(:,:));
sum_train_8_number(k,:) = sum(train_8_number(:,:));
sum_train_9_number(k,:) = sum(train_9_number(:,:));
sum_train_10_number(k,:) = sum(train_10_number(:,:));
sum_train_11_number(k,:) = sum(train_11_number(:,:));
sum_train_12_number(k,:) = sum(train_12_number(:,:));
sum_train_13_number(k,:) = sum(train_13_number(:,:));
sum_train_14_number(k,:) = sum(train_14_number(:,:));
sum_train_15_number(k,:) = sum(train_15_number(:,:));
sum_train_16_number(k,:) = sum(train_16_number(:,:));
sum_train_17_number(k,:) = sum(train_17_number(:,:));
sum_train_18_number(k,:) = sum(train_18_number(:,:));
sum_train_19_number(k,:) = sum(train_19_number(:,:));
sum_train_20_number(k,:) = sum(train_20_number(:,:));
sum_train_21_number(k,:) = sum(train_21_number(:,:));
sum_train_22_number(k,:) = sum(train_22_number(:,:));
sum_train_23_number(k,:) = sum(train_23_number(:,:));
sum_train_24_number(k,:) = sum(train_24_number(:,:));
sum_train_25_number(k,:) = sum(train_25_number(:,:));
sum_train_26_number(k,:) = sum(train_26_number(:,:));
sum_train_27_number(k,:) = sum(train_27_number(:,:));
sum_train_28_number(k,:) = sum(train_28_number(:,:));
sum_train_29_number(k,:) = sum(train_29_number(:,:));
sum_train_30_number(k,:) = sum(train_30_number(:,:));
sum_train_31_number(k,:) = sum(train_31_number(:,:));
sum_train_32_number(k,:) = sum(train_32_number(:,:));
sum_train_33_number(k,:) = sum(train_33_number(:,:));
sum_train_34_number(k,:) = sum(train_34_number(:,:));
sum_train_35_number(k,:) = sum(train_35_number(:,:));
sum_train_36_number(k,:) = sum(train_36_number(:,:));
sum_train_37_number(k,:) = sum(train_37_number(:,:));
sum_train_38_number(k,:) = sum(train_38_number(:,:));
sum_train_39_number(k,:) = sum(train_39_number(:,:));
sum_train_40_number(k,:) = sum(train_40_number(:,:));
sum_train_41_number(k,:) = sum(train_41_number(:,:));
sum_total_3_number(k,:) = sum(total_3_number(:,:));
sum_correct_3_number(k,:) = sum(correct_3_number(:,:));
k_correct_3_rate(k,:) = sum_correct_3_number(k,:)/sum_total_3_number(k,:);
sum_total_4_number(k,:) = sum(total_4_number(:,:));
sum_correct_4_number(k,:) = sum(correct_4_number(:,:));
k_correct_4_rate(k,:) = sum_correct_4_number(k,:)/sum_total_4_number(k,:);
sum_total_5_number(k,:) = sum(total_5_number(:,:));
sum_correct_5_number(k,:) = sum(correct_5_number(:,:));
k_correct_5_rate(k,:) = sum_correct_5_number(k,:)/sum_total_5_number(k,:);
sum_total_6_number(k,:) = sum(total_6_number(:,:));
sum_correct_6_number(k,:) = sum(correct_6_number(:,:));
k_correct_6_rate(k,:) = sum_correct_6_number(k,:)/sum_total_6_number(k,:);
sum_total_7_number(k,:) = sum(total_7_number(:,:));
sum_correct_7_number(k,:) = sum(correct_7_number);
k_correct_7_rate(k,:) = sum_correct_7_number(k,:)/sum_total_7_number(k,:);
sum_total_8_number(k,:) = sum(total_8_number(:,:));
sum_correct_8_number(k,:) = sum(correct_8_number(:,:));
k_correct_8_rate(k,:) = sum_correct_8_number(k,:)/sum_total_8_number(k,:);
sum_total_9_number(k,:) = sum(total_9_number(:,:));
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sum_correct_9_number(k,:) = sum(correct_9_number(:,:));
k_correct_9_rate(k,:) = sum_correct_9_number(k,:)/sum_total_9_number(k,:);
sum_total_10_number(k,:) = sum(total_10_number(:,:));
sum_correct_10_number(k,:) = sum(correct_10_number(:,:));
k_correct_10_rate(k,:) = sum_correct_10_number(k,:)/sum_total_10_number(k,:);
sum_total_11_number(k,:) = sum(total_11_number(:,:));
sum_correct_11_number(k,:) = sum(correct_11_number(:,:));
k_correct_11_rate(k,:) = sum_correct_11_number(k,:)/sum_total_11_number(k,:);
sum_total_12_number(k,:) = sum(total_12_number(:,:));
sum_correct_12_number(k,:) = sum(correct_12_number(:,:));
k_correct_12_rate(k,:) = sum_correct_12_number(k,:)/sum_total_12_number(k,:);
sum_total_13_number(k,:) = sum(total_13_number(:,:));
sum_correct_13_number(k,:) = sum(correct_13_number(:,:));
k_correct_13_rate(k,:) = sum_correct_13_number(k,:)/sum_total_13_number(k,:);
sum_total_14_number(k,:) = sum(total_14_number(:,:));
sum_correct_14_number(k,:) = sum(correct_14_number(:,:));
k_correct_14_rate(k,:) = sum_correct_14_number(k,:)/sum_total_14_number(k,:);
sum_total_15_number(k,:) = sum(total_15_number(:,:));
sum_correct_15_number(k,:) = sum(correct_15_number(:,:));
k_correct_15_rate(k,:) = sum_correct_15_number(k,:)/sum_total_15_number(k,:);
sum_total_16_number(k,:) = sum(total_16_number(:,:));
sum_correct_16_number(k,:) = sum(correct_16_number(:,:));
k_correct_16_rate(k,:) = sum_correct_16_number(k,:)/sum_total_16_number(k,:);
sum_total_17_number(k,:) = sum(total_17_number(:,:));
sum_correct_17_number(k,:) = sum(correct_17_number(:,:));
k_correct_17_rate(k,:) = sum_correct_17_number(k,:)/sum_total_17_number(k,:);
sum_total_18_number(k,:) = sum(total_18_number(:,:));
sum_correct_18_number(k,:) = sum(correct_18_number(:,:));
k_correct_18_rate(k,:) = sum_correct_18_number(k,:)/sum_total_18_number(k,:);
sum_total_19_number(k,:) = sum(total_19_number(:,:));
sum_correct_19_number(k,:) = sum(correct_19_number(:,:));
k_correct_19_rate(k,:) = sum_correct_19_number(k,:)/sum_total_19_number(k,:);
sum_total_20_number(k,:) = sum(total_20_number(:,:));
sum_correct_20_number(k,:) = sum(correct_20_number(:,:));
k_correct_20_rate(k,:) = sum_correct_20_number(k,:)/sum_total_20_number(k,:);
sum_total_21_number(k,:) = sum(total_21_number(:,:));
sum_correct_21_number(k,:) = sum(correct_21_number(:,:));
k_correct_21_rate(k,:) = sum_correct_21_number(k,:)/sum_total_21_number(k,:);
sum_total_22_number(k,:) = sum(total_22_number(:,:));
sum_correct_22_number(k,:) = sum(correct_22_number(:,:));
k_correct_22_rate(k,:) = sum_correct_22_number(k,:)/sum_total_22_number(k,:);
sum_total_23_number(k,:) = sum(total_23_number(:,:));
sum_correct_23_number(k,:) = sum(correct_23_number(:,:));
k_correct_23_rate(k,:) = sum_correct_23_number(k,:)/sum_total_23_number(k,:);
sum_total_24_number(k,:) = sum(total_24_number(:,:));
sum_correct_24_number(k,:) = sum(correct_24_number(:,:));
k_correct_24_rate(k,:) = sum_correct_24_number(k,:)/sum_total_24_number(k,:);
sum_total_25_number(k,:) = sum(total_25_number(:,:));
sum_correct_25_number(k,:) = sum(correct_25_number(:,:));
k_correct_25_rate(k,:) = sum_correct_25_number(k,:)/sum_total_25_number(k,:);
sum_total_26_number(k,:) = sum(total_26_number(:,:));
sum_correct_26_number(k,:) = sum(correct_26_number(:,:));
k_correct_26_rate(k,:) = sum_correct_26_number(k,:)/sum_total_26_number(k,:);
sum_total_27_number(k,:) = sum(total_27_number(:,:));
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sum_correct_27_number(k,:) = sum(correct_27_number(:,:));
k_correct_27_rate(k,:) = sum_correct_27_number(k,:)/sum_total_27_number(k,:);
sum_total_28_number(k,:) = sum(total_28_number(:,:));
sum_correct_28_number(k,:) = sum(correct_28_number(:,:));
k_correct_28_rate(k,:) = sum_correct_28_number(k,:)/sum_total_28_number(k,:);
sum_total_29_number(k,:) = sum(total_29_number(:,:));
sum_correct_29_number(k,:) = sum(correct_29_number(:,:));
k_correct_29_rate(k,:) = sum_correct_29_number(k,:)/sum_total_29_number(k,:);
sum_total_30_number(k,:) = sum(total_30_number(:,:));
sum_correct_30_number(k,:) = sum(correct_30_number(:,:));
k_correct_30_rate(k,:) = sum_correct_30_number(k,:)/sum_total_30_number(k,:);
sum_total_31_number(k,:) = sum(total_31_number(:,:));
sum_correct_31_number(k,:) = sum(correct_31_number(:,:));
k_correct_31_rate(k,:) = sum_correct_31_number(k,:)/sum_total_31_number(k,:);
sum_total_32_number(k,:) = sum(total_32_number(:,:));
sum_correct_32_number(k,:) = sum(correct_32_number(:,:));
k_correct_32_rate(k,:) = sum_correct_32_number(k,:)/sum_total_32_number(k,:);
sum_total_33_number(k,:) = sum(total_33_number(:,:));
sum_correct_33_number(k,:) = sum(correct_33_number(:,:));
k_correct_33_rate(k,:) = sum_correct_33_number(k,:)/sum_total_33_number(k,:);
sum_total_34_number(k,:) = sum(total_34_number(:,:));
sum_correct_34_number(k,:) = sum(correct_34_number(:,:));
k_correct_34_rate(k,:) = sum_correct_34_number(k,:)/sum_total_34_number(k,:);
sum_total_35_number(k,:) = sum(total_35_number(:,:));
sum_correct_35_number(k,:) = sum(correct_35_number(:,:));
k_correct_35_rate(k,:) = sum_correct_35_number(k,:)/sum_total_35_number(k,:);
sum_total_36_number(k,:) = sum(total_36_number(:,:));
sum_correct_36_number(k,:) = sum(correct_36_number(:,:));
k_correct_36_rate(k,:) = sum_correct_36_number(k,:)/sum_total_36_number(k,:);
sum_total_37_number(k,:) = sum(total_37_number(:,:));
sum_correct_37_number(k,:) = sum(correct_37_number(:,:));
k_correct_37_rate(k,:) = sum_correct_37_number(k,:)/sum_total_37_number(k,:);
sum_total_38_number(k,:) = sum(total_38_number(:,:));
sum_correct_38_number(k,:) = sum(correct_38_number(:,:));
k_correct_38_rate(k,:) = sum_correct_38_number(k,:)/sum_total_38_number(k,:);
sum_total_39_number(k,:) = sum(total_39_number(:,:));
sum_correct_39_number(k,:) = sum(correct_39_number(:,:));
k_correct_39_rate(k,:) = sum_correct_39_number(k,:)/sum_total_39_number(k,:);
sum_total_40_number(k,:) = sum(total_40_number(:,:));
sum_correct_40_number(k,:) = sum(correct_40_number(:,:));
k_correct_40_rate(k,:) = sum_correct_40_number(k,:)/sum_total_40_number(k,:);
sum_total_41_number(k,:) = sum(total_41_number(:,:));
sum_correct_41_number(k,:) = sum(correct_41_number(:,:));
k_correct_41_rate(k,:) = sum_correct_41_number(k,:)/sum_total_41_number(k,:);
end % nn
final_train_3_number = sum(sum_train_3_number(:,:));
final_train_4_number = sum(sum_train_4_number(:,:));
final_train_5_number = sum(sum_train_5_number(:,:));
final_train_6_number = sum(sum_train_6_number(:,:));
final_train_7_number = sum(sum_train_7_number(:,:));
final_train_8_number = sum(sum_train_8_number(:,:));
final_train_9_number = sum(sum_train_9_number(:,:));
final_train_10_number = sum(sum_train_10_number(:,:));
final_train_11_number = sum(sum_train_11_number(:,:));
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final_train_12_number = sum(sum_train_12_number(:,:));
final_train_13_number = sum(sum_train_13_number(:,:));
final_train_14_number = sum(sum_train_14_number(:,:));
final_train_15_number = sum(sum_train_15_number(:,:));
final_train_16_number = sum(sum_train_16_number(:,:));
final_train_17_number = sum(sum_train_17_number(:,:));
final_train_18_number = sum(sum_train_18_number(:,:));
final_train_19_number = sum(sum_train_19_number(:,:));
final_train_20_number = sum(sum_train_20_number(:,:));
final_train_21_number = sum(sum_train_21_number(:,:));
final_train_22_number = sum(sum_train_22_number(:,:));
final_train_23_number = sum(sum_train_23_number(:,:));
final_train_24_number = sum(sum_train_24_number(:,:));
final_train_25_number = sum(sum_train_25_number(:,:));
final_train_26_number = sum(sum_train_26_number(:,:));
final_train_27_number = sum(sum_train_27_number(:,:));
final_train_28_number = sum(sum_train_28_number(:,:));
final_train_29_number = sum(sum_train_29_number(:,:));
final_train_30_number = sum(sum_train_30_number(:,:));
final_train_31_number = sum(sum_train_31_number(:,:));
final_train_32_number = sum(sum_train_32_number(:,:));
final_train_33_number = sum(sum_train_33_number(:,:));
final_train_34_number = sum(sum_train_34_number(:,:));
final_train_35_number = sum(sum_train_35_number(:,:));
final_train_36_number = sum(sum_train_36_number(:,:));
final_train_37_number = sum(sum_train_37_number(:,:));
final_train_38_number = sum(sum_train_38_number(:,:));
final_train_39_number = sum(sum_train_39_number(:,:));
final_train_40_number = sum(sum_train_40_number(:,:));
final_train_41_number = sum(sum_train_41_number(:,:));
final_total_3_number = sum(sum_total_3_number(:,:));
final_correct_3_number = sum(sum_correct_3_number(:,:));
final_correct_3_rate = final_correct_3_number./final_total_3_number;
final_total_4_number = sum(sum_total_4_number(:,:));
final_correct_4_number = sum(sum_correct_4_number(:,:));
final_correct_4_rate = final_correct_4_number./final_total_4_number;
final_total_5_number = sum(sum_total_5_number(:,:));
final_correct_5_number = sum(sum_correct_5_number(:,:));
final_correct_5_rate = final_correct_5_number./final_total_5_number;
final_total_6_number = sum(sum_total_6_number(:,:));
final_correct_6_number = sum(sum_correct_6_number(:,:));
final_correct_6_rate = final_correct_6_number./final_total_6_number;
final_total_7_number = sum(sum_total_7_number(:,:));
final_correct_7_number = sum(sum_correct_7_number(:,:));
final_correct_7_rate = final_correct_7_number./final_total_7_number;
final_total_8_number = sum(sum_total_8_number(:,:));
final_correct_8_number = sum(sum_correct_8_number(:,:));
final_correct_8_rate = final_correct_8_number./final_total_8_number;
final_total_9_number = sum(sum_total_9_number(:,:));
final_correct_9_number = sum(sum_correct_9_number(:,:));
final_correct_9_rate = final_correct_9_number./final_total_9_number;
final_total_10_number = sum(sum_total_10_number(:,:));
final_correct_10_number = sum(sum_correct_10_number(:,:));
final_correct_10_rate = final_correct_10_number./final_total_10_number;
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final_total_11_number = sum(sum_total_11_number(:,:));
final_correct_11_number = sum(sum_correct_11_number(:,:));
final_correct_11_rate = final_correct_11_number./final_total_11_number;
final_total_12_number = sum(sum_total_12_number(:,:));
final_correct_12_number = sum(sum_correct_12_number(:,:));
final_correct_12_rate = final_correct_12_number./final_total_12_number;
final_total_13_number = sum(sum_total_13_number(:,:));
final_correct_13_number = sum(sum_correct_13_number(:,:));
final_correct_13_rate = final_correct_13_number./final_total_13_number;
final_total_14_number = sum(sum_total_14_number(:,:));
final_correct_14_number = sum(sum_correct_14_number(:,:));
final_correct_14_rate = final_correct_14_number./final_total_14_number;
final_total_15_number = sum(sum_total_15_number(:,:));
final_correct_15_number = sum(sum_correct_15_number(:,:));
final_correct_15_rate = final_correct_15_number./final_total_15_number;
final_total_16_number = sum(sum_total_16_number(:,:));
final_correct_16_number = sum(sum_correct_16_number(:,:));
final_correct_16_rate = final_correct_16_number./final_total_16_number;
final_total_17_number = sum(sum_total_17_number(:,:));
final_correct_17_number = sum(sum_correct_17_number(:,:));
final_correct_17_rate = final_correct_17_number./final_total_17_number;
final_total_18_number = sum(sum_total_18_number(:,:));
final_correct_18_number = sum(sum_correct_18_number(:,:));
final_correct_18_rate = final_correct_18_number./final_total_18_number;
final_total_19_number = sum(sum_total_19_number(:,:));
final_correct_19_number = sum(sum_correct_19_number(:,:));
final_correct_19_rate = final_correct_19_number./final_total_19_number;
final_total_20_number = sum(sum_total_20_number(:,:));
final_correct_20_number = sum(sum_correct_20_number(:,:));
final_correct_20_rate = final_correct_20_number./final_total_20_number;
final_total_21_number = sum(sum_total_21_number(:,:));
final_correct_21_number = sum(sum_correct_21_number(:,:));
final_correct_21_rate = final_correct_21_number./final_total_21_number;
final_total_22_number = sum(sum_total_22_number(:,:));
final_correct_22_number = sum(sum_correct_22_number(:,:));
final_correct_22_rate = final_correct_22_number./final_total_22_number;
final_total_23_number = sum(sum_total_23_number(:,:));
final_correct_23_number = sum(sum_correct_23_number(:,:));
final_correct_23_rate = final_correct_23_number./final_total_23_number;
final_total_24_number = sum(sum_total_24_number(:,:));
final_correct_24_number = sum(sum_correct_24_number(:,:));
final_correct_24_rate = final_correct_24_number./final_total_24_number;
final_total_25_number = sum(sum_total_25_number(:,:));
final_correct_25_number = sum(sum_correct_25_number(:,:));
final_correct_25_rate = final_correct_25_number./final_total_25_number;
final_total_26_number = sum(sum_total_26_number(:,:));
final_correct_26_number = sum(sum_correct_26_number(:,:));
final_correct_26_rate = final_correct_26_number./final_total_26_number;
final_total_27_number = sum(sum_total_27_number(:,:));
final_correct_27_number = sum(sum_correct_27_number(:,:));
final_correct_27_rate = final_correct_27_number./final_total_27_number;
final_total_28_number = sum(sum_total_28_number(:,:));
final_correct_28_number = sum(sum_correct_28_number(:,:));
final_correct_28_rate = final_correct_28_number./final_total_28_number;
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final_total_29_number = sum(sum_total_29_number(:,:));
final_correct_29_number = sum(sum_correct_29_number(:,:));
final_correct_29_rate = final_correct_29_number./final_total_29_number;
final_total_30_number = sum(sum_total_30_number(:,:));
final_correct_30_number = sum(sum_correct_30_number(:,:));
final_correct_30_rate = final_correct_30_number./final_total_30_number;
final_total_31_number = sum(sum_total_31_number(:,:));
final_correct_31_number = sum(sum_correct_31_number(:,:));
final_correct_31_rate = final_correct_31_number./final_total_31_number;
final_total_32_number = sum(sum_total_32_number(:,:));
final_correct_32_number = sum(sum_correct_32_number(:,:));
final_correct_32_rate = final_correct_32_number./final_total_32_number;
final_total_33_number = sum(sum_total_33_number(:,:));
final_correct_33_number = sum(sum_correct_33_number(:,:));
final_correct_33_rate = final_correct_33_number./final_total_33_number;
final_total_34_number = sum(sum_total_34_number(:,:));
final_correct_34_number = sum(sum_correct_34_number(:,:));
final_correct_34_rate = final_correct_34_number./final_total_34_number;
final_total_35_number = sum(sum_total_35_number(:,:));
final_correct_35_number = sum(sum_correct_35_number(:,:));
final_correct_35_rate = final_correct_35_number./final_total_35_number;
final_total_36_number = sum(sum_total_36_number(:,:));
final_correct_36_number = sum(sum_correct_36_number(:,:));
final_correct_36_rate = final_correct_36_number./final_total_36_number;
final_total_37_number = sum(sum_total_37_number(:,:));
final_correct_37_number = sum(sum_correct_37_number(:,:));
final_correct_37_rate = final_correct_37_number./final_total_37_number;
final_total_38_number = sum(sum_total_38_number(:,:));
final_correct_38_number = sum(sum_correct_38_number(:,:));
final_correct_38_rate = final_correct_38_number./final_total_38_number;
final_total_39_number = sum(sum_total_39_number(:,:));
final_correct_39_number = sum(sum_correct_39_number(:,:));
final_correct_39_rate = final_correct_39_number./final_total_39_number;
final_total_40_number = sum(sum_total_40_number(:,:));
final_correct_40_number = sum(sum_correct_40_number(:,:));
final_correct_40_rate = final_correct_40_number./final_total_40_number;
final_total_41_number = sum(sum_total_41_number(:,:));
final_correct_41_number = sum(sum_correct_41_number(:,:));
final_correct_41_rate = final_correct_41_number./final_total_41_number;
% write statistics of ATTACK to a file
fid = fopen('d:\attack.txt','w');
fprintf(fid,'Number of attacks in training set\n');
fprintf(fid,'Number of attacks in testing set\n');
fprintf(fid,'Number of attacks be correctly detected\n');
fprintf(fid,'Detection rates\n');
fprintf(fid,'\nDOS\n\n');
fprintf(fid,'3\n');
fprintf(fid,'%d\t',final_total_3_number); fprintf(fid,'\n');
fprintf(fid,'%d\t',final_correct_3_number); fprintf(fid,'\n');
fprintf(fid,'%.2f\t',final_correct_3_rate); fprintf(fid,'\n');
fprintf(fid,'9\n');
fprintf(fid,'%d\t',final_total_9_number); fprintf(fid,'\n');
fprintf(fid,'%d\t',final_correct_9_number); fprintf(fid,'\n');
fprintf(fid,'%.2f\t',final_correct_9_rate); fprintf(fid,'\n');
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fprintf(fid,'12\n');
fprintf(fid,'%d\t',final_total_12_number); fprintf(fid,'\n');
fprintf(fid,'%d\t',final_correct_12_number); fprintf(fid,'\n');
fprintf(fid,'%.2f\t',final_correct_12_rate); fprintf(fid,'\n');
fprintf(fid,'16\n');
fprintf(fid,'%d\t',final_total_16_number); fprintf(fid,'\n');
fprintf(fid,'%d\t',final_correct_16_number); fprintf(fid,'\n');
fprintf(fid,'%.2f\t',final_correct_16_rate); fprintf(fid,'\n');
fprintf(fid,'20\n');
fprintf(fid,'%d\t',final_total_20_number); fprintf(fid,'\n');
fprintf(fid,'%d\t',final_correct_20_number); fprintf(fid,'\n');
fprintf(fid,'%.2f\t',final_correct_20_rate); fprintf(fid,'\n');
fprintf(fid,'25\n');
fprintf(fid,'%d\t',final_total_25_number); fprintf(fid,'\n');
fprintf(fid,'%d\t',final_correct_25_number); fprintf(fid,'\n');
fprintf(fid,'%.2f\t',final_correct_25_rate); fprintf(fid,'\n');
fprintf(fid,'27\n');
fprintf(fid,'%d\t',final_total_27_number); fprintf(fid,'\n');
fprintf(fid,'%d\t',final_correct_27_number); fprintf(fid,'\n');
fprintf(fid,'%.2f\t',final_correct_27_rate); fprintf(fid,'\n');
fprintf(fid,'30\n');
fprintf(fid,'%d\t',final_total_30_number); fprintf(fid,'\n');
fprintf(fid,'%d\t',final_correct_30_number); fprintf(fid,'\n');
fprintf(fid,'%.2f\t',final_correct_30_rate); fprintf(fid,'\n');
fprintf(fid,'37\n');
fprintf(fid,'%d\t',final_total_37_number); fprintf(fid,'\n');
fprintf(fid,'%d\t',final_correct_37_number); fprintf(fid,'\n');
fprintf(fid,'%.2f\t',final_correct_37_rate); fprintf(fid,'\n');
fprintf(fid,'\nPROBE\n\n');
fprintf(fid,'8\n');
fprintf(fid,'%d\t',final_total_8_number); fprintf(fid,'\n');
fprintf(fid,'%d\t',final_correct_8_number); fprintf(fid,'\n');
fprintf(fid,'%.2f\t',final_correct_8_rate); fprintf(fid,'\n');
fprintf(fid,'13\n');
fprintf(fid,'%d\t',final_total_13_number); fprintf(fid,'\n');
fprintf(fid,'%d\t',final_correct_13_number); fprintf(fid,'\n');
fprintf(fid,'%.2f\t',final_correct_13_rate); fprintf(fid,'\n');
fprintf(fid,'17\n');
fprintf(fid,'%d\t',final_total_17_number); fprintf(fid,'\n');
fprintf(fid,'%d\t',final_correct_17_number); fprintf(fid,'\n');
fprintf(fid,'%.2f\t',final_correct_17_rate); fprintf(fid,'\n');
fprintf(fid,'19\n');
fprintf(fid,'%d\t',final_total_19_number); fprintf(fid,'\n');
fprintf(fid,'%d\t',final_correct_19_number); fprintf(fid,'\n');
fprintf(fid,'%.2f\t',final_correct_19_rate); fprintf(fid,'\n');
fprintf(fid,'28\n');
fprintf(fid,'%d\t',final_total_28_number); fprintf(fid,'\n');
fprintf(fid,'%d\t',final_correct_28_number); fprintf(fid,'\n');
fprintf(fid,'%.2f\t',final_correct_28_rate); fprintf(fid,'\n');
fprintf(fid,'32\n');
fprintf(fid,'%d\t',final_total_32_number); fprintf(fid,'\n');
fprintf(fid,'%d\t',final_correct_32_number); fprintf(fid,'\n');
fprintf(fid,'%.2f\t',final_correct_32_rate); fprintf(fid,'\n');
fprintf(fid,'\nR2L\n\n');
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fprintf(fid,'5\n');
fprintf(fid,'%d\t',final_total_5_number); fprintf(fid,'\n');
fprintf(fid,'%d\t',final_correct_5_number); fprintf(fid,'\n');
fprintf(fid,'%.2f\t',final_correct_5_rate); fprintf(fid,'\n');
fprintf(fid,'6\n');
fprintf(fid,'%d\t',final_total_6_number); fprintf(fid,'\n');
fprintf(fid,'%d\t',final_correct_6_number); fprintf(fid,'\n');
fprintf(fid,'%.2f\t',final_correct_6_rate); fprintf(fid,'\n');
fprintf(fid,'7\n');
fprintf(fid,'%d\t',final_total_7_number); fprintf(fid,'\n');
fprintf(fid,'%d\t',final_correct_7_number); fprintf(fid,'\n');
fprintf(fid,'%.2f\t',final_correct_7_rate); fprintf(fid,'\n');
fprintf(fid,'11\n');
fprintf(fid,'%d\t',final_total_11_number); fprintf(fid,'\n');
fprintf(fid,'%d\t',final_correct_11_number); fprintf(fid,'\n');
fprintf(fid,'%.2f\t',final_correct_11_rate); fprintf(fid,'\n');
fprintf(fid,'15\n');
fprintf(fid,'%d\t',final_total_15_number); fprintf(fid,'\n');
fprintf(fid,'%d\t',final_correct_15_number); fprintf(fid,'\n');
fprintf(fid,'%.2f\t',final_correct_15_rate); fprintf(fid,'\n');
fprintf(fid,'21\n');
fprintf(fid,'%d\t',final_total_21_number); fprintf(fid,'\n');
fprintf(fid,'%d\t',final_correct_21_number); fprintf(fid,'\n');
fprintf(fid,'%.2f\t',final_correct_21_rate); fprintf(fid,'\n');
fprintf(fid,'23\n');
fprintf(fid,'%d\t',final_total_23_number); fprintf(fid,'\n');
fprintf(fid,'%d\t',final_correct_23_number); fprintf(fid,'\n');
fprintf(fid,'%.2f\t',final_correct_23_rate); fprintf(fid,'\n');
fprintf(fid,'24\n');
fprintf(fid,'%d\t',final_total_24_number); fprintf(fid,'\n');
fprintf(fid,'%d\t',final_correct_24_number); fprintf(fid,'\n');
fprintf(fid,'%.2f\t',final_correct_24_rate); fprintf(fid,'\n');
fprintf(fid,'29\n');
fprintf(fid,'%d\t',final_total_29_number); fprintf(fid,'\n');
fprintf(fid,'%d\t',final_correct_29_number); fprintf(fid,'\n');
fprintf(fid,'%.2f\t',final_correct_29_rate); fprintf(fid,'\n');
fprintf(fid,'33\n');
fprintf(fid,'%d\t',final_total_33_number); fprintf(fid,'\n');
fprintf(fid,'%d\t',final_correct_33_number); fprintf(fid,'\n');
fprintf(fid,'%.2f\t',final_correct_33_rate); fprintf(fid,'\n');
fprintf(fid,'34\n');
fprintf(fid,'%d\t',final_total_34_number); fprintf(fid,'\n');
fprintf(fid,'%d\t',final_correct_34_number); fprintf(fid,'\n');
fprintf(fid,'%.2f\t',final_correct_34_rate); fprintf(fid,'\n');
fprintf(fid,'35\n');
fprintf(fid,'%d\t',final_total_35_number); fprintf(fid,'\n');
fprintf(fid,'%d\t',final_correct_35_number); fprintf(fid,'\n');
fprintf(fid,'%.2f\t',final_correct_35_rate); fprintf(fid,'\n');
fprintf(fid,'38\n');
fprintf(fid,'%d\t',final_total_38_number); fprintf(fid,'\n');
fprintf(fid,'%d\t',final_correct_38_number); fprintf(fid,'\n');
fprintf(fid,'%.2f\t',final_correct_38_rate); fprintf(fid,'\n');
fprintf(fid,'39\n');
fprintf(fid,'%d\t',final_total_39_number); fprintf(fid,'\n');
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fprintf(fid,'%d\t',final_correct_39_number); fprintf(fid,'\n');
fprintf(fid,'%.2f\t',final_correct_39_rate); fprintf(fid,'\n');
fprintf(fid,'40\n');
fprintf(fid,'%d\t',final_total_40_number); fprintf(fid,'\n');
fprintf(fid,'%d\t',final_correct_40_number); fprintf(fid,'\n');
fprintf(fid,'%.2f\t',final_correct_40_rate); fprintf(fid,'\n');
fprintf(fid,'\nU2R\n\n');
fprintf(fid,'4\n');
fprintf(fid,'%d\t',final_total_4_number); fprintf(fid,'\n');
fprintf(fid,'%d\t',final_correct_4_number); fprintf(fid,'\n');
fprintf(fid,'%.2f\t',final_correct_4_rate); fprintf(fid,'\n');
fprintf(fid,'10\n');
fprintf(fid,'%d\t',final_total_10_number); fprintf(fid,'\n');
fprintf(fid,'%d\t',final_correct_10_number); fprintf(fid,'\n');
fprintf(fid,'%.2f\t',final_correct_10_rate); fprintf(fid,'\n');
fprintf(fid,'14\n');
fprintf(fid,'%d\t',final_total_14_number); fprintf(fid,'\n');
fprintf(fid,'%d\t',final_correct_14_number); fprintf(fid,'\n');
fprintf(fid,'%.2f\t',final_correct_14_rate); fprintf(fid,'\n');
fprintf(fid,'18\n');
fprintf(fid,'%d\t',final_total_18_number); fprintf(fid,'\n');
fprintf(fid,'%d\t',final_correct_18_number); fprintf(fid,'\n');
fprintf(fid,'%.2f\t',final_correct_18_rate); fprintf(fid,'\n');
fprintf(fid,'22\n');
fprintf(fid,'%d\t',final_total_22_number); fprintf(fid,'\n');
fprintf(fid,'%d\t',final_correct_22_number); fprintf(fid,'\n');
fprintf(fid,'%.2f\t',final_correct_22_rate); fprintf(fid,'\n');
fprintf(fid,'26\n');
fprintf(fid,'%d\t',final_total_26_number); fprintf(fid,'\n');
fprintf(fid,'%d\t',final_correct_26_number); fprintf(fid,'\n');
fprintf(fid,'%.2f\t',final_correct_26_rate); fprintf(fid,'\n');
fprintf(fid,'31\n');
fprintf(fid,'%d\t',final_total_31_number); fprintf(fid,'\n');
fprintf(fid,'%d\t',final_correct_31_number); fprintf(fid,'\n');
fprintf(fid,'%.2f\t',final_correct_31_rate); fprintf(fid,'\n');
fprintf(fid,'36\n');
fprintf(fid,'%d\t',final_total_36_number); fprintf(fid,'\n');
fprintf(fid,'%d\t',final_correct_36_number); fprintf(fid,'\n');
fprintf(fid,'%.2f\t',final_correct_36_rate); fprintf(fid,'\n');
fprintf(fid,'41\n');
fprintf(fid,'%d\t',final_total_41_number); fprintf(fid,'\n');
fprintf(fid,'%d\t',final_correct_41_number); fprintf(fid,'\n');
fprintf(fid,'%.2f\t',final_correct_41_rate); fprintf(fid,'\n');
fclose(fid);
% write COMPUTATION TIME to a file
% TIME
fid = fopen('d:\time.txt','w');
fprintf(fid,'KNN');
fprintf(fid,'\nknn_a\t');
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',time_average_knn_a);
fprintf(fid,'\nknn_b\t');
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',time_average_knn_b);
fprintf(fid,'\nknn_c\t');
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',time_average_knn_c);
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fprintf(fid,'\nknn_d\t');
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',time_average_knn_d);
fprintf(fid,'\nknn_e\t');
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',time_average_knn_e);
fprintf(fid,'\nknn_f\t');
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',time_average_knn_f);
fprintf(fid,'\nknn_g\t');
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',time_average_knn_g);
fprintf(fid,'\n\nFKNN');
fprintf(fid,'\nfknn_a\t');
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',time_average_fknn_a);
fprintf(fid,'\nfknn_b\t');
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',time_average_fknn_b);
fprintf(fid,'\nfknn_c\t');
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',time_average_fknn_c);
fprintf(fid,'\nfknn_d\t');
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',time_average_fknn_d);
fprintf(fid,'\nfknn_e\t');
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',time_average_fknn_e);
fprintf(fid,'\nfknn_f\t');
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',time_average_fknn_f);
fprintf(fid,'\nfknn_g\t');
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',time_average_fknn_g);
fprintf(fid,'\n\nETKNN');
fprintf(fid,'\netknn_a\t');
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',time_average_etknn_a);
fprintf(fid,'\netknn_b\t');
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',time_average_etknn_b);
fprintf(fid,'\netknn_c\t');
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',time_average_etknn_c);
fprintf(fid,'\netknn_d\t');
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',time_average_etknn_d);
fprintf(fid,'\netknn_e\t');
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',time_average_etknn_e);
fprintf(fid,'\netknn_f\t');
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',time_average_etknn_f);
fprintf(fid,'\netknn_g\t');
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',time_average_etknn_g);
fprintf(fid,'\n\nMYKNN');
fprintf(fid,'\nmyknn_a\t');
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',time_average_myknn_a);
fprintf(fid,'\nmyknn_b\t');
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',time_average_myknn_b);
fprintf(fid,'\nmyknn_c\t');
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',time_average_myknn_c);
fprintf(fid,'\nmyknn_d\t');
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',time_average_myknn_d);
fprintf(fid,'\nmyknn_e\t');
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',time_average_myknn_e);
fprintf(fid,'\nmyknn_f\t');
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',time_average_myknn_f);
fprintf(fid,'\nmyknn_g\t');
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',time_average_myknn_g);
fprintf(fid,'\n\nMYKNN-W');
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fprintf(fid,'\nmyknn_a_w\t');
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',time_average_myknn_a_w);
fprintf(fid,'\nmyknn_b_w\t');
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',time_average_myknn_b_w);
fprintf(fid,'\nmyknn_c_w\t');
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',time_average_myknn_c_w);
fprintf(fid,'\nmyknn_d_w\t');
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',time_average_myknn_d_w);
fprintf(fid,'\n\nENSEMBLE');
fprintf(fid,'\nt_ensemble_bayes\t');
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',time_average_ensemble_bayes);
fprintf(fid,'\n\nTREE');
fprintf(fid,'\nt_tree\t');
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',time_average_tree);
fclose(fid);
% write CLASSIFICATION RATE to a file
fid = fopen('d:\result.txt','w');
fprintf(fid,'KNN');
fprintf(fid,'\nknn_average_normal_rate_a\t');
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',knn_average_normal_rate_a);
fprintf(fid,'\nknn_average_normal_rate_b\t');
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',knn_average_normal_rate_b);
fprintf(fid,'\nknn_average_normal_rate_c\t');
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',knn_average_normal_rate_c);
fprintf(fid,'\nknn_average_normal_rate_d\t');
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',knn_average_normal_rate_d);
fprintf(fid,'\nknn_average_normal_rate_e\t');
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',knn_average_normal_rate_e);
fprintf(fid,'\nknn_average_normal_rate_f\t');
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',knn_average_normal_rate_f);
fprintf(fid,'\nknn_average_normal_rate_g\t');
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',knn_average_normal_rate_g);
fprintf(fid,'\n');
fprintf(fid,'\nknn_average_attack_rate_a\t');
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',knn_average_attack_rate_a);
fprintf(fid,'\nknn_average_attack_rate_b\t');
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',knn_average_attack_rate_b);
fprintf(fid,'\nknn_average_attack_rate_c\t');
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',knn_average_attack_rate_c);
fprintf(fid,'\nknn_average_attack_rate_d\t');
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',knn_average_attack_rate_d);
fprintf(fid,'\nknn_average_attack_rate_e\t');
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',knn_average_attack_rate_e);
fprintf(fid,'\nknn_average_attack_rate_f\t');
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',knn_average_attack_rate_f);
fprintf(fid,'\nknn_average_attack_rate_g\t');
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',knn_average_attack_rate_g);
fprintf(fid,'\n');
fprintf(fid,'\nknn_average_rate_a\t');
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',knn_average_rate_a);
fprintf(fid,'\nknn_average_rate_b\t');
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',knn_average_rate_b);
fprintf(fid,'\nknn_average_rate_c\t');
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',knn_average_rate_c);
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fprintf(fid,'\nknn_average_rate_d\t');
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',knn_average_rate_d);
fprintf(fid,'\nknn_average_rate_e\t');
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',knn_average_rate_e);
fprintf(fid,'\nknn_average_rate_f\t');
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',knn_average_rate_f);
fprintf(fid,'\nknn_average_rate_g\t');
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',knn_average_rate_g);
fprintf(fid,'\n\nFKNN');
fprintf(fid,'\nfknn_average_normal_rate_a\t');
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',fknn_average_normal_rate_a);
fprintf(fid,'\nfknn_average_normal_rate_b\t');
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',fknn_average_normal_rate_b);
fprintf(fid,'\nfknn_average_normal_rate_c\t');
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',fknn_average_normal_rate_c);
fprintf(fid,'\nfknn_average_normal_rate_d\t');
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',fknn_average_normal_rate_d);
fprintf(fid,'\nfknn_average_normal_rate_e\t');
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',fknn_average_normal_rate_e);
fprintf(fid,'\nfknn_average_normal_rate_f\t');
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',fknn_average_normal_rate_f);
fprintf(fid,'\nfknn_average_normal_rate_g\t');
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',fknn_average_normal_rate_g);
fprintf(fid,'\n');
fprintf(fid,'\nfknn_average_attack_rate_a\t');
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',fknn_average_attack_rate_a);
fprintf(fid,'\nfknn_average_attack_rate_b\t');
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',fknn_average_attack_rate_b);
fprintf(fid,'\nfknn_average_attack_rate_c\t');
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',fknn_average_attack_rate_c);
fprintf(fid,'\nfknn_average_attack_rate_d\t');
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',fknn_average_attack_rate_d);
fprintf(fid,'\nfknn_average_attack_rate_e\t');
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',fknn_average_attack_rate_e);
fprintf(fid,'\nfknn_average_attack_rate_f\t');
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',fknn_average_attack_rate_e);
fprintf(fid,'\nfknn_average_attack_rate_g\t');
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',fknn_average_attack_rate_g);
fprintf(fid,'\n');
fprintf(fid,'\nfknn_average_rate_a\t');
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',fknn_average_rate_a);
fprintf(fid,'\nfknn_average_rate_b\t');
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',fknn_average_rate_b);
fprintf(fid,'\nfknn_average_rate_c\t');
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',fknn_average_rate_c);
fprintf(fid,'\nfknn_average_rate_d\t');
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',fknn_average_rate_d);
fprintf(fid,'\nfknn_average_rate_e\t');
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',fknn_average_rate_e);
fprintf(fid,'\nfknn_average_rate_f\t');
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',fknn_average_rate_f);
fprintf(fid,'\nfknn_average_rate_g\t');
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',fknn_average_rate_g);
fprintf(fid,'\n\nETKNN');
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fprintf(fid,'\netknn_average_normal_rate_a\t');
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',etknn_average_normal_rate_a);
fprintf(fid,'\netknn_average_normal_rate_b\t');
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',etknn_average_normal_rate_b);
fprintf(fid,'\netknn_average_normal_rate_c\t');
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',etknn_average_normal_rate_c);
fprintf(fid,'\netknn_average_normal_rate_d\t');
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',etknn_average_normal_rate_d);
fprintf(fid,'\netknn_average_normal_rate_e\t');
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',etknn_average_normal_rate_e);
fprintf(fid,'\netknn_average_normal_rate_f\t');
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',etknn_average_normal_rate_f);
fprintf(fid,'\netknn_average_normal_rate_g\t');
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',etknn_average_normal_rate_g);
fprintf(fid,'\n');
fprintf(fid,'\netknn_average_attack_rate_a\t');
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',etknn_average_attack_rate_a);
fprintf(fid,'\netknn_average_attack_rate_b\t');
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',etknn_average_attack_rate_b);
fprintf(fid,'\netknn_average_attack_rate_c\t');
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',etknn_average_attack_rate_c);
fprintf(fid,'\netknn_average_attack_rate_d\t');
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',etknn_average_attack_rate_d);
fprintf(fid,'\netknn_average_attack_rate_e\t');
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',etknn_average_attack_rate_e);
fprintf(fid,'\netknn_average_attack_rate_f\t');
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',etknn_average_attack_rate_f);
fprintf(fid,'\netknn_average_attack_rate_g\t');
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',etknn_average_attack_rate_g);
fprintf(fid,'\n');
fprintf(fid,'\netknn_average_rate_a\t');
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',etknn_average_rate_a);
fprintf(fid,'\netknn_average_rate_b\t');
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',etknn_average_rate_b);
fprintf(fid,'\netknn_average_rate_c\t');
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',etknn_average_rate_c);
fprintf(fid,'\netknn_average_rate_d\t');
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',etknn_average_rate_d);
fprintf(fid,'\netknn_average_rate_e\t');
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',etknn_average_rate_e);
fprintf(fid,'\netknn_average_rate_f\t');
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',etknn_average_rate_f);
fprintf(fid,'\netknn_average_rate_g\t');
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',etknn_average_rate_g);
fprintf(fid,'\n\nMYKNN');
fprintf(fid,'\nmyknn_average_normal_rate_a\t');
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',myknn_average_normal_rate_a);
fprintf(fid,'\nmyknn_average_normal_rate_b\t');
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',myknn_average_normal_rate_b);
fprintf(fid,'\nmyknn_average_normal_rate_c\t');
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',myknn_average_normal_rate_c);
fprintf(fid,'\nmyknn_average_normal_rate_d\t');
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',myknn_average_normal_rate_d);
fprintf(fid,'\nmyknn_average_normal_rate_e\t');
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fprintf(fid,'%f\t',myknn_average_normal_rate_e);
fprintf(fid,'\nmyknn_average_normal_rate_f\t');
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',myknn_average_normal_rate_f);
fprintf(fid,'\nmyknn_average_normal_rate_g\t');
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',myknn_average_normal_rate_g);
fprintf(fid,'\n');
fprintf(fid,'\nmyknn_average_attack_rate_a\t');
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',myknn_average_attack_rate_a);
fprintf(fid,'\nmyknn_average_attack_rate_b\t');
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',myknn_average_attack_rate_b);
fprintf(fid,'\nmyknn_average_attack_rate_c\t');
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',myknn_average_attack_rate_c);
fprintf(fid,'\nmyknn_average_attack_rate_d\t');
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',myknn_average_attack_rate_d);
fprintf(fid,'\nmyknn_average_attack_rate_e\t');
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',myknn_average_attack_rate_e);
fprintf(fid,'\nmyknn_average_attack_rate_f\t');
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',myknn_average_attack_rate_f);
fprintf(fid,'\nmyknn_average_attack_rate_g\t');
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',myknn_average_attack_rate_g);
fprintf(fid,'\n');
fprintf(fid,'\nmyknn_average_rate_a\t');
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',myknn_average_rate_a);
fprintf(fid,'\nmyknn_average_rate_b\t');
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',myknn_average_rate_b);
fprintf(fid,'\nmyknn_average_rate_c\t');
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',myknn_average_rate_c);
fprintf(fid,'\nmyknn_average_rate_d\t');
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',myknn_average_rate_d);
fprintf(fid,'\nmyknn_average_rate_e\t');
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',myknn_average_rate_e);
fprintf(fid,'\nmyknn_average_rate_f\t');
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',myknn_average_rate_f);
fprintf(fid,'\nmyknn_average_rate_g\t');
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',myknn_average_rate_g);
fprintf(fid,'\n\nMYKNN-W');
fprintf(fid,'\nmyknn_average_normal_rate_a_w\t');
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',myknn_average_normal_rate_a_w);
fprintf(fid,'\nmyknn_average_normal_rate_b_w\t');
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',myknn_average_normal_rate_b_w);
fprintf(fid,'\nmyknn_average_normal_rate_c_w\t');
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',myknn_average_normal_rate_c_w);
fprintf(fid,'\nmyknn_average_normal_rate_d_w\t');
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',myknn_average_normal_rate_d_w);
fprintf(fid,'\n');
fprintf(fid,'\nmyknn_average_attack_rate_a_w\t');
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',myknn_average_attack_rate_a_w);
fprintf(fid,'\nmyknn_average_attack_rate_b_w\t');
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',myknn_average_attack_rate_b_w);
fprintf(fid,'\nmyknn_average_attack_rate_c_w\t');
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',myknn_average_attack_rate_c_w);
fprintf(fid,'\nmyknn_average_attack_rate_d_w\t');
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',myknn_average_attack_rate_d_w);
fprintf(fid,'\n');
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fprintf(fid,'\nmyknn_average_rate_a_w\t');
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',myknn_average_rate_a_w);
fprintf(fid,'\nmyknn_average_rate_b_w\t');
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',myknn_average_rate_b_w);
fprintf(fid,'\nmyknn_average_rate_c_w\t');
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',myknn_average_rate_c_w);
fprintf(fid,'\nmyknn_average_rate_d_w\t');
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',myknn_average_rate_d_w);
fprintf(fid,'\n\nENSEMBLE');
fprintf(fid,'\nensemble_average_normal_rate_m\t');
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',ensemble_average_normal_rate_m);
fprintf(fid,'\nensemble_average_normal_rate_mv\t');
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',ensemble_average_normal_rate_mv);
fprintf(fid,'\nensemble_average_normal_rate_bayes\t');
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',ensemble_average_normal_rate_bayes);
fprintf(fid,'\n');
fprintf(fid,'\nensemble_average_attack_rate_m\t');
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',ensemble_average_attack_rate_m);
fprintf(fid,'\nensemble_average_attack_rate_mv\t');
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',ensemble_average_attack_rate_mv);
fprintf(fid,'\nensemble_average_attack_rate_bayes\t');
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',ensemble_average_attack_rate_bayes);
fprintf(fid,'\n');
fprintf(fid,'\nensemble_average_rate_m\t');
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',ensemble_average_rate_m);
fprintf(fid,'\nensemble_average_rate_mv\t');
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',ensemble_average_rate_mv);
fprintf(fid,'\nensemble_average_rate_bayes\t');
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',ensemble_average_rate_bayes);
fprintf(fid,'\n\nTREE');
fprintf(fid,'\nmyknn_average_normal_rate_a_tree\t');
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',myknn_average_normal_rate_a_tree);
fprintf(fid,'\nmyknn_average_normal_rate_b_tree\t');
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',myknn_average_normal_rate_b_tree);
fprintf(fid,'\nmyknn_average_normal_rate_c_tree\t');
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',myknn_average_normal_rate_c_tree);
fprintf(fid,'\nmyknn_average_normal_rate_d_tree\t');
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',myknn_average_normal_rate_d_tree);
fprintf(fid,'\nmyknn_average_normal_rate_e_tree\t');
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',myknn_average_normal_rate_e_tree);
fprintf(fid,'\nmyknn_average_normal_rate_f_tree\t');
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',myknn_average_normal_rate_f_tree);
fprintf(fid,'\nmyknn_average_normal_rate_g_tree\t');
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',myknn_average_normal_rate_g_tree);
fprintf(fid,'\n');
fprintf(fid,'\nmyknn_average_attack_rate_a_tree\t');
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',myknn_average_attack_rate_a_tree);
fprintf(fid,'\nmyknn_average_attack_rate_b_tree\t');
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',myknn_average_attack_rate_b_tree);
fprintf(fid,'\nmyknn_average_attack_rate_c_tree\t');
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',myknn_average_attack_rate_c_tree);
fprintf(fid,'\nmyknn_average_attack_rate_d_tree\t');
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',myknn_average_attack_rate_d_tree);
fprintf(fid,'\nmyknn_average_attack_rate_e_tree\t');
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fprintf(fid,'%f\t',myknn_average_attack_rate_e_tree);
fprintf(fid,'\nmyknn_average_attack_rate_f_tree\t');
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',myknn_average_attack_rate_f_tree);
fprintf(fid,'\nmyknn_average_attack_rate_g_tree\t');
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',myknn_average_attack_rate_g_tree);
fprintf(fid,'\n');
fprintf(fid,'\nmyknn_average_rate_a_tree\t');
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',myknn_average_rate_a_tree);
fprintf(fid,'\nmyknn_average_rate_b_tree\t');
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',myknn_average_rate_b_tree);
fprintf(fid,'\nmyknn_average_rate_c_tree\t');
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',myknn_average_rate_c_tree);
fprintf(fid,'\nmyknn_average_rate_d_tree\t');
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',myknn_average_rate_d_tree);
fprintf(fid,'\nmyknn_average_rate_e_tree\t');
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',myknn_average_rate_e_tree);
fprintf(fid,'\nmyknn_average_rate_f_tree\t');
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',myknn_average_rate_f_tree);
fprintf(fid,'\nmyknn_average_rate_g_tree\t');
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',myknn_average_rate_g_tree);
fprintf(fid,'\n\nTREE + ENSEMBLE');
fprintf(fid,'\nensemble_average_normal_rate_tree_m\t');
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',ensemble_average_normal_rate_tree_m);
fprintf(fid,'\nensemble_average_normal_rate_tree_mv\t');
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',ensemble_average_normal_rate_tree_mv);
fprintf(fid,'\nensemble_average_normal_rate_tree_bayes\t');
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',ensemble_average_normal_rate_tree_bayes);
fprintf(fid,'\n');
fprintf(fid,'\nensemble_average_attack_rate_tree_m\t');
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',ensemble_average_attack_rate_tree_m);
fprintf(fid,'\nensemble_average_attack_rate_tree_mv\t');
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',ensemble_average_attack_rate_tree_mv);
fprintf(fid,'\nensemble_average_attack_rate_tree_bayes\t');
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',ensemble_average_attack_rate_tree_bayes);
fprintf(fid,'\n');
fprintf(fid,'\nensemble_average_rate_tree_m\t');
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',ensemble_average_rate_tree_m);
fprintf(fid,'\nensemble_average_rate_tree_mv\t');
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',ensemble_average_rate_tree_mv);
fprintf(fid,'\nensemble_average_rate_tree_bayes\t');
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',ensemble_average_rate_tree_bayes);
fclose(fid);
fprintf('\nDONE\n\n');
beep;
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